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CASE COMMENTS
DAMAGES-POWER OF COURT TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO AVOID NEW
TRIAL BY PAYING PLAINTIFF MoRE THAN INADEQUATE DAMAGES
VERDICT. [California]
The practice of remittitur, under which courts have power to refuse
defendant's request for a new trial on grounds of excessiveness of
damages awarded if plaintiff will consent to waive a part of the award
which the court regards as excessive,' has long been regarded as an
established part of American law,2 as used both in trial courts3 and
appellate courts.4 Except in a very few jurisdictions, 5 the remittitur
power does not authorize the court to decrease damage awards over
plaintiff's protest or without plaintiff's knowledge. 6 The argument
has been raised that remittitur amounts to a denial of defendant's
right to trial by jury, in that he is not allowed to have a second trial
in which a jury can determine the proper amount of damages.7 How-
'See Holbrook v. J. J. Quinlan & Co., 84 Vt. 411, 8o At. 339 at 342 (1911) for an
excellent explanation of the origin and meaning of remittitur; McCormick, Damages
(1935) § ig; Note (ig,94) 44 Yale L. J. 318; 39 Am. Jur., New Trial § 210.
2Remittitur is approximately as old as new trials for excessive damages, Justice
Story having recognized remittitur as a substitute for a new trial as early as 1822 in
Blunt v. Little, the same case in which he observed that the practice of granting
of new trials on the ground of excessive damages had only recently become estab-
lished. Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason 102, 3 Fed. Cas. 76o (1822).
3Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co., Ltd. v. Mann, i3o U. S. 69, 9 S. Ct. 458, 32
L. ed. 854 (1889); Davis v. Southern Pac. Co., 98 Cal. 13, 32 Pac. 646 (1893); Duaine
v. Gulf Refining Co., 285 Pa. 81, 131 At. 654 (1926) (practice of remittitur is to be
encouraged); 25 C. J. S., Damages § 2oi.
,'Becker Bros. v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Sandy v. Lake
Street Elevated R. Co., 235 Ill. 194, 85 N. E. 300 (0o8); Brohammer v. Lager, 194
S. W. 1072, 1073 (Mo. 1917) ("The power of the circuit court or of the appellate
court to order a remittitur of a verdict may be said to be now well established in our
jurisprudence."); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Roberts, 113 Tenn. 488, 82 S. AV.
314 (19o4); Heimlich v. Tabor, 123 Wis. 565, 1o2 N. W. 1o (19o5); 15 Am. Jur.,
Damages § 2o5.
5The power to require remittitur without plaintiff's consent has been justified
on the grounds that it is not an abuse of trial court's discretion if the reduction is
reasonable. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Noles, 2oi Ark. 1o88, 148 S. AV. (2d) 65o
(1941); Ticknor v. Seattle-Renton Stage Line, 139 Wash. 354, 247 Pac. 1 (1926).
6Becker Bros. v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Rasmussen v.
National Tea Co., 304 Ill. App. 353, 26 N. E. (2d) 523 (194o; Simpson v. Miller, 97
Mont. 328, 34 P. (2d) 528 (1934); 25 C. J. S., Damages § 2ol. See Somerville v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 285 Mass. 539, 189 N. E. 592, 593 (1934).
"Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co., Ltd., v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, 9 S. Ct. 458, 32
L. ed. 854 (1889); Davis v. Southern Pac. Co., 98 Cal. 13, 32 Pac. 646 (1893); Alter v.
Shearwood, 114 Ohio St. 56o, 151 N. E. 667 (1926); Texas & New Orleans Ry. Co. v.
Syfan, 91 Tex. 562, 44 S. W. 1064 (1898).
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ever, this contention has been met with the answer that even in de-
ciding whether to grant or to deny a new trial "the court necessarily
determines, in its own mind, whether a verdict for a given amount
would be liable to the objection that it was excessive,"s and since the
same determination is exercised in remittitur, remittitur is analogous
to the power of denying a new trial. On this basis, the constitutionality
of the practice has been upheld overwhelmingly. 9 Moreover, it is
argued that the defendant is not prejudiced by the operation of the
remittitur power, because the judgment entered is for a less amount
than a jury has already found against him.10 Although remittitur is
not as strongly upheld in cases in which the verdict has been for un-
liquidated damages, the power is generally held to extend even to
such a situation."
Additur would seem to be merely the converse manifestation of the
same power of the courts to vary a clearly improper damages award,
since there is clearly no difference in principle between the two prac-
tices.12 Logically, if courts can refuse to grant a new trial for defendant
if plaintiff will remit part of an excessively high award, they can refuse
to grant a new trial for plaintiff if defendant will agree to add to an
unreasonably low award.' 3 Plaintiff may argue that he is denied a
constitutional right to a second trial in which a jury could set a prop-
"Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co., Ltd. v. Mann, 13o U. S. 69, 73, 9 S. Ct. 458,
4t59, 32 L. ed. 854, 855. (1889).
"In Texas & New Orleans Ry. Co. v. Syfan, 91 Tex. 562, 44 S. V. 1o64, 1o66
(1898) the court compared remittitur's constitutionality with that of granting or
denying a new trial and declared: "To indicate, before passing upon the motion
for a new trial, its opinion that the damages are excessive, and to require a plaintiff
to submit to a new trial, unless, by remitting a part of the verdict, he removes that
objection, certainly does not deprive the defendant of any right, or give him any
cause for complaint." Also Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co., Ltd. v. Mann, 130
U. S. 69, 9 S. Ct. 458, 32 L. ed. 854 (1889); Davis v. Southern Pac. Co., 98 Cal. 13,
32 Pac. 646 (1893) (citing many decisions directly in point); Alter v. Shearwood, 114
Ohio St. 560, 151 N. E. 667 (1926).
"'See Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F. (2d) 558, 561 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
uDetzur v. B. Stroh Brewing Co., 119 Mich. 282, 77 N. W. 948 (1899); Puutio
v. Roman, 79 Mont. 226, 255 Pac. 730 (1927); Miles v. Fall River County, 5o S. D. 240,
2o9 N. W. 360 (1926).
I'McCormick, Damages (1935) § 19.
13In Gaffney v. Illingsworth, 9o N. J. L. 490, io At. 243 (1917) the court after
referring to the established validity of remittitur, observed: "It would seem to follow,
by parity of reasoning, that when a new trial is granted because the damages are
inadequate, the court may impose like terms, that is, terms to the effect that, if the
defeated party will pay a certain sum greater than that awarded by the verdict, the
rule will be discharged, subject, doubtless, to the power of an appellate court to
vacate any such terms when they appear to be an abuse of discretion."
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erly high award, but this contention seems no stronger than defendant's
corresponding argument in a remittitur case.
However, in the recent California case of Dorsey v. Barba,14 when
the trial court attempted the use of additur to avoid needless future
litigation, it suffered a reversal at the hands of the California Supreme
Court. An action had been brought to recover for personal injuries
sustained by plaintiffs in an automobile accident. The jury returned
a verdict against defendant, operator of the automobile which collided
with the plaintiff's automobile, and judgment was entered accord-
ingly. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdicts
were erroneous in failing to allow damages for pain and disfigurement
caused by the injuries, but the trial court denied the motion on the
condition that defendant consent to an increase of the amount of
damages in a sum the court deemed proper. Defendant consenting, the
modified judgment was entered. On plaintiffs' appeal the Supreme
Court of California, with one Justice dissenting, held that in a case
involving unliquidated damages, the denial of a new trial on condi-
tion of defendant's increasing the amount of an inadequate award
abridged plaintiffs' right to trial by jury. It was reasoned that final
determination of a fact by at jury was necessary to fulfill the constitu-
tional right of jury trial, and that, though plaintiff was apparently
benefited by the trial court's action, he would actually be prejudiced
if a second jury would have given him a still larger award. The ad-
mission was made that "there may be no real distinction between the
powers to increase and decrease an award of damages; '"u 5 but after
observing that the power of remittitur was too firmly entrenched
in the state to be questioned, the court declared that it was not bound
to follow one practice merely because of the validity of the other.
The principal decision relied strongly upon the case of Dimicle v.
Schiedt,16 in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the allowance of additur deprived the plaintiff of his right to trial by
jury guaranteed by: the' Seventh Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution,' 7 because no'such power as .additu'r was included in 'Ehglish
common law to which the Seventh Amendment referred. Moreover, in
1438 Cal. (2d) 350, 240 P. (2d) 604 (1952).
2Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. (2d) 350, 240 P. (gd) 604, 6o9 (1952).
16293 U. S.:474, 55 S. Ct. 96; 79 L. ed. 6o, 95 A. L. R. 1156(1935).
""In suits at commoh Tdw, whiere the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law."
[Vol. X
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distinguishing between remittitur and additur, the Supreme Court
reasoned that in remittitur the defendant is not prejudiced because
the judgment finally entered is for a less amount than a jury has al-
ready assessed against him, whereas in additur, although plaintiff
would recover more than the amount of the jury's award, he is never-
theless denied the right to have a jury pass on the amount of his actual
damages as provided for by English common law.'8 This reasoning
seems illogical because in either case one party is required to submit to
the judge's altering of the amount of damages set by the jury. The
Supreme Court's argument implies that it is less important for the de-
fendant to have a jury set the amount of damages he must pay than for
plaintiff to have a jury set the amount of damages he will receive.
This adverse federal decision does not necessarily apply to cases arising
under normal state constitutional provisions, because the Seventh
Amendment is not binding upon the states,19 and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment guarantee is not controlling
on the state courts on the issue of whether additur violates the common
law rights guaranteed by state constitutional provisions concerning
the right of jury trial.20
The decisions of state courts manifest three divergent opinions in
regard to additur. A few courts appear to deny the validity of additur
in any circumstances. 2' In Pennsylvania additur is not allowed, al-
though remittitur is, because additur would give the option of the new
trial to the negligent, losing defendant.2 2 Though the court was pass-
ing on an unliquidated damages case when it laid down this rule, the
reasoning employed would apply to liquidated damages cases also. In
Missouri, invalid additur and valid remittitur are distinguished on
the ground that in a remittitur case the modified judgment stands
for a part of the actual jury verdict, while in an additur case it would
I'Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 55 S. Ct. 296,.79 L. ed. 603, 95 A. L. R. 115o
(1935).
1Valker v. Sauvient, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678 (1875); Pearson v. Yewdall, 95
U. S. 294, 24 L. ed. 436 (1877); Penton v. State, 194 Ark. 503, 1o9 S. W. (2d) 131
(1937); Tegtmeyer v. Tegtmeyer, 292 Ill. App.-434, ui N. E. (2d) 657 (1937).
-"Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 21o; 37 S. Ct. 255, 61 L. ed. 678 (1916); Darden
v. State, Qo Ark. 295, 97 S. W. 449 (19o6); People v. Botkin, 9 Gal. App. 244, 98 Pac.
861 (19o8); People v. Fisher, 340 II. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930); Frenckiewich v.
Dowd, 291 Mass. 95, 195 N. E. 927 1935).
"Burdict v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 123 Mo. 221, 27 S. W. 453 (184); Lemon
v. Campbell, 136 Pa. Super. 370, 7 A. (2d) 643 (1939).
=Lemon v. Campbell, 136 Pa. Super. 370, 7 A. (2d) 643 (1939) (citing many cases
in that jurisdiction).
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add something never within the terms of the verdict.23 In a great ma-
jority of the jurisdictions where the question has been decided, additur
has been allowed to some extent.24 In one group of courts the practice is
recognized only in cases in which the damages are liquidated, 25 on
the reasoning that it is within the trial court's discretion to raise an
obviously inadequate verdict only where it is a clear case of error
by the jury and where proper damages can be readily ascertained.
In another group of courts additur is allowed in liquidated or un-
liquidated damages cases on reasoning similar to that generally em-
ployed to justify the remittitur practice.26 For example, in Markota v.
East Ohio Gas Co., a judge of the Ohio Supreme Court, after stating
his disregard for the Dimick case, demonstrated that the arguments for
the constitutionality of remittitur could be equally applied to additur,
and concluded that to uphold remittitur and strike down additur
"necessarily leads to the absurd conclusion that a plaintiff has a
greater right to a jury verdict, determining the amount of his damages,
than does a defendant."
2 7
2See Burdict v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 123 Mo. 221, 27 S. W. 453, 458 (1894)
(citing many cases in that jurisdiction); King v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo.
75, 164 S. W. (2d) 458 (1942).
"'Kraas v. American Bakeries Co., 231 Ala. 278, 164 So. 565 (1935); Rudnick v.
Jacobs, 9 Harrison 169, 197 Ad. 381 (Del. 1938); E. Tris Napier Co. v. Gloss, iSO
Ga. 561, 104 S. E. 230 (1920); Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179 (1866); Smith v. Ellyson, 137
Iowa 391, 115 N. W. 40 (1908); Clark V. Henshaw Motor Co., 246 Mass. 386, 140
N. . 593 (1923); Ford v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 98 Minn. 96, 107 N. W. 817 (1906);
Gaffney v. Illingsworth, 90 N. J. L. 490, 1o Ad. 243 (1917); Steel v. Johnson, 9 Wash.
(2d) 347, 115 P. (2d) 145 (1941) (statutory); Reuter v. Hickman, Lauson & Diener Co.,
16o Wis. 284, 151 N. W. 795 (1915).
2Kraas v. American Bakeries Co., 231 Ala. 278, 164 So. 565 (1935); Rudnick v.
Jacobs, 9 Harrison 169, 197 At. 381 (Del. 1938); E. Tris Napier Co. v. Gloss, 150
Ga. 561, 104 S. E. 230 (1920); Carr v. Miner, 42 I1. 179 (1866); Smith v. Ellyson,
137 Iowa 391, 115 N. XV. 40 (19o8); Clark v. Henshaw Motor Co., 246 Mass. 386,
14o N. E. 593 (1923)-
"Gaffney v. Illingsworth, 9o N. J. L. 490, io Ad. 243 (1917); Reuter v. Hick-
man, Lauson & Diener Co., 16o Wis. 284, 151 N. W. 795 (1915). See Markota v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 154 Ohio St. 546, 97 N. E. (2d) 13, 17-19 (1951). In California it was
held,-as late as 1941, -that additur was permissible, that it was established law in
that state, and that there was-no essential difference to be found between additur
and remittitur. Blackmore v. Brennan, 43 Cal. App. (2d) 28o, 11o P. (2d) 723 (1941).
In the principal case, the court purported to distinguish this decision. Dorsey v.
Barba, 38 Cal. (2d) 350, 240 P. (2d) 604 at 6o8, n.2 (1952). In Washington, additur
is provided for by statute where the amount of damages fixed by the jury must have
been the result of passion or prejudice. Steel y. Johnson, 9 Wash. (2d) 347, 115 P.
(2d) 145 (1941). Minnesota adds the reasoning that the trial court may in proper
use of its discretion do justice by use of additur where the jury has failed to do it.
Ford v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 98 Minn. 96, 107 N. W. 817 (1906).
-Markota v. East Ohio Gas Co., 154 Ohio St. 546, 97 N. E. (2d) 13, 19 (1951).
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In ignoring the sound arguments and the majority authority sup-
porting additur, the principal case perhaps confirms the opinion stated
in 1947 that the "authority of the Supreme Count ... has had at least
a discouraging effect on attempts to impose additur on a plaintiff claim-
ing unliquidated damages" 2 -this, despite the fact that the Dimick case
was a five to four decision in which a convincing dissent was entered
by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo.29
The dissent's view in the principal case is preferable because of the
logical similarity between additur and remittitur, and because it would
give affect to the "generally recognized advantages of the practice as a
means of securing substantial justice and bringing the litigation to a
more speedy and economical conclusion than would be possible by a
new trial to a jury ... -30 It seems sound to regard additur as a further
logical step in the growth of the law relating to the correction of er-
roneous damages verdicts, and there is no merit in distinguishing be-
tween the validity of remittitur and additur merely because one be-
came established in the law earlier than the other.
RicHARD A. DENNY, JR.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-JuRISDICrION OF COURT OTHER THAN OF DOMI-
CILE OF CHILD TO REDETERMINE CUSTODY AS BETWEEN DIVORCED
PARENTS. [Oregon]
The complexities of the problem of what court has jurisdiction to
determine custody of children, subsequent to a divorce decree which has
initially awarded custody to one of the parents, are dramatized by the
recent Oregon case of Lorenz v. Royer.' The parents and minor chil-
dren had all been domiciled in Indiana at the time of the divorce pro-
ceedings there. The wife was awarded custody by the Indiana court,
nNote (1947) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 115.
--Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 488, 55 S. Ct. 296, 301, 79 L. ed. 6o3, 612, 95
A. L. R. 1150,1158 (1935).
'4Dissent in Dimick v. Schiedt. 293 U. S. 474, 490, 55 S. Ct. 296, 302, 79 L. ed. 603,
613, 95 A. L. R. 1150, 1159 (1935). See dissent of Justice Traynor in Dorsey v. Barba,
38 Cal. (2d) 350, 240 P. (2d) 604, 615 (1952): "[Remittitur] has been utilized in in-
numerable cases to avoid, for both the parties and the courts, the expense and delay
of repetitious litigation. In the field of inadequate verdicts, additur can be of
similar value." And at 613: "By their motion for new trial ... plaintiffs in effect
appealed to the conscience of the court. They cannot complain that the court,
viewing all the equities of the case, has selected a more expeditious and less costly
method of remedying the alleged injustice of the verdict."
1241 P. (2d) x42 (Ore. 1952).
1953]
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but a few months after the divorce, while the children were visiting
their paternal grandparents in Illinois, the husband took them to
Oregon, his new domicile, without the wife's consent. This removal
of the children occurred in 1945, and after subsequent marriages by
both parties, the wife in 1950 instituted habeas corpus proceedings
in the Oregon courts to regain custody of the children. Plaintiff had
learned three years earlier where the children were, but she was not
then financially able to attempt to secure their return. The trial court
awarded custody to the father on the finding that the welfare of the
children would thereby be best served, but the Supreme Court of
Oregon reversed that ruling, declaring that the Oregon courts had no
jurisdiction to award custody of the children. The Supreme Court
asserted that the question of jurisdiction must here be regarded
as paramount even to the welfare of the children, 2 and it reasoned
that the jurisdiction of the divorce court over the custody of minor
children, as the court of the domicile of the children, was a con-
tinuing jurisdiction, binding on the parties until modified or set
aside. The court further stated that the trial court's decree constituted
an improper change of the children's domicile, because where parents
are separated by judicial decree or divorce, the minor's domicile fol-
lows that of the parent to whose custody it has been awarded; and
the children could not change that domicile themselves, nor could
the change be accomplished by anyone else other than the custodian-
parent. It was admitted in dictum that should the children become
domiciled in another state by action of the custodian, the decree of
a court of the first state regarding custody of the children would not
be binding.a However, since the jurisdiction of the court of domicile
was deemed exclusive, the Oregon court concluded that the decree of
the Indiana court must be given full faith and credit under the United
States Constitution and recognized as a final adjudication until modi-
fied by that court or until the children ceased to have their domicile
in that state.
4
2"On the trial of this case, as shown by the record, the able trial judge assumed
that this proceeding was equitable in nature, and that the paramount issue before
the court was the welfare of these children as is usually the case in such pro-
ceedings.... However, the remedy by habeas corpus is available to test the legality
of the custody of a child in certain circumstances where the question of jurisdiction,
rather than the welfare of the child, is of primary importance." 241 P. (2d) 142, 147
(Ore. 1952).
3
See Lorenz v. Royer, 241 P. (2d) 142, 15o (Ore. 1952).
'Cases following the view of the principal case are numerous and represent
the weight of judicial authority: Dorman v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 1 S. (2d) 734
(1941); McDonald v. Short, i9o Ind. 338, ixo N. E. 536 (1921); Jones v. McCloud,
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Apart from matters of legal theory, practical considerations such as
are reflected in the principal case raise doubt as to the desirability
of accepting as an inexorable rule the principle of exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the court of the children's domicile. Here two children, ages two
and four, were taken to live in Oregon with their father, and after all
connection with their former home had been severed for nearly seven
years, the Oregon court deems the courts of that state powerless even
to look into the question of custody. Therefore, the children, now
aged about eight and ten, will return to their mother whom they no
longer know, although they have been well established in the home of
their father and step-mother who are conceded to be people of good
character and of sufficient means to afford the children an excellent
home.5 As a result of the decision, the ties of friendship, habits of life
and developing mental attitudes of young children must be abruptly
interrupted, and a new pattern of existence in strange surroundings
must be established for them.
Recognizing that such hardships may frequently arise from the
operation of the rule that the original forum alone can modify the
original award, a number of courts have taken the position that even
where there has been no subsequent change of domicile, the state of
residence has sufficient interest in the children's welfare to have author-
ity to modify custody arrangements as circumstances may require.6
Under this view the welfare of the children becomes controlling, and it
seems clear to them that this consideration should be paramount to the
fictional concept of the children's domicile.7 Certainly the courts of
residency ordinarily will have a more immediate source of knowledge
of current local conditions to draw upon, and such courts may well be
better equipped to decide questions involving the interests of the child
in subsequent litigation.8 Judge Cardozo, speaking on a parallel issue
19 Wash. (2d) 314, 142 P. (2d) 397 (1943). See also Minor, Conflict of Laws (i9ol)
§ 96; Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 117, 148; Beale, The Status of the
Child and the Conflict of Laws (933) 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 13, 22.
.Lorenz v. Royer, 241 P. (2d) 142 at 146 (Ore. 1952).
6Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N. W. (2d) 6o at 73 (195o); Sheehy v.
Sheehy, 88 N. H. 223, x86 Ad. 1, 107 A. L. R. 635 (1936). See also i7i Am. Jur.,
Divorce and Separation § 688; Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict
of Laws (1940) 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 42.
7Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 112 S. W. (2d) 165 (1938).
'Sampsell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 32 Cal. (2d) 763, 197 P.
(2d) 739 (1948); Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N. H. 223, 186 At. 1 (1936); Kenner v. Kenner,
139 Tenn. 211 20, S. W. 779 (1918). See also Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.
1951) 327. Cf. State v. Scott, 3o N. H. 274 (1855) on the issue of the field of inquiry
as to desires of children. Included within this field are the desires of the child
and the weight to be given to such desires according to age, experience, etc. The
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for the New York court, has declared: "The jurisdiction of a state to
regulate the custody of the infants found within its territory does not
depend upon domicile of the parents. It has its origin in the protection
that is due to the incompetent or helpless .... For this, the residence
of the child suffices, though the domicile be elsewhere." 9
Some courts agree that the welfare of the children may be best
protected in the place of actual living, but contend that there is no
reason why the other states with interests in the children's status should
not also have jurisdiction over custody controversies. 10 Such concur-
rent jurisdiction would satisfy the theory applied in the principal
case that the court of domicile has a continuing jurisdiction which
is never lost. While it is obvious that concurrent jurisdiction might
lead to conflicting decrees regarding the same children, a California
court has sought to discount this danger, observing that: "The courts
of one state may determine that the other state has a more substantial
interest in the child and leave the matter to be settled there. On the
other hand, if the jurisdiction of one state has been exercised over the
child, there is no reason why, if the welfare of the particular child is
a matter of real concern to the courts of another state, those courts
may not also have jurisdiction, which might be exercised in the interest
of the child ... ."11 Such solution to the problem is unrealistic if it fails
to consider the conflicting results that might arise from decrees of
sister courts. One could imagine a possible decision of the Oregon
courts in the Lorenz case awarding custody to the father, and the In-
diana court's subsequent desire to enforce its original decree awarding
custody to the mother; for if the children were living in Oregon and
domiciled in Indiana, the courts of both states having juirsdiction over
child's views may be determined by personal inquiry, private or public, or through
a committee appointed by the court. The court of the state of residence with its
knowledge of local conditions and with the closest contact with the needed witnesses
would seem to be best equipped to arrive at a proper result in reference to prac-
tice of employing investigators also. See Brown v. Jewell, 86 N. H. 19o, 191, 165 Atl.
713, 714 (1933); Note (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1024, as to powers conferred by statute
and extent of equity court's jurisdiction without statute.
9Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 431, 148 N. E. 624, 625 (1925). In this case a
non-resident husband sought a decree in the New York courts granting custody and
control for fixed periods of his two sons. There had been do demand for divorce
or separation between the parents, and the decree was denied on procedural
grounds, the court saying that except when adjudged as incident to divorce or
separation, custody is to be regulated by habeas corpus or petition to the chancellor.
Here the prayer was dismissed without prejudice to proceed by proper remedy.
"Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. '39, 112 S. W. (2d) 165 (1938).
uSampsell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 32 Cal. (2d) 763, 197 P.
(2d) 739, 75 (1948).
[Vol. X
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their custody, determinations might be so conflicting as to defeat the
interests of the children as well as completely to confuse the respective
courts and put them in hopeless competition with each other.
Other shortcomings of the residence theory may have discouraged
the Oregon court from taking jurisdiction. As apparently happened in
the principal case, the non-custodian parent may abduct the children
from the state of their domicile and establish residence elsewhere.
If the accomplished fact of new residence is all that is necessary to
make possible a redetermination of the custody issue, the disappointed
parent might frequently be tempted to violate the decree of the divorce
court in order to get the children settled in another state.12 And the
more cleverly he could conceal the location of the children, the greater
the chance he would have to maintain such duration of residence in
the new state as might persuade its courts to decide that the children
should not be moved back to their earlier domicile. Certainly such
wrongful action should be weighed in the determination of whether
the parent seeking to change the legal custody is of sufficiently good
character to rear the children. However, other sanctions than refusal
to reaward custody are available to deter abductions of the children.
The divorce court could hold child-stealers in contempt,13 and some
statutes and judicial decisions have labelled the parent-abductors kid-
nappers subject to criminal punishment.14 It may be doubted that the
danger of encouraging abductions in some instances is sufficiently acute
to justify an absolute denial in all cases of the right of the courts of the
state of the present residence to determine custody.' 5
The effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Con-
stitution and the legal concept of res judicata is frequently inserted
into these controversies. Res judicata has to do with the finality of a
decision within the same jurisdiction,'6 and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires the recognition of the judgment in a sister state, thus
affording it the same effect outside the state of its issuance as res
judicata gives it within that state.17 Those courts, like Oregon's, which
follow the domicile rule contend that if the original decree fixing the
custody was rendered according to the laws of the state, by a court
having competent jurisdiction, such judgment must be given full faith
'-See Note (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1024, 1o28.
"Bums v. Shapley, 16 Ala. App. 297, 77 So. 447 (1917).
"'Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 127 Pac. 1023 (1912).
'"Larson v. Larson, i9o Minn. 489, 252 N. W. 329 ('934); Griffin v. Griffin, 95
Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598 (1920).
"5o C. J. S. 141.
'1750 C. J. S. 492, 493.
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and credit in other states as long as circumstances remain substantially
the same.'8 It is mandatory to follow the extrastate judgment as a
constitutional requirement. Those courts following the residence
theory hold that although the judgment is res judicata in the state
where rendered, it is not necessarily binding on the courts of a sister
state where the children may be subsequently found.19 These latter
courts contend the concept of res judicata applies only to the judgment
on facts then before the court;20 new facts arising subsequent to a judg-
ment can reopen litigation concerning the decree, for custody decrees
are not final,21 except as to matters before the court when the decree
was entered.22 Still other courts embracing this theory have said the
rights are purely personal and so are not entitled to full faith and
credit.23
The United States Supreme Court expressed its opinion on this as-
pect of the problem in its 1947 decision of Halvey v. Halvey.24 The
Florida court had granted Mrs. Halvey a divorce and permanent cus-
tody of the child, and she brought habeas corpus proceedings in the
New York Supreme Court challenging the legality of her former hus-
band's detention of the child. The New York court ordered that the
child's custody remain with the mother, but modified the Florida de-
cree by giving the father rights to visit and to keep the child during
stipulated periods each year. The Appellate Division and Court of
Appeals affirmed,25 and the Supreme Court of the United States took
the case on the constitutional issue of full faith and credit. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, declared that "the custody decree was
not irrevocable and unchangeable," 28 and that, "So far as the Full
'sMorrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 At. i (191o); Wilson v. Elliott, 96 Tex. 472,
73 S. W. 946 (1903); Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Wash. (2d) 419, 174 P. (2d) 790 (1946).
2-Seeley v. Seeley, 3o App. Cas. (D. C.) 191, 12 Ann. Cas. 1058 (19o7); Anthony
v. Tarpley, 45 Cal. App. 72, 187 Pac. 779 (1920); Avery v. Avery, 33 Kan. 1, 5 Pac.
418 (1885).
2 Halvey v. Halvey, 33o U. S. 6io, 67 S. Ct. 9o3, 91 L. ed. 133 (1947).
Ashley v. Wendover, 113 Ore. 43, 231 Pac. 153 (1924).
nNote (1934) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 104, 107.
23Avery v. Avery, 33 Kan. 1, 5 Pac. 418, 422 (1885). But see Davis v. Davis, 305
U. S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3, 83 L. ed. 26 (1938), where a Virginia court's finding on residence
and jurisdiction status concerning a marital domicle was enforceable in courts of
the District of Columbia.
24330 U. S. 61o, 67 S. Ct. 9o3, 91 L. ed. 1133 (1947).
25The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed without opinion, Ex parte
Halvey, 269 App. Div. 1o9, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 396 (1945). The Court of Appeals
affirmed in a per curiam opinion, Halvey v. Halvey, 295 N. Y. 836, 66 N. E. (2d) 851
(1946).




Faith and Credit Clause is concerned, what Florida could do in modi-
fying the decree, New York may do."27 Custody decrees of Florida
courts are not res judicata either in Florida or elsewhere, except as to
the facts before the court at the time of the judgment, and "it is clear
that the State of the forum has a least as much leeway to disregard the
judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the State where it
was rendered."28 Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion stated:
"The constitutional policy formulated by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause cannot be fitted into tight little categories or too abstract gen-
eralities .... [In] judgments affecting domestic relations technical
questions of 'finality' as to [custody] seem to me irrelevant in deciding
the respect to be accorded by a State to a valid prior judgment touch-
ing [custody] rendered by another State." 29 Justice Rutledge, also
concurring, implied that the controlling consideration was the best
interests of the children even in the formulation of federal policies of
full faith and credit.30
Thus, in weighing the practical advantages of the residence doctrine
against the legal theory of the domicile rule, it must be recognized that
the cases dealing with the extraterritorial effect of the custody pro-
vision of a divorce decree are in conflict, and no rigid standard ex-
ists as to the degree of independence that may be exercised in modi-
fying a foreign custody decree. Though no one policy can be laid down
to satisfy every set of facts, practical solutions which benefit the child
should not be subordinated to the technicalities of the domicile doc-
trine. If valid changes of circumstances arise in the state of subse-
quent residence, the courts of such state may be the better forum to
rule on the interests of the child. If circumstances do not warrant
modification by a sister state, the original decree should be binding.
So, too, though sufficient changes of circumstances may exist, if the
residence theory would lead to disobeyance of court orders and flagrant
law violation, the state of rendition should be recognized as the sole
state of jurisdiction. If the husband is allowed to invoke the juris-
diction of the new state by abducting the children and establishing
a new residence, then it would follow that the wife, by re-abducting
the children, and taking them to yet another state, could place the
733o U. S. 61o, 614, 67 S. Ct. 9o, go6, 91 L. ed. 113, 1136 (1947).
-3o U. S. 61o, 615, 67 S. Ct. 9o3, 906, 91 L. ed. 113, 1136 (1947).
2'3o U. S. 61o, 616, 67 S. Ct. 903, 907, 91 L. ed. 113, i137 (1947).
033o U. S. 6io, 62o, 67 S. Ct. 9o3, 909, 91 L. ed. 113, 1139 (1947). Justice Rut-
ledge stated: "I agree that technical notions of finality applied generally to other
types of judgment for such purposes have no proper strict applications to these de-
crees."
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controversy under the jurisdiction of a court more sympathetic to her.
Though the welfare of the children is a primary concern in custody
cases, the rights of the custodian-parent must also be safeguarded
against infringement by the unlawful acts of the other parent. Where
the removal to another state was contrary to an order of the original
state, the policy against disregarding judicial decrees should prevent
the subsequent state's taking action except to enforce the original
decree, at least to the extent the original forum iself would enforce it.31
Such considerations may well explain the Oregon court's refusal to
recognize the need for re-examining the original custody award in
the Lorenz decision.
D. HENRY NORTHINGTON
INSURANCE-LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANY FOR FAILURE TO ACT
PROMPTLY ON APPLICATION FOR LIFE INSURANCE POLICY. [North
Dakota]
Since an offer creates no duty of acceptance,' an offeree, in failing
to act on the offer made to him, generally incurs no liability for any loss
which the offeror may suffer as a result of not obtaining the benefits
of the desired contract. However, because the insurance business is
so closely related to the public interest, the failure of an insurance
company to act on an application for a policy by either issuing the
policy or rejecting the application within a reasonable time gives rise to
special considerations which may justify holding the company liable
in damages where the loss sought to be insured against occurred after
a reasonable time had elapsed. 2
Such a situation confronted the Supreme Court of North Dakota
in the recent case of Mann v. Policyholders' National Life Ins. Co.
3
On April 4, 1949, plaintiff's husband had applied for a $2,5oo life
insurance policy and received a receipt for the first premium; but at
51.See Note (194o) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1024, 1027.
1i Corbin, Contracts (195O) 21.
2It has been suggested that where the applicant does not pay a premium or
give a binding promise to pay a premium when he makes the application, he does
not make an offer but only invites the insurance company to make an offer. Pat-
terson, Essentials of Insurance Law (1935) 53. Under this view plaintiff's position is
weakened. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts § 28. The discussion in this comment will be
directed, therefore, to the case where the applicant did pay the first premium when
he applied for the policy.
'5 N. W. (2d) 853 (N. D. 1952).
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the time of his death, three months later, the company had neither is-
sued the policy nor notified him of the acceptance or rejection of his
application. Plaintiff brought an action for $2,5oo damages, alleging
that defendant company had a duty either to accept or reject the ap-
plication within a reasonable time and was negligent in not doing so,
thereby becoming liable for the amount of the policy when the ap-
plicant died. Defendant asserted that there could be no liability for
negligence in failing to act upon an application for insurance because
such a liability would deny defendant the right to contract, in viola-
tion of the State and Federal Constitutions. Furthermore, a clause in
the application stipulated that no liability would accrue unless and
until there was an acceptance of the application and a delivery of the
policy by defendant.
4
Plaintiff had obtained a judgment for the full amount sought in the
trial court, and on appeal the Supreme Court affirmed, predicating de-
fendant's liability on the fact that the insurance business is affected
with a public interest and is therefore subject to reasonable regula-
tion by the state. Also, defendant did business under a franchise
granted by the state, which made the company in the conduct of its
business subject to rules laid down by the legislature as interpreted by
the Supreme Court.5 The duty to act promptly was held not to impair
the right of defendant to contract or not as it chose; it only required
the company to do one or the other within a reasonable time. The pro-
vision in the application that no liability would be incurred by the
insurer until it delivered the policy to the applicant was said to affect
only any alleged contract liability, and since this action was based on
liability in tort, the provision had no effect.
A review of the case authority on this problem reveals a wide di-
vergence of views among different courts, with a majority of the courts
which have considered the problem having favored liability, 6 and a
'Whether the law of the state where the application was made or the law of
the state where the insurer's home office was located was controlling, and whether
the applicant was contributorily negligent, were collateral issues in the case, decided
in favor of plaintiff.
5But there was no statute involved. The court was therefore not intepreting; it
was making a rule itself.
OAlabama, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Washington, and Wisconsin have favored liability. Lewis v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 220 Ala. 270, 124 So. 889 (1929);
De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924); Wallace v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 Pac. 1oo9 (1918); Duffy v. Bankers' Life
Ass'n, 16o Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 25 (1913); Cloyd v. Republic
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 137 Kan. 869, 22 P. (2d) 431 (1933); Strand v. Bankers' Life Ins.
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minority having set forth a contrary view in some very emphatic
opinions.7
Although in these cases the policies which would have established a
contractual relation have not been issued, some courts have based
liability on a contract theory. The idea that silence beyond a reason-
able time constitutes acceptance has been employed as a means of
placing a contractual duty on the insurance company,S although the
general rule is clearly that where an offeree neither accepts nor rejects
the offer within a reasonable time the offer is considered to have been
dedined.9 The rationale for the general rule is that the offeree has not
in fact consented, and there is normally no understanding between the
insurer and an applicant for insurance to the effect that silence will
indicate acceptance.' 0 The fact that the offer in the insurance cases is
solicited by the offeree detracts somewhat from the applicability of the
general rule, which is partially designed to protect people against un-
solicited offers;" but this fact alone does not justify the creation of
Co., 115 Neb. 357, 213 N. W. 349 (1927); Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 185
N. C. 121, 116 S. E. 266 (1923); Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 7o N. D. 122, 293
N. W. 200 (1940); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Barbe, 187 Okla. 22, 100 P. (2d) 866
(1940); Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925);
Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N. W. 403 (1931).
But cf. Moon v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 138 Kan. 83, 23 P. (2d) 444 (1933), where
liability was denied because applicant had frequent opportunities to inquire about
the application but did not do so.
7Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914 (W. D. Mo. 1933); Amer-
ican Ins. Co. v. School Dist., 182 Ark. 158, 3o S. W. (2d) 217 (1930); Swentusky v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 16 Conn. 526, 165 At. 686 (1933); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Brady, 95 Ind. App. 564, 174 N. E. 99 (1930); Savage v. Prudential Ins. Co., 154
Miss. 89, 121 So. 487 (1929); Zayc v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426,
13 A. (2d) 34 (194o); Thornton v. Nat. Council Junior Order United American Me-
chanics, u1o W. Va. 412, 158 S. E. 507 (1931). Illinois, Minnesota, and Texas also
deny liability. Miller v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 255 Il1. App. 586 (193o); Tjepkes v.
State Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 193 Minn. 505, 259 N. W. 2 (1935); American Life
Ins. Co. v. Nabors, 124 Tex. Civ. App. 221, 76 S. AV. (2d) 497 (1934).
8Cloyd v. Republic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 137 Kan. 869, 22 P. (2d) 431 (1933);
Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan.:48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899).
91 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) §§ 5oA, 54; 17 C. J. S., Contracts § 51b; 12
Am. Jur., Contracts § 4o. The weight of authority is clearly contrary to the view that
silence beyond a reasonable time amounts to an acceptance. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Brady, 95 Ind. App. 564, 174 N. E. 99 (1930); Ross v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
124 N. C. 395, 32 S. E. 733 (1899); Royal Ins Co. v. Beatty, 118 Pa. St. 6, 12 Ad.
607 (1888); Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 23 Pa. 72 (1854); Brink v. Merchants' &
Farmers' United Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 17 S. D. 235, 95 N. W. 929 (19o3); Raymond v.
National Life Ins. Co., 40 Wyo. 1, 273 Pac. 667 (1929).
"Savage v. Prudential Ins. Co., 154 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487 (1929); Strand v.
Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 115 Neb. 357, 213 N. W. 349 (1927); Brink v. Merchants'
& Farmers' United Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 17 S. D. 235, 95 N. W. 929 (1903).
nPatterson, Essentials of Insurance Law (1935) 55.
[Vol. X
CASE COMMENTS1953]
a completely fictitious acceptance upon which to base a contractual
obligation. Certainly a provision in the application such as was in-
cluded in the Mann case, that no liability will accrue until the applica-
tion is accepted and the policy delivered to the applicant,' 2 ought to
make this theory inappropriate.' 3
Where the applicant paid a premium when he made application for
the policy, many courts have seen that fact as supporting liability-
i.e., they have felt that an applicant should not have to pay over a
premium for insurance protection unless he is in fact insured1 4 But the
applicant paid the premium in advance knowing that it would not buy
insurance for the current period unless the company accepted the
application. None of the courts make clear, and it is not seen why
the fact that the applicant paid in advance rather than later should
make the company liable although the application was not accepted,
when the understanding between the parties was contrary.' 5
Some of the courts have based the liability on a theory of implied
nApplications for insurance now generally contain this provision. Prosser,
Delay in Acting on an Application for Insurance (1935) 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 39, 46.
"Liability based on any contract theory would seem to be rendered very dubious
by the presence of this clause in the application. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Brady, 95 Ind. App. 564, 174 N. E. 99 (1930).
1 'DeFord v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1o49 (1924); Duffy
v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 16o Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 25 (1913)-
The courts commonly make it appear that liability results from the fact that the
company upon issuance of the policy dated it as of the day application was made.
But the language of the courts suggests that they are really concerned not with
the dating back, which only has the effect of making premiums due for the interim
between the date of the application and the date of the issuance of the policy, but
rather with the fact that a premium was paid over along with the application.
"Policies ... ordinarily are dated as of the day the application is signed, and, aside
from other considerations, the insurer should not be permitted to unduly prolong
the period for which it is exacting the payment of premium without incurring
risk." Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, i6o Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087, 1090, 46 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 25, 3o (1913). The insurer might pursue its present policy by dating back
upon issuance and charging the applicant premiums retroactively to the date of the
application. It appears probable that the courts would not predicate liability upon
this circumstance.
No case has been found where the court relied on the paying over of a preium
along with the application as the main basis for recovery, although an Indiana court,
in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brady, 95 Ind. App. 564, 174 N. E. 99 (193o), in
denying liability saw the fact that no premium was paid when application was made
as distinguishing the case at bar from several cases cited by plaintiff in which
liability was imposed. The point is generally thrown in as a make-weight argument,
often where the action is based on a tort theory. Taken to its logical conclusion,
this view would seem to make the company liable regardless of whether a reasonable
time for action had elapsed.
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agreement or quasi-contract.16 "By the soliciting, making and receiving
of the application, the parties had entered into some kind of a con-
sensual relationship." 17 Certainly the applicant would usually hope
for prompt action. But the company was not bound to act promptly
on a basis of implied contract, unless from its conduct the company
created the appearance that it agreed to act promptly.18 Usually the
conduct of the company does not justify that inference.19 As for quasi-
contract, to say that there was a quasi contractual duty only states a
conclusion; it does not offer an explanation of the source of the duty.
2 0
To be valid, the conclusion must find support in some fact which war-
rants imposing a duty to act irrespective of the company's intentions.
2 '
The liability of the insurer is more often based on tort principles.
Under this theory, the courts generally attach great significance to the
facts that the insurance business is affected with a public interest,
22
and that insurance companies carry on their business under authority
of a public franchise.2 3 These facts are utilized in an attempt to ration-
alize out of the state's police power the insurance company's unusual
duty to act. It is declared that the company may be required to act
because it is subject to the regulatory power of the legislature.2 4 But
16De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924); Fox v.
Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 185 N. C. 121, 116 S. E. 266 (1923); Columbian Nat.
Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923); Dyer v. Missouri State
Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925); Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-
Tornado Ins. Co., 20o4 Wis. 66, 235 N. W. 403 (1931).
"-Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N. W. 403, 405
(1931). The nebulous quality of the term "some kind of a consensual relationship"
indicates the real difficulty the courts have had in basing liability on implied or
quasi-contract.
"8Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 5-
""The suggestion that the insurer or the agent promises to act promptly
ignores actuality. No such agreement is made expressly, nor can the intention to
make one be implied." Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applica-
tions (1927) 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 207, 224.
20Of course the courts actually are offering an explanation of the source of a
quasi-contractural duty when they work out a theory of liability in tort, which is
discussed infra.
211 Corbin, Contracts (1950) § 19.
"Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, i6o Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.)
25 (1913); Strand v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 115 Neb. 357, 213 N. W. 349 (1927);
Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 7o N. D. 122, 293 N. W. 200 (1940); Security Ins.
Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. 151, 27 A. L. R. 444 (1922).
"Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 16o Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.)
25 (1913); Strand v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 115 Neb. 357, 213 N. W. 349 (1927);
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 225 (1923); Security
Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. 151, 27 A. L. R. 444 (1922).
2"Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 70 N. D. 122, 293 N. W. 200 (1940).
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it does not follow that the courts can regulate the companies where the
legislature has not. The public-interest and public-franchise arguments
should properly be directed to the power of the legislature, which
exercises the police power, to impose a liability which the courts them-
selves seek to impose.
25
It has been held that where a premium is paid with the application,
the premium is held in trust by the company, and failure to act on the
application within a reasonable time is a breach of the trust.26 Since
this view assumes an implied agreement between the parties as to the
conditions on which the money was received by the company, it is
clearly a rephrasing, for the purpose of a recovery in tort, of the view
that there was an implied contract that the company would act within
a reasonable time. The different words employed do not make the
theory any more persuasive. And it is not shown why the trustee's ob-
ligation should involve anything more than the return of the prem-
ium. 27
Some courts believe that the company's liability stems from the
fact that control of the transaction, once the application was made,
was in the company's hands.28 This view seems to be concerned with
considerations of fair play and morality, which do not normally war-
rant the imposition of such a liability;29 and the insurer-offeree's duty
to act has not been extended to the many other types of situations in
which an offeree normally stands in a superior position during contract
negotiations.
30
•2'"State regulation of insurance companies has its basis in the police power and
by no means in the public interest with which the insurance business is affected. The
fact of public interest is not the source of that power, it but affects the locus of the
boundry line limiting its exercise. And the police power is exclusively to be ex-
ercised by the Legislature, never by the judicial branch of government." Munger
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914, 918 (W. D. Mo. 1933).
21Strand v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 115 Neb. 357, 213 N. W. 349 (1927).
'Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914 (W. D. Mo. 1933); Prosser,
Delay in Acting on an Application for Insurance (1935) 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 39, 55.
26"Can the insurer, having pre-empted the field, retain control of the situation
and the applicant's funds indefinitely?" quoted with approval from Kukuska v.
Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N. W. 403 (1931), a hail in-
surance case, in Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 7o N. D. 122, 293 N. W. 200, 213
(1940), which involved life insurance, where the danger of loss is typically much
less immediate.
2'Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914 (W. D. Mo. 1933).
"E.g., negotiations for a loan from a bank, see Savage v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
154 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487, 489 (1929); negotiations for employment, see Thornton
v. Nat. Council Junior Order United American Mechanics, 11o W. Va. 412, 158
S. E. 507, 508 (1931).
19531
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Thus, none of the grounds on which tort liability has been based
gives rise to a legal-as distinct from a moral-duty to act within a
reasonable time.31 The arguments for tort liability establish only
that if the legislature should pass a statute imposing liability upon
insurance companies for losses resulting from their inaction beyond
a reasonable time, that statute would be a proper exercise of the police
power. 3
2
Although the several grounds for liability propounded by the
courts when lumped together give the appearance of plausibility, upon
thorough examination they are not persuasive. The fallacy of the logic
in the Mann case points up the error in imposition of liability by the
courts. The North Dakota court relied on a United States Supreme
Court case 33 in which the legislature had by statute required that an
insurance company notify the applicant for hail insurance of the ac-
ceptance or rejection of his application within twenty-four hours or
be liable in the event of loss.3 4 The court in the Mann case quoted
'Aft has been suggested that the tort test for determining whether there was
negligence, utility of conduct v. magnitude of risk, should be applied to the type
of fact sitation under discussion, and that it clearly indicates liability for negligence
in not taking action. Note (1942) 46 Dick. L. Rev. 2o5. If that test is to be applied
here, the courts will then have to consider,of course, many factors bearing on the
magnitude of risk the age of the applicant, his medical history and that of his
family, the nature of the applicant's occupation, etc. in the case of life insurance-
in order to determine what the foreseeable risk is. Liability would not result
automatically. But if this tort test is to be used to determine whether the insurance
company had a duty to act on an offer for a contract, why should not the same
test be applied to the offeree's conduct in all contract negotiations? It would seem
that this test should not be applied peculiarly to the offeree in this particular
context unless something unique in the negotiations for an insurance policy
justifies it. To justify the use of the test here, the courts must then resort to those
grounds, discussed above, which have already been used as the basis for imposing
liability.
82Since tort liability requires a legal duty, failure to comply with the duty,
and an injury which is the proximate result of such failure [Bohlen, Studies in
the Law of Torts (1926) 33], the question must arise whether plaintiff's loss was
the proximate result of defendant's failure to act within a reasonable time. If the
insurance company had a legal duty to act within a reasonable time, then -as soon
as the time became unreasonable the applicant had a duty to avoid the consequences
of the company's negligence by making application for equivalent insurance else-
where. Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914 (W. D. Mo. 1933); Note
(1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 395. Plaintiff's loss will be the proximate result of the com-
pany's failure to act on the application within a reasonable time, therefore, only
if it occurred in the intermim 4etween the moment. when the defendant, company's
inaction had extended beyond a reasoniable time and the date when another in-
surance company would have had a reasonable time in which to act on the ap-
plication it received.
1'National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71, 43 S. Ct. 32, 67 L. ed.
136 (1922).
"N.D. Laws (1913) c. 177, No. i; Comp Laws Ann. (1913) § 4902.
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the arguments which the Supreme Court had used to uphold the con-
stitutionality of this statute-i.e., the public-interest and public-fran-
chise arguments-in support of the court's right to impose such liability
in the absence of any statute. Both cases arose in the same state, and
the hail insurance statute was in effect when the Mann case came up.
The legislature had not extended the duty to act to types of insurance
other than hail insurance. 35 Yet what the legislature had been allowed
to do under the police power, the court contended it could do itself,
and for the same reasons.
36
Some of the courts have been disturbed by the fact that the parties
did not deal on terms of equality.37 Hesitant to impose hardship on
plaintiffs in these cases, the courts have grounded their own right to
impose on insurers a duty to act on reasons which are of tortured arti-
ficiality or which suggest only that the legislature could impose that
duty. It is submitted that the courts holding the company liable have
found a duty where no legal duty existed, and that the imposition of
liability in the absence of statutory authority constitutes unwarranted
judicial legislation.38
DONALD S. LATouRETTE
LABOR LAw-APPLICATION OF UNLAWFUL PURPOSE DOCTRINE TO SUSTAIN
INJUNCTION AGAINST PICKETING IN SUPPORT OF BREACH OF EMPLOY-
MENT CONTRACT. [Arkansas]
A controversial judicial limitation on the activities of labor unions
is the unlawful purpose doctrine, under which the courts test the legal-
ity of union conduct. Early American courts had held coercive labor
activity illegal by invoking the criminal conspiracy doctrine,' but in
1842 in Commonwealth v. Hunt2 the Massachussetts court refused to
4'Thc fact that the legislature required insurers to act on an application
within a reasonable time only in the case of hail insurance might well give rise to
the presumption that it did not want insurers to have that duty where other kinds
of insurance were applied for. Weatherby v. Aetna Ins. Co., ii N. J. Misc. 435, 167
Atl. 877 (1933).
" See note 5, supra.
27 See note 28, supra.
Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 Conn. 526, 165 Ad. 686 (1933); Schliep
v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 479, 254 N.W. 68 (1934); Note (1933)
32 Mich. L. Rev. 595; see also Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914
at 917 (W. D. Mo. 1933).
'People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. io (N. Y. 1835); People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler Crim.
Cas. 262 (N. Y. i8io).
-4 Metc. ii (Mass. 1842).
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apply that rule, holding instead that a labor union was not in itself
criminal, as it conceivably could have a socially desirable purpose.
Though the criminal conspiracy concept was not immediately abro-
gated by the Hunt case,3 it did gradually fall into disuse and was even-
tually superseded by the prima facie tort concept.4 Under this approach,
any concerted labor interference with an existing relationship between
employer and employee was actionable unless justified.5 The decisive
questions before the courts following the prima facie tort theory thus
centered around "justification."6' The famous Trilogy cases7 refined the
concept by limiting its application to concerted activity and moreover
by asserting that the legality of the purpose of the labor conduct is
the measure of what constituted justification. Out of this latter test the
unlawful purpose doctrine came into being.s
The courts have applied two divergent interpretations of the un-
lawful purpose doctrine. By one view, if in the opinion of the court
the result is "objectionable" 9 because (i) the end is socially undesir-
able' 0 or (2) the end does not constitute a proper labor objective even
though it may be socially desirable, 11 then the conduct that would lead
to such result is enjoinable. This view turns upon the effects that labor
activity would have upon society generally, with the courts enunciating
public policy of the state.
3.Gregory, Labor and the Law (2d ed. 1949) 29. In Regina v. Bunn, 12 Cox C. C.
316 (1872), strikers were found guilty of criminal conspiracy because they struck
collectively in breach of individual employment contracts which required notice
of quitting. And even as late as 191 7 the Supreme Court in Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 299 at 253, 38 S. Ct. 65 at 73, 62 L. ed. 26o at 277 (1917)
intimated that the general legality of the labor unions was still an open question,
with the determination depending upon the particular facts of each case.
'A more effective procedual method than the criminal conspiracy prosecu-
tion for combating organized labor activity was adopted in the form of injunctions
from courts of equity.
5Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 25 S. Ct. 3, 49 L. ed. 154 (19o4); White
Mountain Freezer Co. v. Murphy, 78 N. H. 398, 1o At. 357 (1917).
For discussion of "justification" see i Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining (1949) § 74.
'Mogul Steamship Co., Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [i8gi] 23 Q. B. 598;
Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1; Quinn v. Leathem, [19o] A. C. 495.
"Gregory, Labor and the Law (2d ed. 1949) 5o. See 31 Am. Jur., Labor § 23o.
"'Objectionable" in this sense means an activity which tends to disturb the
economic balance created by the unfettered operation of the theory of supply and
demand.
"Haverhill Strand Theatre, Inc. v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671 (1918)
(unlawful purpose to coerce employer, who desired one organist, into hiring five
musicians).
2-'De Minico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N. E. 317 (1911) (unlawful purpose to
strike to get rid of two undesirable foremen).
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Under the other view, if the result of labor activity is prohibited
by statute, then the conduct becomes enjoinable under the unlawful
purpose doctrine. Thus, a labor objective has been held unlawful
because it would compel the employer to violate a criminal statute,
12
or to act contrary to the public policy of the state as proclaimed by the
legislature, 13 or to commit an act designated by statute as an unfair
labor practice,' 4 or to violate a statutory obligation to perform its
function as a common carrier.' 5 The latter decision indicates that it
is not necessary that the statute prohibit the conduct itself, if it pro-
hibits the result that the conduct would effectuate.
Essentially, the difference between the social desirability view and
the statutory violation view is in the test of the purpose: Under the
former view the courts employ their own ideas of social desirability and
policy, whereas under the latter view the courts are guided by the
legislature.
In Lion Oil Co. v. Marsh16 the Arkansas Supreme Court has re-
cently demonstrated the facility with which the social desirability view
of the unlawful purpose doctrine can be employed to impose drastic
restrictions on labor union activities. A one-year employment agree-
ment had been negotiated between the union and the oil company with
provision for termination at the end of the year upon a sixty-day written
notice. The union allegedly violated the contract by its failure to give
proper notice before setting up its picket line.' 7 An injunction pro-
hibiting the picketing was issued by a county court and was upheld
on the ground that the failure to give written notice and to wait for
sixty days was a breach of the contract, and that the picketing which
2Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. ed.
834 (1949) (anti-trade restraint statute, violation of which is punishable by fine and
imprisonment or both).
"Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532,
70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. ed. 1045 (195o) (statute prohibiting coercion by employer of his
employee's choice of a bargaining representative, violation of which is enjoinable).
"Park & Telford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27
Cal. (2d) 599, 165 P. (2d) 891, 162 A. L. R. 1426 (1946) (statute condemned employer's
recognizing group which did not represent majority of employees in preference to
group which did represent the majority).
15Northwestern Pac. R. Co. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers' Union, 31 Cal. (2d)
441, 189 P. (2d) 277 (1948) (obligation of railroad to serve the public on pain of sanc-
tions imposed by law for nonperformance of such duty).
2"249 S. W. (2d) 569 (Ark. 1952).
"Statutes in Minnesota [Minn. Acts (1939) c. 44o, § ii (a)] and Wisconsin [Wis.
Laws (1939) c. 57, § 11 i.o6 (2c)] declare strikes in violation of the terms of col-
lective bargaining agreements to be unfair labor practices and as such subject to
cease and desist orders (Wisconsin) and liability for suits for damages (Minnesota).
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supported the breach of the contract was in furtherance of an unlaw-
ful purpose. Thus, the court has ruled that if the activity creates civil
liability, it is enjoinable even though the legislature had not made it
illegal to breach an employment agreement.
In reaching this conclusion the majority relied upon' the previous
decision of the court in Self v. Taylor,'8 in which picketing had been
enjoined. However, the picketing in the Self case had for its purpose
the effectuation of a closed shop, an objective which was specifically
prohibited by the state constitution 19 and by state statutes. 20 There-
fore, the majority, in applying the social desirability views of unlaw-
ful purpose, invoked as precedent a case which exemplifies the statutory
violation view. The view of the majority is more closely analogous to
that of Florsheim Shoe Store v. Retail Salesmen's Union2 ' where the
New York court, in the face of a statute prohibiting the issuance of
injunctions in "labor disputes, '22 determined that the union's activity
was for an unlawful purpose because it was in violation of an existing
employment contract, and therefore enjoined peaceful picketing that
arose from a conflict between two unions over the election of one of
them as a bargaining agent.
A number of other state courts have assumed the authority to de-
termine, on the basis of their own concepts of social desirability,
whether union action involves an illegal purpose.2 3 And the unlaw-
ful purpose doctrine has received perhaps its most expanded rami-
fication when recently some courts have applied it to limit the use of
the Thornhill v. Alabama24 doctrine-that peaceful picketing is a
'217 Ark. 953, 235 S. W. (2d) 45 (1950).
"Ark. Const. (1874) Amend. 34-1.
2OArk. Stat. (1947) § 81-201.
2288 N. Y. 188, 42 N. E. (2d) 480 (1942).
2N. Y. Civil Practice Act § 876a. The court avoided the affect of the anti-
injunction act by holding that there was no labor dispute within the meaning of
the act.
-'Shop 'N Save v. Retail Food Clerks Union, 2 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 747 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, (1940) (picketing held unlawful and subject to
injunction because it was conducted in furtherance of an "outlaw" strike resulting
from a conspiracy on the part of the union members to breach collective bargaining
agreements and called in violation of arbitration clauses in the bargaining con-
tracts); Haverhill Strand Theatre Inc. v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671 (1918)
(injunction upheld against musicians' union which had attempted to provide ad-
ditional work for its members by requiring prospective employer to hire extra,
unneeded musicians in order to get the services of a desired organist); Opera on
Tour v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 84 N. B. (2d) 349 (1941) (injunction issued to pre-
vent a musicians' union from impeding scientific progress by picketing against use
of canned music).
2431o U. S. 88, 6o S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940).
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constitutionally guaranteed form of free speech-as a justification for
a union's picket.
25
Two of the dissenting Justices in the Lion Oil case argued that no
breach of contract had occurred; the other Justice took the position
that even if the failure to give the termination notice did constitute
a breach of contract, there was no wrongdoing involved which justi-
fied the invoking of the unlawful purpose doctrine. It is clear that
the latter judge accepted the statutory violation view of unlawful pur-
pose by arguing that since the breaching of a contract was not punish-
able by criminal prosecution, the picketing in furtherance of the
breaching was not for such an unlawful purpose as to be enjoinable.
This judge, in rejecting the use of the term "wrongful" to mean "un-
lawful" in questionable labor objective controversies, 2 6 is supported
by the pronouncements of the California courts in regard to whether
peaceful picketing for the purpose of inducing a breach of contract or
in violation of a contract is enjoinable. A lower California court in
Lichtenberger-Ferguson Co. v. International Jewelry Workers Union27
held that picketing, if peaceful and honest, could not be enjoined even
if conducted to support a strike which was in violation of a union
5An early deviation from the Thornhill v. Alabama doctrine was the Supreme
Court decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 49o, 69 S. Ct.
684, 93 L. ed. 834 (1949) that picketing would not be immune from injunctive
process if the purpose of the activity was to compel the employer to violate a
criminal statute, and later in the Building Service Employees International Union v.
Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532, 70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. ed. 1045 (1950) if the employer be forced
to violate a non-criminal statute. The employer was not forced to violate any statute
in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773,
94 L. ed. 995 (195o), but a union objective which would cause a man to give up his
self-employed garage and used-car lot in the interests of unionization was held by
the Supreme Court of Washington, 33 Wash. (2d) 646, 207 P. (2d) 2o6 (1949), and
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, to be so socially undersirable that
an injunction was issued despite the fact that the picketing was peaceful and
allegedly protected by the constitution right of free speech. In one of the most recent
cases on the subject of free speech doctrine, the Supreme Court in Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. ed. 985 (1950) upheld a California
court injunction, 32 Cal. (2d) 85o, 198 P. (2d) 885 (1948), of a union's peaceful picket-
ing to compel the employer to employ a proportionate number of Negro workers
as there were Negro customers of the employer's store. The California court held
that peaceful picketing doctrine was not available to the union as a defense because
the purpose of the picketing was not the pursuance of a proper labor obpective
since the picketing would, in the mind of the court, tend to promote rather than
abolish racial discrimination. The Hughes case would seem to be the clearest case
of judicial legislation in the field of unlawful purpose.
^Lion Oil Co. v. Marsh, 249 S. W. (2d) 569 at 575 (1952).
22o L. R. R. M. 2785 (Cal. Super Ct., Los Angeles County, 1946). Shop 'N Save
v. Retail Food Clerks Union, 2 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 747 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles
County, 194o) represents an earlier inconsistent decision. See note 23, supra.
1953]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
contract, while the Supreme Court of California has declared that
"The interest of labor in improving working conditions is of sufficient
social importance to justify peaceful labor tactics otherwise lawful,
though they have the effect of inducing breaches of contracts between
employer and employee or employer and customer."28
When the issue of the controversy is the right of an employer to ob-
tain an injunction against peaceful picketing, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act29 has rendered both views of the unlawful purpose doctrine mean-
ingless in the federal courts.30 Instead of determining the basis for
issuance of the injunction in terms of the legality of the purpose, the
federal courts, under this Act, can issue the injunction only if the
labor activity is not within the list of acts sanctioned in Section 4 of
the statute.31 Thus, in Wilson and Co. v. BirJ3 2 injunctive relief was
denied because a peaceful picket to compel a dosed shop was deemed
to be within Section 4, though in the absence of an anti-injunction
statute such an objective would possibly be the basis for restraint upon
the ground of unlawful purpose.33
One of the foremost authorities in the labor law field has recently
declared that to extend the doctrine of unlawful purpose as the ma-
jority of the court did in the Lion Oil case, constitutes a step toward
the undesirable situation in which the judiciary will feel free to use
the unlawful purpose doctrine as a convenient tool to strike down
labor activity personally objectionable to it.34 Former Justice Leflar
of the Arkansas Supreme Court 5 vigorously concurred with that point
of view when, in the dissenting opinion in Self v. Taylor, he warned:
nImperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. (2d) 33, 112 P. (2d) 631, 632 (1941).
"47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 1o (1947).
'Wilson & Co. v. Bin, 27 F. Supp. 915, 917 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
81If the labor activity is not within the list of acts sanctioned in Section 4, the
court will issue injunctive relief upon the finding of the enumerated facts in Sec-
tion 7.
- 2 7 F. Supp. 915 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
See Self v. Taylor, 217 Ark. 953, 235 S. W. (2d) 45, 50 (1950). Some state
courts, interpreting legislation modeled after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, have held
in accord with the Wilson case that union self-help methods which breach col-
lective bargaining disputes are "labor disputes" and are not enjoinable. Accord:
Bulkin v. Sacks, 31 Pa. D. & C. 291 (1938). Contra: Greater City Master Plumbers
Ass'n. Inc. v. Kahme, 6 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 589 (1937).
3Gregory, Labor and the Law (2d ed. 1949) 1o3. See Justice Brandeis' dissent-
ing opinion Duplex Printing Press Co v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 479, 41 S. Ct. 172,
181, 65 L. ed. 349, 362 (1921).
"Judge Leflar is presently Dean of the University of Arkansas School of Law,
and was not a member of the court which decided the principal case.
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"The action now being taken by the majority of this court
appears to me to be a serious and dangerous one. It is not limited
in its impact or effect to labor union cases. It may apply in any
case where any group, or any individual, seeks to engage in law-
ful conduct which in the minds of some or all may create a later
opportunity for unlawful conduct. It is the motive, the hope, the
uncertain expectation that is feared; and because of the fear a
lawful act is enjoined. This is too tenuous. It goes a step beyond
our past decisions in seeking to control the minds of men by law,
in seeking to prevent the peaceful communication of ideas upon
a subject of legitimate public interest. I do not want to take
that step."36
The judicial ideas of social utility and public policy which are
brought to bear when the courts employ the unlawful purpose doc-
trine are too often inadequate as guiding principles in specific cases.
8 7
While some courts would permit the jury to decide the lawfulness
of the purpose,38 it seems more feasible to place the responsibility
with the legislature. Since the question is primarily one of public
policy, the theoretical solution would require that the legislative
branch set the standard for the judiciary by making such statutory en-
actments as it deems desirable.
However, since the legislature could not possibly foresee all the
objectives that the labor unions will seek, it should not become an
absolute rule that no labor activity could be enjoined unless it is vio-
lative of some established tort or criminal law or prohibited by some
positive statute. Unquestionably there are some labor union objectives,
not within such classification, which would be contrary to the best
interests of society. For example, in Opera on Tour v. Weber,39 the
New York court sensibly invoked the unlawful purpose doctrine to
-"217 Ark. 953, 235 S. W. (2d) 45, 52 (1950).
"See 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) 348. Cf. Dolan
Dining Co. v. Cooks' and Assistants' Union, 124 N. J. Eq. 584, 4 A. (2d) 5, 8 (1938)
wherein a distinction was drawn between "big business" and "small business" with
reference to the permissibility of peaceful picketing. The court enjoined the picket
of the "small business," though it intimated that if this were "big business" no in-
junction would have been issued. The rationale for this acute analysis: "The labor
union was born of necessity. However, that necessity arose not from the abuses of
the small business men employing few men, but from the oppression of workmen
by large combinations of capital employing such numbers of men that the indi-
vidual was reduced to a mere number utterly incapable of audible voice protest
against the exactions of unscrupulous employers...."
"Prosser, Torts (1941) 996, n. 48.
3285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941).
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prevent a musicians' union from impeding scientific progress by picket-
ing against the use of canned music. 4
0
When a court evaluates the proper use of purely economic weapons
such as strikes and pickets, it is not exercising a proper judicial func-
tion since vital public policy considerations are concerned. Because
the legislature is normally charged with this responsibility, full accord
should be given by the judiciary to that body's enactments, when it
determines as a matter of substantive law that some labor objective
is prohibited. When the legislature has not acted upon the substantive
point in this field, but has set out procedural limitations, such as
an anti-injunction act, then the court must of necessity determine the
substantive question. However, this should be done with consideration
for those legislative procedural standards which have been pronounced.
In those situations where the legislature has not acted at all upon the
subject, then the court in applying the unlawful purpose doctrine
should realize that it is exercising a function which is primarily legis-
lative and consequently should apply the unlawful purpose doctrine
with the utmost caution.
JOHN P. WARD
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF CITY TO CHARGE NONRESIDENT
CONSUMERS DISCRIMINATORY RATES FOR UTILITY SERVICES. [Texas]
Under the general common law rule, a municipality supplying water
as a public service to private consumers acts in a proprietary capacity
and cannot discriminate in regard to rates charged to its customers if
a private corporation in the same position could not do so.1 This rule
is almost universally followed when applied to the residents of the
municipality.2 However, there have been a number of recent cases
"0In Haverhill Strand Theatre, Inc. v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671 (1918),
an injunction was upheld against a musicians' union which had attempted to pro-
vide additional work for its members by requiring prospective employer to hire
extra, unneeded musicians in order to get the services of a desired organist.
1City of Montgomery v. Greene, i8o Ala. 322, 6o So. goo (1913); Knotts v.
Nollen, 2o6 Iowa 261, 218 N. W. 563 (1928); H. 0. L. C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 175
Md. 676, g A. (2d) 747 (1939); Almaras v. City of Hattiesburg, 181 Miss. 752, x8o So.
392 (1938); American Aniline Products v. City of Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 135 Ad.
726, 5o A. L. R. 121 (1927); Simons v. City Council of Charleston, 181 S. C. 353,
187 S. E. 545 (1936); 43 Am. Jur., Public Utilities and Services § 172.
2City of Malvern v. Young, 205 Ark. 886, 171 S. W. (2d) 47o (1943); Knotts v.
Nollen, 2o6 Iowa 261, 218 N. W. 563 (1928); Almaras v. City of Hattiesburg, 181
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which hold that a municipally-owned public utility is not bound
by this rule when supplying water to consumers outside the limits of
the municipality, and so may arbitrarily charge nonresidents any rate
that it desires. 3
In the face of this growing view that the general rule no longer ap-
plies to guarantee equality of rates for nonresidents the Supreme Court
of Texas, in a 5 to 4 decision, has recently ruled in City of Texarkana
v. Wiggins,4 that the Texas municipal utilities regulation statute5
does not permit arbitrary discrimination in water and sewer rates be-
tween resident and nonresident consumers. In 1948, the City of Tex-
arkana, through the issue of revenue bonds, had purchased a privately-
owned water works which had been serving both Texarkana and North
Texarkana. The private utility had charged all consumers the same
rates, and the city had continued the same rate scale until two years
after the purchase, when a city ordinance was passed raising the water
rates of nonresidents to one and one-half times the previous charge
without a corresponding increase in rates charged to residents of the
city. The city gave no reason for this change in rates. Petitioners, resi-
dents of North Texarkana, brought an action to enjoin the city from
charging the increased rates. The majority of the Texas court found
that the general rule still applies in Texas notwithstanding a statute
which gives municipal utilities power to serve nonresidents "... under
such terms and conditions as may appear to be for the best interest of
such town or city."6 The court said of the statute: "'We find no classi-
fication of consumers in the language of the statute nor do we find
authority for unjustified discrimination there. True, the statute ex-
pressly authorizes a city to serve nonresidents of the city and by so des-
ignating them it has, perhaps, so classified them. But when the reasons
for the enactment of the statute are considered we think it clear that
Miss. 752, 18o So. 392 (1938); Barnes Laundry Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 266 Pa. 24,
1o9 At. 535 (192o); Simons v. City Council of Charleston, 181 S. C. 353, 187 S. E.
545 (1936); 2 Pond, Public Utilities (4th ed. 1932) § 545.
3Service of water: City of Phoenix v. Kasun, 54 Ariz. 470, 97 P. (2d) 210, 127 A. L.
R. 84 (1939); City of Englewood v. City & County of Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 229 P.
(2d) 667 (1951); Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 2o6 Ga. 753, 58 S. E. (2d) 823 (1950);
Childs v. City of Columbia, 87 S. C. 566, 70 S. E. 296 (1911). Contra: Wagner v.
City of Youngstown, 75 N. E. (2d) 724 (Ohio App. 1946). Sewer service: Davisworth
v. City of Lexington, 311 Ky. 6o6, 224 S. W. (2d) 649 ('949); Atlantic Const. Co. v.
City of Raleigh, 23o N. C. 365, 53 S. E. (2d) 165 (1949).
'246 S. W. (2d) 622 (Texas 1952).
'Texas Stat. (Vernon's, 1939 Supp.) Art. io8, subd. 3.
OTexas Stat. (Vernon's, 1939 Supp.) Art. 11o8, subd. 3.
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the legislature did not intend to create a class of consumers against
which the city could discriminate for any reason or without reason.' 7
The dissenting judges, in disagreeing with this interpretation of
the Texas statute, relied on the recent decision of the Supreme Court
of Colorado in City of Englewood v. City and County of Denver8 where,
under a fact situation remarkably similar to that of the Texas case, it
was held that the general rule against discrimination among customers
did not apply to the supplying of water outside the limits of the muni-
cipality. Further, the Colorado court ruled that even if the common law
rule were still generally operative in such situations, it had been ab-
rogated by the Colorado statute which authorized municipalities to
supply water to consumers outside their corporate limits, "and to col-
lect therefor such charges and upon such conditions and limitations
as said towns and cities may impose by ordinance." 9
Both the dissenting judges in the Texarkana case and the court in
the Englewood case take the position that there should be no absolute
restriction against a variance in rates for the services rendered by a
municipally-operated public utility to nonresidents. They argue that
a municipality owes no duty to serve nonresidents at all, and therefore
if it does agree to provide them with utilities the service can be on
any terms which the city may designate1 0 This is the familiar argument
that the greater power necessarily includes the lesser, which has been
invoked to uphold the right of a municipality to regulate speech
7City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 246 S. W. (2d) 622, 627 (Texas 1952). The reason
for passage of the statute, as given by the court, was to allow cities to serve non-
residents. This power had previously been denied by the courts.
8123 Colo. 290, 229 P. (2d) 667 (1951). The municipal corporation had purchased
a privately-owned public utility serving the residents of Denver and, Englewood
with water. The city then raised the water rates charged nonresidents by thirty
per cent without also raising rates charged to residents. The City of Englewood un-
successfully sued to enjoin the City and County of Denver from charging the higher
rates. For a discussion of the law in Colorado prior to this decision see Waldeck,
Extraterritorial Service of Municipally Owned Water Works in Colorado (1949)
21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 56.
"Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 163, § 22.
1°Justice Calvert dissenting in the Texarkana case said: "It [the City of Tex-
arkana] may furnish water and sewer services and facilities to residents of North
Texarkana so long and only so long as the residents of that municipality contract for
such services and the authorities of that municipality permit; but being under no
duty to furnish in the first instance it may discontinue such services, on reasonable
notice, with or without cause. Being entitled to discontinue the services according
to its want, it follows that the City can continue them on its own terms and con-
ditions." City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 246 S. W. (2d) 622, 629 (Texas 1952).
[Vol. X
CASE COMMENTS1953]
making in a municipally-owned common,' 1 and to restrict political
activities of a city law enforcement officer.' 2
Logically, this contention is difficult to overcome in the water
rate cases, but the Texas court compared the situation before it with
those of cases involving the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Under that rule, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
state can, as a prerequisite to allowing corporations to do business
therein, require that the corporations agree to certain conditions under
which they will carry on their business,' 3 so long as those conditions
are not unconstitutional.14 While these cases are distinguishable from
the water rate discrimination cases, yet the decisions demonstrate that
the greater power of the municipality to refuse service to nonresidents
does not necessarily include the lesser power to serve them only if they
agree to submit to an unequal rate schedule, for the discrimination
may involve an illegal condition. The ordinance of the City of Tex-
arkana, imposing increased rates on nonresidents as a condition to
further service, is rendered illegal by its violation of the common law
rule forbidding unjust discrimination.
A privately-owned public utility must have its rates approved
by a regulatory body, which will not allow the utility to discriminate
between different consumers without showing a sound reason there-
"Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. 113 (1895) where Judge
Holmes said: "When no proprietary rights interfere, the legislature may end the
right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the
dedication to public uses. So it may take the lesser step of limiting the public use to
certain purposes. If the legislature had power under the constitution to pass a law
in the form of the present ordinance, there is no doubt that it could authorize the
city of Boston to pass the ordinance, and it is settled ... that it has done so."
"McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N. E. 517 (1892) (since city had
right to refuse to employ individual as policeman, it had right to employ him on
condition that he refrain from engaging in political party activities).
"Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Warren, 181 U. S. 73, 21 S. Ct. 535, 45 L. ed.
755 (1901) (upholding a state statute regulating the making of contracts of in-
surance); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 20 S. Ct. 518, 44 L. ed. 657
(19oo) (upholding a state statute which required the corporation to abide by the
state anti-trust laws).
"4Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm. of California, 271 U. S. 583, 46
S. Ct. 605, 70 L. ed. 1101, 47 A. L. R. 457 (1926) (state cannot require private car-
riers for hire to assume burdens and duties of common carrier as prerequisite to use
of state highways); Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529, 42 S. Ct. 188,
66 L. ed. 352, 21 A. L. R. 186 (1922) (state cannot restrict right of corporation to
bring action in or remove action to federal court). For further discussion see Hale,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 321;
Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions (1929) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 879.
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for.15 It would seem to follow that a municipality which purchases
and operates a public utility bound not to discriminate in rate
charges has no more right arbitrarily to discriminate between classes
of its consumers than did the previous owners. It is the same plant
serving the same functions for the same people, the only change
being in the management. The municipality stands in the same po-
sition as the former private owners.16 This change in management
should not of itself justify depriving nonresident consumers of service
they could reasonably expect.' 7
The argument is advanced that no rights of the outside customers
are infringed because the city owes no duty to serve consumers out-
side the city. This is undoubtedly true when the extension of service
to new consumers is being considered, as even the majority of the
court in the Texarkana case agree;' s but the city would seem to be
in a decidedly different position when the withdrawal of service from
old consumers is being considered. The leading case of City of Mont-
'3 This is ordinarily provided by statute. Exemplary are Texas Stat. (Vernon's,
1936) Art. 1125 (judicial regulation); 8 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) §56-235
(regulation by commission). See notes 24 and 25, infra.
16"When the city purchased the private plant it assumed a trust to perform the
contract and meet the obligations of the private concern. The obligation of that
company to its customers did not require water service at the same rate paid by
citizens of Beverly Hills. The obligation which the city assumed through the pur-
chase of the system was an obligation to continue to serve plaintiff water at a
reasonable rate. Lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful
discrimination, and is not prima facie unreasonable. Discrimination to be ob-
jectionable must draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance between those in
like circumstances having equal rights and privileges." Durant v. City of Beverly
Hills, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 133, 1o2 P. (2d) 759, 762 (1940).
17Here, a distinction can be drawn between services of different types of
utilities. A privately-owned electric company after selling part of its facilities to a
municipality might very well continue to serve nonresidents. A water company
which usually operates on a smaller scale than an electric company would most
likely sell all of its facilities to the municipality and be unable to serve its former
consumers in any way. If the utilities had completely sold out, the nonresidents
would find it easier to get service from another electric utility company than
from a new water utility. The Colorado court in City of Englewood v. City and
County of Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 229 P. (2d) 667 at 671 (1951), recognizes that there
is a difference but fails to comment on it.
's"We think the effect of the statute is that when a city decides to exercise this
power to provide its utility service to customers outside the city limits it may then
fix such service charges as it decides the situation requires; if it requires a higher
charge than is fixed against residents of the city for the same service, the city may
exact the higher rate. But whatever it fixes, a rate status between the city and its
outside customers is thereby established and the city cannot thereafter arbitrarily
change the rate so as to discriminate, or further discriminate, between them and




gomery v. Greene19 holds that since the supply of water is a public
necessity, it cannot be arbitrarily limited to residents of the city, im-
plying that the city must continue to serve those persons residing in
close proximity to the city unless there are good and compelling rea-
sons for not doing so. 20 And in Durant v. City of Beverly Hills,21 the
California court declared: "When the city purchased the private plant
it assumed a trust to perform the contract and meet the obligations
of the private concern .... The obligation which the city assumed
through the purchase of the system was an obligation to continue
to serve plaintiff water at a reasonable rate. '22 In Virginia a statute2
requires cities which purchase electric or water plants to continue ser-
vice to former consumers from the private owner. When the city does
not have the greater power to refuse service, it no longer logically fol-
lows that the city has the lesser power to impose arbitrary restrictions
on the service. The municipality would be governed by the rule re-
quiring a reasonable basis for a difference in rates between classes of
consumers.
There are many factors which could enter into a determination of
whether the inequality in rates was justifiable. A city could well be
justified in charging nonresidents higher rates if the purchase and/or
operation of the utility placed an increased burden on the taxpayers of
the municipality which was not reflected in the taxes of nonresidents.2 4
If the payments of interest or principal on bonds issued to finance the
purchase or construction of the system were paid out of the general
funds of the city rather than from revenues of the system, the city
would have the right to charge the nonresidents their fair share of the
expense.25 In such a situation there would need be no corresponding in-
crease in the rates to residents, for they would be paying their share
in taxes.
It appears that the courts in deciding such a controversy as was
'Di8o Ala. 322, 60 So. goo (1913).
OThe examples of such reasons given by the court were an inadequate supply
and the remoteness of the prospective consumers.
2139 Cal. App. (2zd) 133, 102 P. (2d) 759 (1940).
2Durant v. City of Beverly Hills, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 133, 102 P. (2d) 759, 762
(1940).
23 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 15-716. This statute is discussed at length
in City of South Norfolk v. City of Norfolk, 19o. Va. 591, 58.S. E. (2d) 32 (195o),
noted in (1950) 7 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 225.
"'Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, 307 Ky. 413, 211 S. W. (2d) 122, 4 A. L. R. (2d) 588 (1948); Village of
Fox Point v. Public Servce Commission, 242 Wis. 97, 7 N. W. (2d) 571 (1943).
'Simons v. City Council of Charleston, 181 S. C. 353, 187 S. E. 545 (1936).
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presented in the principal case should first consider whether the non-
residents contracted with the city initially for the service, or whether
they were originally served by a nondiscriminating, privately-owned
water works which was later taken over by the municipality. In the
former situation, the argument seems sound that the city owing no
duty to serve at all, may serve on any basis it desires, and the courts
should not interfere with the practice of charging unequal rates. If
the latter situation is found to be involved, then the courts must pro-
ceed to the further inquiry of whether the city can show some reason-
able basis for charging nonresidents the higher rate. If the city cannot
establish such a justification, it should be held to the same duty in re-
gard to nonresidents that it must follow in dealing with residents.
ROBERT E. GLEN
PROCEDURE-IMMUNITY OF NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT IN CRIMINAL PROSE-
CUTION FROM SERVICE OF CIVIL PROCESS. [West Virginia]
Nonresident litigants and witnesses in civil suits are generally
granted immunity from service of civil process while in the jurisdiction
for purposes of attending to matters concerning the litigation.' This
immunity was originally asserted as the privilege of the court to secure
the administration of justice from outside interference or influence.
2
In regard to the extension of such immunity to defendants in criminal
prosecutions, the courts are sharply divided.3 In those jurisdictions
'Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U. S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. ed. 192 (1916); Nichols v.
Horton, 14 Fed. 327 (N. D. Iowa 1882); Moseley v. Ricks, 223 Iowa 1038, 274 N. W. 23
(1937); Diamond v. Earle, 217 Mass. 499, 105 N. E. 363 (1914); Cooper v. Wyman,
122 N. C. 784, 29 S. E. 497 (1898); 72 C. J. S., Process § 8o.
2"Experience, however, has shown that in order that causes may be fully heard,
and the orderly administration of justice may be assured, it is necessary that parties,
witnesses, and jurors shall be protected against service of process in civil actions
while they are in good faith in attendance upon the trial of causes." Nichols v.
Horton, 14 Fed. 327, 330 (N. D. Iowa 1882); Cole v. Hawkins, 2 Strange 1094, 93
Eng. Rep. 1054 (1738).
8,... nowhere is there more confusion than in the cases concerning non-
resident defendants in criminal actions." Keeffe and Roscia, Immunity and Senti-
mentality (1947) 32 Corn. L. Q. 471, 486. A number of courts base the granting of
immunity on whether or not the person voluntarily appeared: Reid v. Ham, 54
Minn. 305, 56 N. W. 35 (1893); Broaddus v. Partrick, 177 Tenn. 335, 149 S. W. (2d)
71 (1941). Other courts grant immunity even though attendance was compulsory.
Adamy v. Parkhurst, 61 F. (2d) 517 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Feister v. Hulick, 228 Fed.
821 (E. D. Pa. 1916); Morris v. Calhoun, 119 W. Va. 6o3, 195 S. E. 341 (1938). Still
other courts refused to grant immunity to any nonresidents in criminal cases: Wood
v. Boyle, 177 Pa. St. 620, 35 At. 853, 55 Am. St. Rep. 747 (1896); Anderson v.
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which grant immunity to the nonresident defendant, perhaps the
principal justification advanced is that immunity is necessary as a
means of encouraging those charged with a crime to enter the juris-
diction voluntarily, thus saving the cost and trouble of extradition.
4
Those courts which go beyond the mere consideration of the con-
venience of the court argue that a man charged with a crime should
not be harassed with the threat of civil process, which might prevent
him from devoting all his energies and thoughts to defending against
the prosecution.5 It is also pointed out that to deny immunity would be
to force a man to stand trial in the civil action in a county or state
far from his residence, among strangers and at great extra expense,
whereas a defendant has a right to be tried by a jury in the vicinity in
which he resides, so that his true character and conduct may be taken
into consideration. 6
On the other hand, those courts which take the view that immunity
from civil process should be denied nonresident defendants in criminal
cases base their contentions on the fact that since the defendant can
be compelled to come before the court in the foreign jurisdiction, it
is not necessary to encourage him to appear by granting him immun-
ity.1 This reasoning disregards the arguments that the granting of
immunity from civil process may protect the state against the delay
and expense of extradition, and that there are considerations of fair-
ness which require the granting of this immunity.
In State ex rel. Sivnksty v. Duflield s a recent case of first impression,
the West Virginia court manifests both the great degree of confusion
which exists among courts generally in regard to immunity from civil
process of defendants in criminal prosecutions and also the tendency
of the judges to apply questionable reasoning and to draw tenuous
Atkins, 161 Tenn. 137, 29 S. W. (2d) 248 (193o). See Crusco v. Strunk Steel Co., 365
Pa. 326, 74 A. (2d) 142, 143, 2o A. L. R. (2d) 160 (1950).
'Church v. Church, 270 Fed. 361, 14 A. L. R. 769 (C. A. D. C. 1921); New
England Industries, Inc. v. Margiotti, 185 Misc. 845, 6o N. Y. S. (2d) 53 ('945);
Silvey's Estate v. Koppell, 107 S. C. io6, 9 r -S. E. 975 (1917); Morris v.-Calhoun,
119 W. Va. 6o3, 195 S. E. 341 (1938).
1Cummins' Adm'r v. Scherer, 231 Ky. 518, 21 S. W. (2d) 836 (1929); Feuster v.
Redshaw, 157 Md. 302, 145 At. 56o (1929); Silvey's Estate v. Koppell, 107 S. C.
1o6, 91 S. E. 975 (1917); Whited v. Phillips, 98 W. Va. 204,' 126 S. E. 916 (1925).
"Whited v. Phillips, 98 W. Va. 204, 126 S. E. 916 (1925).
'White v. Underwood, 125 N.- C. 25, 34 S. E. 1o4 (1899); Moore v. Green, 73 N. C.
394, 21 Am. Rep. 470 (1875); Ex parte Hendersen, 27 N. D. 155, 145 N. W. 574, 51
L. R. A. (N. s.) 328 (1914); Crusco v. Strunk Steel Co., 365 Pa. 326, 74 A. (2d) 142, 20
A. L. R. (2d) i6o (195o); Anderson v. Atkins, 161 Tenn. 137, 29 S. W. (2d) 248 (1930).
871 S. E. (2d) 113 (IV. Va. 1952).
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distinctions in deciding the individual cases. Petitioner Sivnksty came
into Gilmer County with the intention of remaining a few days, but
soon after his arrival his automobile struck and injured two children.
As a result, Sivnksty was arrested and placed in the county jail on a
charge of reckless driving, where he was held for two days, after which
time he was found guilty as charged and fined fifty dollars. Between
the time of his arrest and trial, he was served with a civil process issued
by the Circuit Court of Gilmer County, commencing an action for
damages for the personal injuries sustained by one of the children. In
the civil action, Sivnksty appeared specially and filed a plea in abate-
ment, alleging that the circuit court was without jurisdiction because
at the time he was served with the process, he was a nonresident of
the county and a prisoner in the county jail. The circuit court sustained
a demurrer to the petitioner's plea in abatement, and set the trial on
the docket. The present action is for a writ of prohibition against the
circuit court judge and the injured child to prevent further proceed-
ings in the personal injury action.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia denied the writ,
answering in the negative the sole issue of the case: "In the circum-
stances of this case was the petitioner immune from civil process at
the time he was served with process in the civil action?" 9 The majority
of the court set out four reasons for granting immunity to defendants
in criminal prosecutions and then ruled that because the present de-
fendent's entry was voluntary, "the reason for the application of the
immunity rule is not present. ... "10 The court did not identify "the
reason" which it found inapplicable here, nor did it indicate why it
singled out one of four reasons as controlling and ignored the other
three, some of which would support imnmunity as strongly where the
entry is voluntary as where involuntary. And the majority judges
now apparently ignore several previous West Virginia cases granting
immunity which indicate that it is immaterial whether the entrance
was voluntary or involuntary."
071 S. E. (2d) 113, 114 (W. Va. 1952).
1071 S. E. (2d) 113, 115 (W. Va. 1952).
"Whether his presence in that county was voluntary or involuntary is im-
material.... Morris v. Calhoun, 119 W. Va. 6o3, 195 S. E. 341, 344 (1938). In Whited
v. Phillips, 98 W. Va. 2o4, 126 S. E. 916 (1925), the court held the defendant to be
immune from service of civil process when his appearance was voluntary, while
in Lang v. Shaw, 113 W. Va. 628, 169 S. E. 444 (1933), the court held the defendant
to be immune when his appearance was involuntary. Therefore, it appears that the




The dissenting judge denied the relevancy of the voluntary nature
of the entry, arguing that, in accord with the cumulative effect of
previous West Virginia decisions,1 2 immunity should be granted in
either situation because it is needed to protect the defendant against
harassment while defending a criminal prosecution, against the pre-
judices of a strange jurisdiction, and against the extra expense of de-
fending a suit far from his own home. Thus, the two factions of the
court did not meet each other's arguments directly because the ma-
jority turned the issue on the consideration of the convenience of the
state, while the dissent would decide the case on the consideration of
fairness to the defendant.
Most of the cases support neither the view of the majority or the
dissent in regard to the effect of the voluntary-involuntary entry dis-
tinction. In disagreement with the dissent's contention, the nature of
the entry is generally considered relevant, but in direct opposition to
the position of the principal decision, it is generally held that im-
munity will be granted where the entrance is voluntary, but not where
it is involuntary.13 The rationale of this view is that immunity is
granted mainly to encourage a person charged with a crime to come
into the jurisdiction voluntarily, which he will be more likely to do if
he knows he is immune from civil process. Thus, the state will be saved
the cost and delay of extradition. 14 However, it may well be argued
that if the offense is sufficiently serious to justify extradition, the desire
to avoid criminal prosecution may be strong enough to keep the defen-
dant from coming back voluntarily. On the other hand, the defendant
may think that he can successfully defend against the criminal prosecu-
tion, but not against civil liability. Therefore, immunity would en-
courage him to enter voluntarily.
=See cases cited, note ii, supra. A few other courts are in accord with these
decisions: Cummins' Adm'r v. Scherer, 231 Ky. 518, 21 S. W. (2d) 836 (1929); Feuster v.
Redshaw, 157 Md. 3o02, 145 AtI. 560 (1929); Thomas v. Blackwell, 172 Okla. 487, 46
P. (2d) 509 (1935).
13Reid v. Ham, 54 Minn. 3o5, 56 N. W. 35, 21 L. R. A. 232 (1893); Casino Fabrics,
Inc. v. Alpren, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 260 (1943); Merritt v. Genth, 130 Misc. 401, 223 N. Y.
Supp. 593 (1927); Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham, 197 N. Y. 377, 90 N. E. 962, 27
L. R. A. (N. s.) 333 (1910); Broaddus v. Partrick, 177 Tenn. 335, 149 S. W. (2d) 71
(1941); Husby v. Emmons, 148 Wash. 333, 268 Pac. 886, 59 A. L. R. 46 (1928); Note
(1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 137.
"By coming voluntarily [into the jurisdiction] the defendant removes an
obstacle to the administration of justice and saves the expense and trouble of ex-
tradition. Is it not in the interest of sound public policy that this should be en-
couraged?" Church v. Church, 27o Fed. 361, 363, (C. A. D. C. 1921). Also, Netograph
Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham, 197 N. Y. 377, 90 N. E. 962, 27 L. R. A. (N. s.) 333 (191o); Note
(1925) 20 IlL. L. Rev. 172.
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Immunity is generally denied where the entrance is involuntary,
because the state already has the defendant within its control and
can compel his presence at the criminal prosecution.15 This reasoning
ignores all but one basis for immunity, but it has been asserted that
this is the only substantial basis for granting immunity, the others
being largely sentimental.' 6 It must be conceded that such a proposi-
don finds some support in history, for immunity was originally granted
solely for the purpose of protecting the court from interference with
its judicial processes.' 7 The "sentimental" factors were injected later,
when some courts extended the rule in order to protect the personal
rights of the individual.' s
It is to be noted that cases denying immunity under the majority
view and the West Virginia decision denying immunity both justify
their results by reasoning that the interest of the state does not demand
that immunity be granted. Yet the majority view cases state that this is
true where the defendant's entry into the jurisdiction was involuntary,
while the West Virginia court termed the petitioner's entry "volun-
tary." Though there thus appears to be a fundamental disagreement
between the two points of view, actually the deviation of the West
Virginia court lies merely in its characterization of petitioner's entry
as voluntary.
Most courts, when speaking of a voluntary entry, have in mind
the situation in which the accused has been in the state previously,
committed the alleged crime, and then departed without being arrested.
Then, in order to induce him to come back voluntarily to stand trial,
the law grants him immunity from civil process. However, in the
principal case, the petitioner came into the jurisdiction, committed
the offense, and was arrested before he could flee the county. In both
situations, the -defendant's original entry was voluntary, before any
n"The reason of the [immunity] rule fails when a party to a suit is brought into
the jurisdiction of the court under arrest or other compulsion of law. Such a party
does nothing to encourage or promote voluntary submission to judicial proceedings.
He comes because he cannot do otherwise." Anderson v. Atkins, 161 Tenn. 137, 29
S. W. (2d) 248 (1930); Crusco v. Strunk Steel Co., 365 Pa. S26, 74 A. (2d) 142, 20
A. L. R. (2d) 16o (1950); Broaddus v. Partrick, 177 Tenn. 335, 149 S. W. (2d) 71 (1941).
"Note (1925) 2o Il. L. Rev. 172.
'7Feister v. Hulick, 228 Fed. 821 (E. D. Pa. 1916); Nichols v. Horton, 14 Fed.
327 (N. D. Iowa 1882); Cole v. Hawkins, 2 Strange 1094, 93 Eng. Rep. 1054 (1738).
the rationale of the rule does not depend upon the voluntary nature of the
non-resident's appearance, but ... upon broad grounds of public policy and indi-
vidual rights." [italics supplied]. Feuster v. Redshaw, 157 Md. 3o2, 145 At. 56o, 562
(1929); Martin v. Bacon, 76 Ark. 158, 88 S. W. 863 (1905); Whited v. Philips, 98 W.
Va. 2o4, 126 S. E. 916 (1925).
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offense was committed. However, the majority courts are not referring
to that entry when they talk about voluntary entry, but rather the
subsequent entry to stand prosecution.
In the principal case, there was never any such subsequent entry,
because the defendant never left the jurisdiction. Therefore, the pe-
titioner in the principal case was actually in the same situation as
the defendant in the ordinary situation who has been brought back
into the state for prosecution by extradition process. Although he
came into the county of his own volition, yet at the time the civil
process was served on him, he was being detained there by force of
incarceration, and thus would generally be classified as being in the
jurisdiction involuntarily' 9 Where a defendant has been extradited
and is served with process while in custody or immediately after dis-
charge, the privilege is generally denied under the majority view, as
his entry is deemed involuntary.20 Similarly, where a nonresident de-
fendant has given bail and returns to stand trial, he is generally re-
garded as being in constructive custody, and his entrance is therefore
involuntary, so that the immunity is denied.21 A few courts have
granted immunity in cases of this kind, fearing that not to do so would
encourage defendants to jump bail.
22
The weakness of the West Virginia court's reasoning lay in classi-
fying petitioner's entry as voluntary, because the majority judges
"The immunity privilege is generally denied in cases of this kind, apart from
statutory provisions. Dunn's Appeal, 35 Conn. 82 (1868); Rosenblatt v. Rosenblatt,
110 Misc. 525, 18o N. Y. Supp. 463 (192o); Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham, 197
N. Y. 377, 90 N. E. 962, 27 L. R. A. (N. s.) 333 (91O); White v. Underwood, 125
N. C. 25, 34 S. E. 104, 46 L. R. A. 7o6 (1899); Mosier v. Aspinwall, 151 Okla. 97, 1 P.
(2d) 633 (1931).
^ONichols v. Goodheart, 5 Ill. App. 574 (188o); Reid v. Ham, 54 Minn. 305, 56
N. W. 35 (1893); In re Walker, 61 Neb. 803, 86 N. W. 510 (19o); Rutledge v.
Krauss, 73 N. J. L. 397, 63 At. 988 (19o6); Williams v. Bacon, io Wend. 636 (N. Y.
1834). A few courts allow immunity in extradition cases on the theory that not to do
so would cause a fraudulent use of extradition to obtain civil process. However, since
such a use of extradition laws is everywhere recognized as ground for vacating
process, this view is of little force.
1 Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham, 197 N. Y. 377, go N. E. 962, 27 L. R. A. (N. s.)
333 (igio); Ex parte Hendersen, 27 N. D. 155, 145 N. W. 574, 5P L. R. A. (N. s.) 328
(1914); Broaddus v. Partrick, 177 Tenn. 335, 149 S. W. (2d) 71 (1941); Husby v.
Emmons, 148 Wash. 333, 268 Pac. 886, 59 A. L. R. 46 (1928).
-"... it can readily be seen that defendants under bail would be tempted to
evade our courts if they are aware that by voluntarily coming here to face an in-
dictment they are rendering themselves liable to summons or capias in a civil action."
Michaelson v. Goldfarb, 94 N. J. L. 352, 11o Atl. 710, 711 (192o); Thomas v. Black-
well, 172 Okla. 487, 46 P. (2d) 5o9 (1935).
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were apparently thinking of the original entry rather than of his status
at the time of the criminal prosecution. Under the situation of the
principal case, there was no element of need to encourage the defen-
dant to come into the county voluntarily, because when he came in
he was not under any threat of criminal liability and after he had
committed the offense he was kept in the county by force of law until
punished. Thus, the majority of the West Virginia court, by a faulty
process of reasoning, has reached a result fully consistent with the
general majority view. Whether that rule denying immunity or the
dissent's views granting immunity is preferable must be determined as a
policy question, turning on the desirability of guarding the accused
against the prejudices involved in standing civil prosecution away
from his home jurisdiction.
CHARLES F. TucKER
PROPERTY-EFFECT OF TAX SALES ON APPURTENANT EASEMENT UPON
SERVIENT ESTATE SOLD FOR DELINQUENT TAXES. [Federal]
In most states, under the applicable statutory provisions and the
courts' interpretation thereof, the purchaser at a valid tax sale of real
estate for delinquent taxes acquires a new, complete, and paramount
title to the land in fee simple absolute, created by grant from the
sovereign.1 As such, the tax sale and subsequent tax deed and title are
said to extinguish all prior titles, rights, interests, equities, and en-
cumbrances, whether such be held by the owner or someone not liable
for the tax.2 However, when the question involves the effect of the
'Hefner v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 123 U. S. 747, 8 S. Ct. 337, 31 L. ed. 3o9
(1887); Teget v. Lamback, 226 Iowa 1346, 286 N. W. 522 (1939); Rist v. Toole
County, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P. (2d) 340 (1945); Polenz v. City of Ravenna, 145 Neb.
845, 18 N. W. (2d) 510 (1945); Alamogordo Improvement Co. v. Prendergast, 43
N. M. 245, 91 P. (2d) 428 (1939). However, in other jurisdictions the applicable
statutes and the courts' interpretation thereof vest in the purchaser a derivative
title, that of the owner against whom the assessment was made. Virginia and West
Virginia Coal Co. v. Charles, 251 Fed. 83 (W. D. Va. 1917); Rothenberger v. Gar-
rett, 224 Mo. 191, 123 S. W. 574 (igog). In such jurisdictions easement rights of
the dominant owner are not affected by the sale of the servient estate for delin-
quent taxes. Smith v. Smith 21 Cal. App. 378, 131 Pac. 89o (1913); Anderson v.
Daugherty, 169 Ky. 308, 183 S. W. 545 (1916); Cardwell v. Crumley, 35 S. W. 767
(Tenn. 1895). For a general discussion of derivative and paramount tax titles and
their effect upon easements see: Kloek, Effect of Tax Deeds on Easements Ap-
purtenant and Rights of Way (1938) 16 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 328; King, The
Assessment and Taxation of Easements (1941) 16 Wash. L. Rev. 36.
2Hefner v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 123 U. S. 747, 8 S. Ct. 337, 31 L. ed.
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tax deed on easements upon the servient estate, created by deed and
appurtenant to the dominant estate, though some decisions rule that
the tax deed extinguishes the easement, 3 many courts are reluctant thus
to carry the general rule to its logical extreme.
4
In the recent case of Engle v. Catucci5 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has placed itself in the latter group of courts.
Plaintiff was the owner of two row lots, a part of a large tract of land
which had been subdivided into a row of six lots fronting on a street,
with one long narrow lot running along the rear of them. By deed to
each of the lots in the tract, the row lots had a right of ingress and
egress across the rear lot. Defendant acquired the rear lot by tax deed
upon payment of the delinquent taxes on it. Thereafter he built a
fence upon his lot and across the rear of plaintiff's lots, thereby deny-
ing plaintiff his right of way, and plaintiff brought an action to enjoin
defendant from thus interfering with the easement right. Defendant
claimed that the tax upon the real estate was a tax directly upon the
land, that the tax deed conferred upon him a title which was in the
nature of a new and independent grant from the sovereign; and that,
as such, it extinguished the easement rights of plaintiff. Plaintiff con-
tended that an easement is a property right which is carved out of
the servient estate for the benefit of, and attaches to, the dominant
estate; that the tax is upon the servient estate less the easement, and
that therefore the easement is not extinguished by sale of the servient
estate upon a tax sale.
The Federal District Court granted the injunction, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that since the tax sale did not extinguish
the easement, plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief against the
defendant's interference with the right of way. While acknowledg-
ing that under the District's statute a tax deed extinguishes all liens,
309 (1887); De Roux v. Girard, 1o5 Fed. 798 (C. C. E. D. Pa. xgoi); Crum v. Cot-
ting, 22 Iowa 411 (1867); Kahle v. Nisley, 74 Ohio St. 328, 78 N. E. 526 (19o6). See
also, notes 8, 13, and 14, infra.
3Wolfson v. Heins, 149 Fla. 499, 6 S. (2d) 858 (1942); Nedderman v. City of Des
Moines, 221 Iowa 1352, 268 N. W. 36 (1936); Harmon v. Gould, i Wash. (2d) 1, 94
P. (2d) 749 (1939)-
'Schlafly v. Baumann, 341 Mo. 755, 108 S. W. (2d) 363 (1937; Northwestern Im-
provement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P. (2d) 792 (1937); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. McGurk, 119 N. J. L. 517, 197 At. 47 (1938); Queens Park Gardens v.
Long Island Water Corp., 277 App. Div. 1146, 1oi N. Y. S. (2d) 454 (195o); Jackson
v. Smith, 153 App. Div. 724, 138 N. Y. Supp. 654 (1912).
a197 F. (2d) 597 (C. A. D. C. 1952).
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equities, and encumbrances in and upon the land conveyed,( the court
ruled that an appurtenant easement created by deed does not fall
within any of these categories; rather, it is a part of the dominant
estate, being carved out of the servient estate, owned by the owner
of the dominant estate to which it is attached, and adding to the value
of the dominant estate while decreasing the value of the servient es-
tate. It was pointed out that, by statutory requirement, realty in the
District of Columbia must be assessed "at not less than the full and
true value thereof in lawful money,"7 and that, hence, the assessment
of the servient estate would be based upon a value lessened by the
existence of the easement, and the assessment of the dominant estate
would be upon an increased value. Therefore, when the servient estate
is sold for non-payment of taxes, it passes subject to the easement, the
taxes upon which have been assessed as part of the dominant estate. 8
While this result and reasoning is in accord with what is said to be
the "majority view,"9 there is a substantial group of courts which
OW. C. & A. N. Miller Development Co. v. Emig Properties Corp., 134 F. (2d)
36, 39 (C. A. D. C. 1943): A tax deed "expunges all the interests which spring from
the record title and vests in the holder a new and complete title to the property in
fee simple."
7D. C. Code (194o) § 47-713.
8Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P. (2d) 792 (1937);
Gowen v. Swain, go N. H. 383, 1o A. (ad) 249 (1939); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. McGurk, 119 N. J. L. 517, 197 Atl. 47 (1938); Tax Lien Co. of New York v.
Shultze, 213 N. Y. 9, io6 N. E. 751 (1914); Queens Park Gardens v. Long Island
Water Corp. 277 App. Div. 1146, 1O N. Y. S. (2d) 454 (1950); Ross v. Franko, 139
Ohio St. 395, 40 N. E. (2d) 664 (1942). While these courts are conscious of the
statutes which declare that the tax deed vests in the purchaser a new, perfect, and
complete title, in fee simple, free of all liens, equities, and encumbrances, they avoid
the conclusion of the minority group of courts under similar statutes by holding
that the assessment is the basis of the tax title and since the assessment is upon the
servient estate less the easement, the statutes apply only to the title to that portion
of the estate. Schlafly v. Baumann, 341 Mo. 755, 1o8 S. W. (2d) 363 (1937); Al-
amogordo Improvement Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N. M. 245, 91 P. (2d) 428 (1939);
Crawford v. Senosky, 128 Ore. 229, 274 Pac. 3o6 (1929). Some courts have gone so
far as to hold that to rule that the easement rights are extinguished would be a
deprivation of property without due process of law. Jackson v. Smith, 153 App. Div.
724, 138 N. Y. Supp. 654 (1912); Blenis v. Utica Knitting Co., 73 Misc. 6i, 13o N. Y.
Supp. 740 (1911).
9"Although there is a division of authority, the majority of the cases hold that
the sale for taxes of land which is subject to an easement or servitude, or a re-
strictive covenant (sometimes called a negative easement), does not have the effect
of extinguishing such easement, servitude, or covenant." Note (1947) 168 A. L. R.
529, 530. While it is true that only those cases dealing with affirmative easements
are in point with the principal case, a great number of the cases included in the
"majority view" deal with negative easements and restrictive covenants, the courts
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have adopted the contrary position for which the tax sale purchaser in
the principal case contended.10 The two divergent views expressed by
the courts on this problem seem to arise from a difference of opinion
as to the nature of an easement for purposes of real property assess-
ment and valuation."
The jurisdictions adopting the "minority view"'12 that the easement
is extinguished by the tax sale of the servient estate13 lay particular
stress upon their statutes which declare that the tax lien has priority
over all other rights, interests, liens, equities, and encumbrances. The
courts reason that a new and complete title is vested in the purchaser,14
and they refuse to draw any distinctions between the character and
nature of easement rights, and the character and nature of the liens,
encumbrances, and equities expressly mentioned in the statutes.' 5
apparently seeing no reason for reaching a different conclusion on the basis of the
nature or type of easement concerned. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry,
104 Mont. 289, 66 P. (2d) 792 (1937) (reciprocal negative easements); Crawford v.
Senosky, 128 Ore. 229, 274 Pac. 3o6 (1929); Hayes v. Gibbs, 11o Utah 54, 169 P. (2d)
781 (1946).
"1See footnotes 12 and 13, infra.
nFor a discussion of the various considerations in property evaluation and the
effect of easements thereof, see Bonbright, The Valuation of Real Estate For Tax
Purposes (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1397, 1435.
2
0nly two or three of the cases whch are generally thought of as comprising
the minority view, deal with the precise question of the principal case-i.e., the
effect of a tax sale upon an affirmative easement. Wolfson v. Heins, 149 Fla. 499, 6 S.
(2d) 858 (1942); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Moyle, 162 Kan. 133, 175 P. (2d) 133
(1946); Tamblin v. Crowley, 99 Wash. 133, 168 Pac. 982 (1917). The others deal
with negative easements or restrictive covenants. Hill v. Williams, 104 Md. 595, 65
At. 413 (xgo6); Hunt v. City of Boston, 183 Mass. 303, 67 N. E. 244 (1903); City of
Jackson v. Ashley, 189 Miss. 818, 199 So. 91 (194o); Hanson v. Carr, 66 Wash. 81,
118 Pac. 927 (1911).
"Wolfson v. Heins, 149 Fla. 499, 6 S. (2d) 858 (1942); Nedderman v. City of
Des Moines, 22!1 Iowa 1352, 268 N. W. 36 (1936) [but see Iowa Code (1946) § 448.3,
which would indicate that the rule has been changed by legislation in Iowa]; Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co. v. Moyle, 162 Kan. 133, 175 P. (2d) 133 (1946); Hill v.
Williams, 104 Md. 595, 65 Atl. 413 (19o6); Hunt v. City of Boston, 183 Mass. 303,
67 N. E. 244 (19o3) [but see Mass Ann. Laws (Michie, 1945) c. 60 § 45, which states:
"... the premises conveyed [by tax deed] ... shall also be subject to and have the
benefit of all easements and restrictions lawfully existing in, upon or over said
land or appurtenant thereto and ... all covenants and agreements running with said
premises either at law or in equity."]; City of Jackson v. Ashley, 189 Miss. 818, 199
So. 91 (1940).
1 Nedderman v. City of Des Moines, 221 Iowa 1352, 268 N. W. 36 (1936); City of
Jackson v. Ashley, 189 Miss. 818, 199 So. 91 (194o); Harmond v. Gould, 1 Wash. (ad)
1, 94 P. (ad) 749 (1939)-
15This refusal is shown by the courts' constant stress upon the idea that the
assessment is upon the land as land and not upon the divided interests therein. See
cases in note 16, infra.
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Therefore, the tax asses'sement does not take easements into considera-
tion. It is not regarded as being upon the separate and divided in-
terests and titles which might exist in relation to a particular piece
of realty (in these cases, the servient estate), but upon the land in its
entirety, upon the land as land, upon the entire "res."' 6 Hence, when
the servient estate is sold for delinquent taxes, the fee simple passes
to the purchaser and the easement right is extinguished. The minority
view seems to fear that to hold that the easement is not extinguished
would be to recognize that the valuation and assessment of the servient
estate excluded the easement, and that such a holding would cause
undue complexities in the field of tax enforcement and would burden
the tax assessor by compelling him to try to determine the existence of
any claims adverse to the principal ownership when evaluating the
property for taxation purposes.17
The arguments on either side of the question seem to reflect the
opinions of the courts as to the best solution to the practical problem
of whether the issue should be decided from the standpoint of fairness
to the owner of the dominant estate or from the standpoint of the
state's interests in tax enforcement and collection. In holding that the
tax sale of the servient estate extinguishes the easement, the minority
courts are placing a burden upon the owner of the dominant estate
not only to make sure that his own taxes are paid, but also to see that
his neighbor who owns the servient estate does not default in payment
of his taxes, thereby depriving the dominant owner of his easement
right through no default of his own.18 The majority view, on the
"'Wolfson v. Heins, 149 Fla. 499, 6 S. (2d) 858 (1942); Nedderman v. City of
Des Moines, 221 Iowa 1352, 268 N. W. 36 (1936); City of Jackson v. Ashley, 189 Miss.
818, 199 So. 91 (1940).
'i,.., it is not compatible with our general tax system to assume that the
assessor took into consideration any question of dominant or servient tenements
that might have been revealed had he searched the title records, nor do we thnk
[that the legislature intended that the state] be handicapped in the prompt collec-
tion of revenue by the burden of tracing out subdivided or qualified interests and
be compelled to seek to hold the various owners responsible according to their
respective interests." Nedderman v. City of Des Moines, 221 Iowa 1352, 268 N. W.
36, 38 (1936).
"8"If the principle contended for by the respondents is sound [that the tax sale
extinguishes the easement], the owner of the dominant estate who pays taxes upon
a valuation which includes the value of his easements, must also, to protect his ease-
ments, pay taxes assessed on another's property, although the value of the easement
is necessarily excluded from the assessed valuation thereof." Jackson v. Smith, 153
App. Div. 724, 138 N. Y. Supp. 654, 656 (1912). "Shall he [the owner of the domin-
ant estate] be subjected to double taxation? Shall he thus suffer the destruction of
his property rights upon which he has regularly paid tax?" Alamogordo Improve-
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other hand, avoids penalizing the dominant owner for the default of
another and, as has been suggested by the New York courts, avoids
taking his property without due process of law.19
A very important consideration in tax lien sales law, however, is the
assurance of collection of delinquent taxes, and from the standpoint of
tax enforcement, the minority .view is the more practical, because
an estate sold free from easement rights will presumably bring a higher
bid at the tax sale. Furthermore, under this rule, the job of the tax
assessor is simplified, as he can make his assessment on the basis of the
full fee title to the land without the burden of examining the estate
or investigating the records for claims adverse to the principal owner-
ship. It is this very consideration which justifies the destruction of
most kinds of interests in and charges against land when sold for de-
linquent taxes, 20 and the contention is strong that easements should
not be an exception.
21
Granting the fact that to require the tax assessor to take into con-
ment Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N. M. 245, 91 P. (2d) 428, 432 (1939). "To follow such
a theory would create a great insecurity of title by placing unreasonable burdens
upon landowners by putting them in the precarious position of seeing that everyone
of their 1,o58 neighbors are properly assessed and their taxes paid, in order to
protect their property from loss ... " Hayes v. Gibbs, iio Utah 54, 169 P. (2d) 781,
788 (1946).
"'Tax Lien Co. of New York v. Schultze, 213 N. Y. 9, io6 N. E. 751 (1914);
Jackson v. Smith, 153 App. Div. 724, 138 N. Y. Supp. 654 (1912); Blenis v. Utica
Knitting Co., 73 Misc. 61, 13o N. Y. Supp. 740 (1911).
Cummings v. Cummings, 91 Fed. 602 (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1899) (estate in re-
mainder extinguished, where property is assessed to life tenant); Lucas v. Purdy,
142 Iowa 359, 12o N. W.'1o63 (19o9) (inchoate right of dower); Shell v. Duncan,
31 S. C. 547, 1o S. E. 33o (1889) (claim of homestead). See Restatement, Property
(19H4) §5og, comment a: "Incumbrances resulting from conveyance, adverse use
or otherwise, however, do affect the sale value of land. If they are not to be de-
stroyed by a sale for tax purposes they should be taken account of in assessing land
for such purposes and the assessed value accordingly lowered. Under the interpre-
tation of general tax statutes they are, however, not ordinarily taken account of
and are held to be cut off by a sale as a result of assessements under such statute."
Restatement, Property (1944) §5o9, comment e: "To assess for tax purposes the
various legal interests in land would however produce an exceedingly complicated
tax structure and it is therefore commonly attempted only in exceptional situations.
Hence in levying a tax upon land separate legal interests in the land are ordinarily
disregarded."
"It is difficult to rationalize and give a categorically justifiable answer to this
exception, unless the basic reasoning of the majority view is adopted that the ease-
ment is a vested property right carved out of the servient estate for the benefit of
the dominant estate. "But account can be taken of an easement appurtenant with-
out increasing the complication of the process of tax collection and without de-
creasing the amount of the total levy by simply substracting the value of the use
authorized thereby from the servient tenement and adding it to the dominant tene-
ment." Restatement, Property (1944) § 509, comment e.
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sideration all interests and claims which might be adverse to the prin-
cipal ownership would immeasurably burden the tax system, it does
not follow that such would be the result if he were forced to consider
the effect upon the value of the servient and dominant estates caused
by easements appurtenant.2 2 Most affirmative easements are open and
visible, and usually the existence of such is common knowledge within
the area. Since the tax assessor is often required by statute to view the
property before assessment, it is reasonably probable that he can be-
come aware of such interests. Negative easements generally are re-
corded and usually appear in the chain of title of either the dominant
or servient estate owner. Where such is the case, it would seem not an
undue burden to require that the assessor consider such an easement
in evaluating the estate in whose chain of title the easement appears.
The task of also relating the easement by cross-reference to the cor-
responding dominant or servient tract for purposes of assessment is
no doubt an excessive requirement, however.
Adoption of the majority view would have little effect upon the
policy of the state in the collection of delinquent taxes. While the
sale of the servient estate subject to the easement would bring a lower
price at the tax sale, this loss would be equalized by the increased
assessment of the dominant estate by including the value of the ease-
ment.23 In the case of negative easements, which usually take the form
of restrictions against certain undesired actions within a tract of land
and thereby increase the value of all the lots within the tract, it would
actually seem to defeat the state's purpose to hold that such easements
are extinguished by the tax sale, thereby lowering the property value
of the entire tract.2 4  W=mr C. GuTnuz, JR.
2Restatement, Property (1944) § 5og, comment e.
23"It would be a myopic public and financial policy for the state to blow cold
on the value of a lot at the tax sale while blowing hot on its assessed value in ar-
riving at the amount of delinquent taxes for which the lot is being sold ...." Schlafly
v. Baumann, 341 Mo. 755, io8 S. W. (2d) 563, 368 (1937).
2"... in cases like the present the mutual easements are created for the very
purpose of increasing the taxable value of the entire tract. It is by such development
that a large percentage of the aggregate taxable value of the state is created, and
a revenue system which should disregard the permanence and safety of such
conditions would be highly detrimental to the interest of the people." State ex rel.
Koeln v. West Cabanne Imp. Co., 278 Mo. 310, 213 S. W. 25, 28 (1919). "We do not
believe that the Legislature intended, nor do the holdings of this court lend color
to the theory, that tax lien foreclosures and sales should decrease the value of the
realty holdings of citizens by destroying restrictions on the use of real estate mutually
beneficial to individual citizens in increasing the value of such holdings and the
state in increasing its revenue from taxation." Hayes v. Gibbs, iio Utah 54, 169
P. (2d) 781, 788 (1946).
[Vol. X
CASE COMMENTS
SALES-APPLICATION OF BULK SALES ACT FOR PROTECTION OF NON-
MERCHANDISE CREDITOR OF VENDOR OF STOCK OF DURABLE GOODS.
[Wisconsin]
Passage of the early bulk sales acts, some sixty years ago, was
prompted by the specific need of protection for wholesalers who sup-
plied merchandise to retailers on credit.1 During the latter part of the
nineteenth century it became a prevalent practice for retailers to sell
their entire inventories secretly and then abscond leaving the creditor-
wholesalers unpaid,2 and the absence of a bankruptcy act at the time to
protect creditors against fraudulent and preferential transfers rend-
ered the need for remedial legislation on bulk sales particularly acute.3
Hence, pressure brought to bear upon state legislatures by private
enterprise4 eventually led to the passage of the early acts. These statutes,
however, were not uniform and some were held to be unconstitutional.5
The validity of such legislation having become established,8 every
state and the District of Columbia have enacted bulk sales statutes.
Though these acts still vary to a large degree, they can be classified
roughly into two main categories. The first, originally known as the
'For a detailed historical sketch of bulk sales statutes, see Billig, Bulk Sales
Laws: A Study in Economic Adjustment (1928) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 72.
-The following cases concerning bulk sales in which the creditors alleged that
they were defrauded are indicative of the situation which gave rise to the great
need for bulk sales acts in the period from about i8go to 19o3. Nelms v. Steiner, 113
Ala. 562, 22 So. 435 (1897); Carl & Tobey Co. v. Beal & Fletcher Grocer Co., 64 Ark.
373, 42 S. W. 664 (1897); Bliss v. Crosier, 159 Mass. 498, 34 N. E. 1075 (1893); Schloss
v. Estey, 114 Mich. 429, 72 N. W. 264 (1897); Fisher v. Stout, 74 App. Div. 97, 77 N. Y.
Supp. 945 (1902)_
'As regards sales of inventory, the bulk sales acts now appear to be a more
satisfactory remedy than the Bankruptcy Act, largely by virtue of the fact that in
bankruptcy all creditors are considered in the distribution of the bankrupt's entire
assets, whereas in bulk sales the creditors interested in satisfying their claims only
from the stock-in-trade are considered.
'Agitation for remedial legislation was led by the National Credit Men's As-
sociation. Note (1935) io Tulane L. Rev. 131, 133.
1Several early acts were held unconstitutional on the grounds that one could not
be deprived of his right to purchase, hold and sell or dispose of his property without
due process of law, Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 Pac. 22 (19o4); or that such
statutes constituted class legislation, Charles J. Off & Co. v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40,
85 N. E. 264 (1908).
GAs more states passed bulk sales acts, it was generally held that such legislation
was justifiable under the police power. Kidd, Dater & Price Co. v. Musselman Grocer
Co., 217 U. S. 461, 3o S. Ct. 606, 54 L. ed. 839 (191o); Spurr v. Travis, 145 Mich. 721,
1o8 N. W. 1o9 o (19o6); Nobel v. Ft. Smith Wholesale Grocery Co., 34 Okla. 662,
127 Pac. 14 (1911).
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New York type,7 provides that the bulk buyer should obtain from the
bulk seller or retailer a list of his creditors and give them notice of the
prospective bulk sale a specified number of days in advance of its in-
tended consummation, so that they may satisfy their claims against the
merchandise. On the other hand, the second form of statute, originally
known as the Pennsylvania type and followed in a minority of states,
8
puts a heavier imposition on the bulk buyer, requiring him to go so
far as to see that the proceeds of the bulk sale are applied to the
creditors' claims. 9 Most bulk sales statutes specify that if the sale is not
in compliance with the act, it is either "void,"' 0 "fraudulent and
void,"" or "presumed to be fraudulent and void,"' 2 thereby enabling
the creditors to satisfy their claims from the goods in the hands of
the bulk buyer.' 3
The recent Wisconsin case of State Bank of Viroqua v. Jackson
14
illustrates the questionable judicial interpretations which have been
placed upon several controversial aspects of the bulk sales statutes by
the courts. The defendant, Jackson, who was engaged in the garage
business, had undertaken the additional work of selling farm machin-
ery. Because of ill health, however, he had disposed of most of his
farm machinery at auction. He was also desirous of selling his garage
business and the balance of farm implements and repair parts. Hence,
after some negotiations, the defendant Jackson's remaining assets were
7The New York type is more widely in effect, having been adopted in thirty-
eight states, the District of Columbia, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Weintraub & Levin,
Bulk Sales Law and Adequate Protection of Creditors (1952) 65 Harv. L. Rev. 418,
420.
8This type of statute has been adopted in Pennsylvania, Idaho, Kentucky, Louis-
iana, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Alaska and the
Virgin Islands.
OThe proposed Uniform Commercial Code has adopted the basic Pennsylvania
policy, but appears to go even further in that, in effect, it makes the bulk buyer
a special receiver charged with responsibility for carrying out pro-rata distribution
among the creditors and for retaining sufficient funds to satisfy disputed claims.
Uniform Commercial Code § 6-io6.
"Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 27, § 1; 3 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1948) c. 442.1, § 361; N. Y.
Pers. Prop. Law § 44-
"Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) tit. 18. c. 2, § 202; Pa. Stat. Ann. (1931) tit. 69,
§ 523.
'-'Ala. Code Ann. (Supp. 1951) tit. 20, § 10; Minn. Stat. Ann. (West, 1945) c. 513,
§ 18; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) § 7283.
'$States are not in accord, however, as to the exact remedies of an attacking
creditor. For a short discussion of the way some courts have disposed of the prob-
lems involved, see Weintraub & Levin, Bulk Sales Law and Adequate Protection of
Creditors (1952) 65 Harv. L. Rev. 418, 428.
14261 Wis. 538, 53 N. W. (2d) 433 (1952).
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sold to defendant Iverson for $6,ooo, there being no compliance with
the Wisconsin bulk sales law.' 5 At that time defendant Jackson was
indebted to plaintiff bank in the sum of over $5,00o. Plaintiff, after
securing judgment against defendant Jackson for .4,7o.45, began
garnishment proceedings against the bulk buyer, Iverson, asserting his
liability on the ground of failure to comply with the bulk sales law.
The plaintiff's complaint was dismissed on the merits by the trial
court, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the
items of farm machinery sold by defendant Jackson in his retail busi-
ness fell within the act, but that the machinery used by him in his
repair business did not.
Though consistent with the general application of the bulk sales
statutes, the Jackson decision demonstrates several phases of the fault)'
legislation and application of principles common in the field of bulk
sales.16 One such factor is the matter of what property is meant to be
covered by bulk sales legislation. The typical statutory phrase "goods,
wares and merchandise" has been held to cover almost any property sold
at retail.1 7 Consistent with this broad interpretation, no distinction is
made in the principal case between perishable or expendable items
and hard, durable goods such as farm machinery, it appears, however,
that this distinction should be observed. Creditors who supply re-
tailers farm machinery and similar durable items have at their disposal
the trust receipt or conditional sale with which to provide security for
themselves. If they fail to make use of these devices, it does not appear
that they should be allowed to fall back upon the double protection
of bulk sales legislation, the original purpose of which was to protect
those creditors who otherwise had no means of protection against
fraudulent conveyances. Extending the remedy to those creditors
"-Under the Wisconsin bulk sales provision, the bulk buyer is required to de-
mand and receive from the bulk seller, at least five days before the sale, a written,
complete and certified list of the names and addresses of all the creditors of the
seller. The bulk buyer must then notify personally every creditor of the sale within
five days of taking possession of the goods, or in lieu of personal service, notify every
creditor by registered mail at least ten days before the goods are paid for, taken
possession of, or delivered. Wis. Stat. (1947) § 241.18.
" the credit men, as a class, believe in the efficacy of bulk sales laws, but at
the same time they realize that at best these statutes are limited in their applica-
tion, and that in their present form many of them still require considerable re-
vision." Billig & Smith, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Statutory Interpretation (ig3i)
38 W. Va. L. Q. 309, 318.
"TMerchandise has been held to mean "something that is sold every day, and is
constantly going out of the store and being replaced by other goods." Root Re-
fineries v. Gay Oil Co., iTV Ark. 129, 284 S. W. 26 (1926).
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who failed to avail themselves with other protective devices at their
disposal often has the effect of unnecessarily prejudicing good faith
bulk purchasers.
Another discrepancy with original purpose found in modern bulk
sales legislation is suggested by the Jackson case in the matter of what
creditors are included within the protection of the statute. The creditor
bank in the principal case is not identified as a merchandise creditor,
and hence it appears that the court by implication approved the
prevailing view that all creditors are covered by bulk sales legislation.'5
Bulk sales statutes, however, were originally passed for the narrow pur-
pose of protecting merchandise creditors, or only those wholesalers, job-
bers, growers and manufacturers who supplied the retailers their
stock-in-trade on credit. 19 It is readily seen that the current prevailing
view, which includes personal creditors whose claims are in no way
connected with the operation of the retailer's business, imposes too
heavy a burden of notification on bulk purchasers. Nevertheless, courts
have gone so far as to hold that the United States is a creditor for
federal income taxes so as to come within the terms of a bulk sales
act;20 and a lessor to whom rent is owing has been held to be a creditor
covered by the applicable statute.
21
The words of the court in the Jackson case that the bulk sales law
"does not apply to items that are to be processed or to which labor is
to be added prior to sale"22 suggests the further problem of what
businesses are to come under bulk sales laws. In holding that the items
of farm machinery to be installed by Iverson in his repair business
were not covered by the statute, the Wisconsin decision is in accord
with the majority view that the statutes apply only to merchants or
traders and. not to businesses involving labor or mechanical skill as the
principal factors.2 3 This view appears consistent with the original
IsThe prevailing view is that "no distinction is to be drawn between one class
of creditors and another." 24 Am. Jur. 358. In accord with the prevailing view:
Rabalsky v. Levenson, 221 Mass. 289, io8 N. E. io5o (1915); Nash Hardware Co. v.
Morris, 105 Tex. 217, 146 S. W. 874 (1912). The court in the principal case stated
merely that "Jackson was indebted to the plaintiff bank in a sum in excess of $5ooo"
with no mention being made of the source of the debt. State Bank of Viroqua v.
Jackson, 261 Wis. 538, 53 N. W. (2d) 433, 434 (1952).
DNote (1951) 53 W. Va. L. Rev. 188, 189.
United States v. Goldblatt Bros., 128 F. (2d) 576 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
"Wright v. Haley, 2o8 Ind. 46, 194 N. E. 637 (1935).
"State Bank of Viroqua v. Jackson, 261 Wis. 538, 53 N. W. (2d) 433, 435 (1952).
"Connecticut Steam Brown Stone Co. v. Lewis, 86 Conn. 386, 85 At. 534 (1912);
Cooney, Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 133 Ga. 511, 66 S. E. 257 (19o9); Axtell Co. v.
Word, 29 S. W. (2d) 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Everett Produce Co. v. Smith Bros.,
40 Wash. 566, 82 Pac. 9o5 (19o5); 24 Am. Jur. 361; Note (1948) 34 Va. L. Rev. 96, 97-
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purpose for which bulk sales laws were enacted, yet courts have fre-
quently expanded the coverage of this legislation to include such
transactions as the sale of a dry cleaning establishment 24 and the sale
of a manufacturer's machinery and inventory.25 On the other hand, on
the outmoded theory that they render a service rather than make a
sale, restaurants have generally been held not within the scope of bulk
sales laws.
26
Though the proposed Uniform Commercial Code 27 now offers a step
toward uniformity and provides numerous improvements in bulk
sales law, 28 it does not remedy all the defects suggested by State Bank
of Viroqua v. Jackson. For example, it is provided that "a bulk transfer
subject to this Article is ineffective against any creditor of the trans-
feror .. ." unless the terms of the statute are fulfilled.29 Hence, as in
the Jackson case, creditors are not confined to those people who sup-
plied the retailer his stock-in-trade. Furthermore, though Section
6-1o2 provides, consistent with the construction of the Wisconsin Act
in the principal case, that "the enterprises subject to this Article are
all those whose principal business is the sale of merchandise from
stock, including those who manufacture what they sell," still the Code
clings to an unrealistic concept in holding restaurants not to be
covered under the bulk sales laws. The Code also continues to use the
term "merchandise" without distinguishing between hard, durable
goods and perishable or expendable items. In view of the continued
existence of these shortcomings in the proposed Code, it appears that
-'Flushing National Bank in New York v. Abrams, 296 N. Y. 1009, 7S N. E. (2d)
582 (1947).
3Kranke v. American Fabrics Co., 112 Conn. 58, 151 At. 312 (1930). Other
extreme cases in which bulk sales legislation has been held applicable: a farmer's
sale of all his cattle, Hall v. Main, 34 F. (2d) 528 (E. D. Ill. 1929); a sale of all its
property by an opera house company, LaSalle Opera House Co. v. LaSalle Amuse-
ment Co., 289 Ill. 194, 124 N. E. 454 (191g); a sale of a woodworking business,
Mosson v. Kriser, 212 App. Div. 282, 20o8 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1925); a sale of a pub-
lishing and printing business, Digregorio v. Avanti Pub. Co., 129 Misc. 345, 221 N.
Y. Supp. 497 (1927)-
'Carnaggio Bros. v. City of Greenwood, 142 Miss. 885, io8 So. 141 (1926); Swift
9- Co. v. Tempelos, 178 N. C. 487, 101 S. E. 8 (1919); O'Connor v. Smith, 188 Va. 214,
49 S. E. (2d) 310 (1948); Vold, Sales (1931) 411; Note (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev. 123, 124.
27Article 6 of the U. C. C. (Final Text Edition, Nov. 1951) deals with bulk
transfers.
2bAmong the many improvements, so far as details are concerned, are the pro-
visions that equipment, such as fixtures, is not involved unless sold in connection
with a sale of inventory, and that bona fide sub-vendees are exempted from bulk
sales requirements.
"Uniform Commercial Code § 6-104 [italics supplied].
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the court in the Jackson case would have reached the same decision
had the case been decided under the Uniform Commercial Code.
JAMES H. FLIPPEN, JR.
SURETYSHIP-SCOPE OF LIABILITY OF SURETY FOR POLICE OFFICER FOR
INJURIES INFLICTED THROUGH MISCONDUCT OF OFFICER. [Maryland]
State statutes generally require that a police official, upon assuming
office, execute a surety bond conditioned upon the faithful perform-
ance of his duties and the accounting for funds received. Upon the
subsequent misconduct of such official and suit on the bond, the
court is faced with the vexatious problem of determining the scope
of the liability of the surety. On the one hand the court must con-
sider the need for imposing very broad liability, because police of-
ficals "are endowed ... with special and extraordinary official powers
which are peculiarly susceptible of abuse,"' and because officers are
so often financially irresponsible that the victim cannot recover un-
less the surety bond is held to cover the wrong suffered.2 On the other
hand the courts must bear in mind the undersirability of making the
surety liable for every conceivable harm which police officers might
do, since this w6uld force the insurers to charge prohibitively high
premiums for such bonds. A difficult balance then must be struck be-
tween the protection which the public deserves and the risk the surety
can fairly be expected to bear at moderate rates. Thus far the courts
do not seem to have struck upon any satisfactory formula for determin-
ing the scope of the surety's liability3
The recent Maryland case of State, to Use of Hill v. Fidelity and De-
posit Co. of Maryland4 demonstrates the inadequacy of the traditional
theory based on the distinction between acts virtute offlcii and acts
acts colore officii.5 The state of Maryland brought suit to the use of
'Nelson v. Bartell, 4 Wash. (2d) 186, io3 P. (2d) 3o, 35 (1940).
2Van Pelt v. Littler, 14 Cal. 194 at 200 (1859); The People ex rel Kellogg v.
Schuyler, 4 Com. 173 at 179 (N. Y. 1850); Arnold, Suretyship and Guaranty (1927)
397.
3The conflict in opinions is well set out in Lee v. Charmley, 2o N. D. 570, 129
N. W. 448 (ig9o), and in Note (1911) 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 275.
'88 A. (2d) 457 (Md. 1952.)
5Lord Kenyon in his oft-quoted definition in Alcock v. Andrews, 2 Esp. 542.
17o Eng. Rep. 449 (1788), characterized acts virtute officii as those "where a man
doing an act within the limits of his official authority, exercises that authority
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one Hill against the Sheriff of Talbot County and the Surety Company
to recover for personal injuries inflicted upon Hill at the country jail.
Police officers had arrested Hill for drunken driving and delivered him
into the custody of the sheriff. The sheriff maliciously assaulted and
beat Hill and then shot him in the face with tear gas, which act will
cause him to become totally blind. It was alleged that the sheriff com-
mitted these acts by virtue of his office so that the surety was liable, but
the trial court sustained the surety's demurrer. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals, recognizing that Maryland has not abandoned the tra-
ditional distinction between acts virtute oficii and colore officii, posed
the issue thus: If there was a breach of official duty on the part of the
sheriff, the surety would be liable; however, if the wrongful act was
not committed in discharge of his official duty, the sheriff would be
personally liable, but the surety would not be liable. In summation
the court explained that, "In an action against the surety, it is neces-
sary to allege and prove that the sheriff was required to take some of-
ficial action under the circumstances, that the injuries complained of
were inflicted by the sheriff while he was attempting to take such action,
and that they were the result of official misconduct." 6 The court re-
manded the case to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend by speci-
fically alleging how the sheriff breached an official duty at the time of
the assault.
The virtute and colore distinction reaffirmed in the instant case
is one of long standing, having been stated by Lord Kenyon in an
English case as early as 1788.7 When the question of liability on a
sheriff's bond first rose in Maryland in 188o the court accepted Lord
Kenyon's distinction,s and this test for liability was early adopted as
well by courts of New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Wisconsin
and Oklahoma.9
In cases arising in other states, the courts rejected this distinction
improperly, or abuses the discretion placed in him." Colore officii he defined as
"where the act committed is of such a nature that the office gives him no authority
to do it; in the doing of that act he is not to be considered as an officer."
688 A. (2d) 457, 461 (Md. 1952).
7Alcock v. Andrews, 2 Esp. 542, 170 Eng. Rep. 449 (1788).
8State, Use of Vanderworker v. Brown, 54 Md. 318 (1880).
OState v. Conover, 28 N. J. L. 224, 78 Am. Dec. 54 (186o); Ex parte Reed, 4 Hill
572 (N. Y. 1843); State v. Brown, ii Ired. 141 (N. C. 1856); Dysart et al v. Lurty, 3
Okla. 6oi, 41 Pac. 724 (1895); Gerber v. Ackley, 37 Wis. 43, 19 Am. Rep. 751 (1875).
Ex Parte Reed was overruled shortly after being decided by People ex rel. Kellogg v.
Schuyler, 4 Com. 173 (N. Y. 1850).
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as illogical and unjust,10 and adopted what has now become the ma-
jority view that the surety is liable for all wrongful acts done under
indicia of official position." These courts reason that the "purpose of
an official bond is to provide indemnity against malfeasance and mis-
behavior in public office, the misuse of powers belonging to the office
and the assumption under the guise of official action of powers not
belonging to it."12 Under this view all acts which the officer pur-
portedly performs in the capacity of public official, though unauthor-
ized and unlawful, are official acts within the scope of the officer's
oath faithfully to discharge the duties of his office. As such they may
be considered as having been within the risk contemplated by the
surety at the time of undertaking the suretyship contract.
3
A few states continue to recognize the virtute-colore distinction,
but this action sometimes seems to be based more upon respect for
precedents than on conviction of the logic of the test.14 In the princi-
pal case the court set out the arguments of the majority courts in
great length and in approving tones, and in conclusion stated: "Under
our decisions which it is not necessary for us to overrule, the surety on
a sheriff's bond is liable where the sheriff, in discharge of the duties of
his office, brutally assaults a person without provocation or necessity."'I
The passing of the virtute-colore test is not to be mourned. The
results of its application were frequently illogical and confusing be-
cause the terms are too indefinite and nebulous to set out a workable
standard for deciding cases.16 A review of the cases indicates that
""The refinement or supposed distinction between acts that were termed to have
been committed colore officii or virtute officii is as useless in practice as it is obscure
in meaning ..." Geros v. Harries, 65 Utah 227, 236 Pac. 220, 225 (1925).
-Lammon v. Feusier, ini U. S. 17, 4 S. Ct. 286, 28 L. ed. 337 (1884); National
Bank of Redemption v. Rutledge, 84 Fed. 400 (N. D. Ohio 1897); Clancy v. Ken-
worthy, 74 Iowa 740, 35 N. W. 427 (1887); City of Lowell v. Parker, io Metc. 3o9,
43 Am. Dec. 436 (Mass. 1845); Kosowsky v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 245 Mich.
266, 222 N. W. 153 (1928); Hall v. Tierney, 89 Minn. 407, 95 N. W. 219 (1903);
Turner, Frazer & Co. v. Killian, 12 Neb. 580, 12 N. W. 1o (1882); Lee v. Charmley,
20 N. D. 570, 129 N. W. 448 (191o); American Guaranty Co. v. McNiece, 111 Ohio
532, 146 N. E. 77 (1924); Geros v. Harries, 65 Utah 227, 236 Pac. 220 (1925); Mace
v. Gaddis, 3 Wash. Terr. 125, 13 Pac. 545 (1887).
1224 R. C. L., Sheriffs § 50.
"Lee v. Charmley, 20 N. D. 570, 129 N. W. 448 (1910); 24 R. C. L., Sheriff's § 50.
"The Sheriff's official position gives him an advantage over private persons, and, it
being a breach of his official duty to use this advantage, his bondsmen are liable
therefor." Mace v. Gaddis, 3 Wash. Terr. 125, 13 Pac. 545, 546 (1887).
"See Inman v. Sherrill, 29 Okla. 1oo, ni6 Pac. 426 (1911).
2588 A. (2d) 457, 461 (Md. 1952) [italics supplied].
""The best argument against attempting to fix an arbitrary line of demarca-
tion between acts done colore oflicii and those done in virtue of office is that the
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various courts have applied a wide variety of meanings to the term
colore officii.17 Under such a shifting standard the surety has no means
of determining just what degree of risk it is undertaking on the bond,
and the injured party has no basis for judging whether he may re-
cover from the surety.1s
It is obvious that the injured party is not interested in whether the
act was done by virtue of under color of office. In either case it is
the officer's position which creates the opportunity for harm.19 As one
court has observed, "It is as much his duty as an officer to refrain from
corruptly usurping or assuming powers not pertaining to his office, as
to refrain from corruptly exercising those which properly belong to
it."
'
20 If the victim of the wrong cannot collect from the surety for his
injury, it is highly unlikely that he will collect at all.
Another criticism of this standard is that the distinctions drawn
out at great length between acts virtute officii and colore offlcii are
from their very nature "argumentations in a circle."21 If the test were
carried to its logical conclusion the surety would never be liable. The
surety is not held liable for the illegal, unauthorized acts of the official.
These are the very acts against which the public seeks assurance and
which constitute the only reason for requiring the surety bond, for,
the sheriff is obviously not liable for his legal, authorized acts, and
consequently the surety is not liable either.
Having rejected the virtute-colore test, the majority courts still
face the problem of determining what standard to apply in deciding
cases, after a hundred years exposition, are in hopeless and interminable confusion."
Greenius v. American Surety Co., 92 Wash. 401, 159 Pac. 384, 385 (1916). See also,
note io supra.
1 See American Guaranty Co., v. McNiece, iii Ohio 532, 146 N. E. 77 at 79 (1924).
'Two Maryland cases illustrate the illogical results achieved by courts applying
this standard. In State, to Use of Wilson v. Fowler, 88 Md. 6oi, 42 At. 2o1 (1898), it
was held that the surety was liable to the injured party where an officer executed a
writ in a wrongful and oppressive manner, but in State, to Use of German v. Tim-
mons, 90 Md. io, 44 AtI. 1oo3 (x899), the court held that the sureties were not liable
for an officer's illegal seizure of property when acting under a void distress warrant,
as the act was not done by virtue of his office.
1 For example, the injured party in the Timmons case, supra note 18, would
not have surrendered the property if he had not thought that the sheriff was acting
under his legal powers.2 State v. Wedge, 24 Minn. 150, 153 (1877).
2'24 R. C. L., Sheriffs § 59. As the Iowa court observed, "If, in exercising the
functions of his office, defendant is not liable for acts because they are illegal or
forbidden by law, and for that reason are trespasses or wrongs, he cannot be held
liable on the bond at all, for the reason that all violations of duty and acts of op-
pression result in trespasses or wrongs. For lawful acts in discharge of his duty he
of course is not liable." Clancy v. Kenworthy, 74 Iowa 740, 35 N. W. 427, 428 (1887).
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whether or not the officer acted "unofficially" within the terms of the
bond. Unfortunately, no satisfactory substitute has been discovered,
for though various alternate tests have been advocated and applied,
all have serious shortcomings. Some courts, including the federal
courts, have adopted a form of "but for" test for determining liability
of the surety,22 which operates by posing the question: "Would [the
officer] have acted in the particular instance if he were not clothed
with his official character, or would he have so acted if he were not an
officer?" 2 3 This test shares the disadvantages of the virtute-colore test
in that it has no concrete meaning and is largely a result-getting device.
Whether or not he would have so acted if he were not an officer, the
fact remains that it was his official position which made the abuse on
his part much more likely and deterred his victims from their ordinary
vigor in protecting their persons and property.
A few courts have held that an officer acts officially whenever he
believes or claims he is acting in an official capacity.24 Such a test im-
poses unreasonably broad liability on the surety. Some acts are so far
removed from official duties that it is apparent to any reasonable per-
son that the officer cannot be acting in an official capacity; 25 yet by such
a test, if a power-mad or emotionally unstable officer believed that
he was acting officially, the surety would be liable for his wrongful
acts.
It has been suggested that the most practical criterion of liability
is whether the act was done or committed in the course of an attempt
to serve or execute a writ or process, and as a means to that end.26 The
advocates of this test claim it will exonerate the sureties from liability
2State of Missouri to use of DeVault v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 107 F. (2d) 343
(C. C. A. 8th, 1939); State ex rel. Penrod v. French, 222 Ind. 145, 51 N. E. (2d) 858
(1943); Stark Hickey Inc. v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 291 Mich. 350, 289
N. W. 172 (1939); State to Use of Kaercher v. Roth, 330 Mo. 105, 49 S. W. (2d) 1o9
(1932); Lynch v. Burgess, 40 Wyo. 30, 273 Pac. 691 (1929).
2324 R. C. L., Sheriffs § 59.
!"Mobile County v. Williams, i8o Ala. 639, 61 So. 963 (1913); Myers v. Colquitt,
173 S. W. 993 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); 43 Am. Jur., Public Officers §418; Note (1918)
Ann. Cas. 1918C 1021.
2For instances of outrageous misconduct by a police officer, who nevertheless
could argue that he believed he was acting under authority of his office, see Reed
v. PhilpAot's Adm'r, 235 Ky. 429, 31 S. W. (2d) 709 (1930) (a chief of police of a city,
in an attempt to take a prisoner away from the deputy sheriff of the county, shot the
deputy, causing his death); Greenberg v. People to Use of Balaban, 225 Ill. 174,
8o N. E. oo (1go6) (a constable engaged in levying an execution on a stock of
merchandise, roughly shoved the pregnant wife of the debtor aside and struck her
in the abdomen with a box, causing her to have a still birth).
2OState, to Use of German v. Timmons, 9o Md. 1o, 44 Atl. 1003 (1899); McLendon
v. State, to Use of Kennedy, 92 Tenn. 520, 22 S. W. 200 (1893); 24 R. C. L. 960.
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for an assault committed by an officer out of personal malice and bear-
ing no relation to service of the writ. It is apparent that this test re-
stricts liability too closely. His official position makes it possible for
the officer to commit abuses in many situations other than the service
of process, and injured persons, such as the unfortunate plaintiff in
the principal case, are not interested in whether or not a writ was
being served at the time they were assaulted.
The distinction is sometimes made that sureties are liable for a
mistake of fact made by an officer in attempting to discharge a duty
which he is called upon to perform by virtue of his office, but are not
liable for a mistake of law, by reason of which he assumed to act
as an officer, when the undisputed facts show that he was not called
upon to act in his official capacity. 27 This type of test would call for
fine distinctions with their accompanying variant results, often ig-
noring the fundamental fact that it was his official capacity which
placed the officer in a position to commit the wrong. Technical distinc-
tions should not be employed to defeat the purpose of the bond to
protect the public from misconduct by police officers.
Since the courts have not been successful in establishing a reliable
standard for determining to what extent injured persons are to be in-
demnified by the officers' sureties, and since the mere posting of a bond
is no guarantee of good conduct on the part of police officials, some
further forms of deterrents should be developed. It has been suggested
that imposing broader liability on the surety may help serve that pur-
pose, because if the surety is made to pay, it will become more likely
that the wrongdoer will be civilly and criminally prosecuted, since
the surety company will pursue him relentlessly for reimbursement.28
Heavy and certain criminal penalities for guilty officers would add a
powerful sanction against misconduct in office. Such penalties, however,
would require special procedures, since the regular law enforcement
agencies tend to view the situation with sympathy for the offender,
who is a compatriot. Perhaps the courts should be given special powers
to set up investigational and prosecuting boards divorced from the
regular police departments when incidents like that in the principal
case occur; or perhaps a permanent overseeing body on a state-wide
level would be able to exert the proper impersonal discipline over
2Mace v. Gaddis, 3 Wash. Terr. 125, 13 Pac. 545 (1887); Fish v. Nethercutt, 14
Wash. 582, 45 Pac. 44 (1896); 24 R. C. L., Sheriffs § 54.
'Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 1930) 920.
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local officials. Vhatever steps are taken, it is evident that some meas-
ures must be developed to deter future atrocities such as those practiced
on the unfortunate plaintiff of the principal case.
ROBERT LEE BANSE
TAXATION-APPLICATION OF STATE USE TAX TO PRINTING PRESS EM-
PLOYED IN MAINTAINING INTERSTATE COMMERCE. [South Dakota]
The use tax, levied on the consumption within the taxing state of
goods purchased outside of the state by a local consumer,1 was de-
veloped as a means of implementing state sources of revenue during
the depression years.2 In 1937, the constitutionality of the use tax was
tested in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., Inc.,3 where the Supreme
Court of the United States sustained a tax imposed on machinery
purchased outside the taxing state, but which had come to rest within
its boundaries. In declaring this type of revenue-producing device to be
valid, the Court considered not only the legal technicalities of con-
stitutionality but also the social and economic ramifications inherent
in the imposition of a use tax, and endeavored to balance the necessity
for free and unburdened channels of interstate commerce against the
indispensibility to the states of such a source of income.
4
In the recent South Dakota case of Mitchell Publishing Co. v.
Wilder,5 the validity of a state use tax imposed on a printing press
was contested by a newspaper publisher. The press was operated
within the state boundaries of South Dakota, but it had been pur-
chased outside of its jurisdictional limits. The publishing company
contended that the press was used in maintaining interstate commerce
and thus fell within the clause of the local tax statute which exempted
from the levy all items, "used or to be used in operating or maintaining
'Brown, Some Legal Aspects of State Sales and Use Taxes, (1943) 18 Ind. L. J.
77, 80.
2Notes (1938) 48 Yale L. J. 273; (1938) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 787.
3300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524, 81 L. ed. 814 (937). The Supreme Court ruled
that the Washington tax was valid because it was equally imposed by nondis-
criminatory methods and was not a burden on interstate commerce, but was a tax
upon the privilege of use after interstate commerce had ended. The property
here was at rest in the state of Washington, and as such became part of the com-
mon mass of property inside the state which was subject to taxation.
4For general discussion, see Warren & Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Inter-
state Commerce Pays Its Way (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 49.
'52 N. W. (2d) 732 (S. D. 1952).
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interstate transportation or interstate commerce." 6 The Supreme Court
of South Dakota, one judge dissenting, adopted this position, on the
reasoning that the use of out-of-state raw materials, advertising, news
sources, and the dissemination of a small percentage of the copies of
the newspaper outside the state, all involved interstate commerce.
7
Since both the receipt of the raw materials and the distribution of the
newspaper were held to be interstate commerce, the South Dakota court
concluded that the incoming news retained its interstate character
during the printing process, and the press was a mechanical instru-
mentality used in maintaining this commerce. Thus the press was
held to be within the scope of the provision of the statute exempting
interstate commerce from the state use tax on tangible personal prop-
erty.
8
Support for this line of reasoning may be found in the fact that the
6S. D. Laws (1939) c. 276, 4, subdiv. 3, as amended by S. D. Laws (1943) c. 301:
"Tangible personal property, the storage, use or other consumption of which the
state is prohibited from taxing under the Constitution or laws of the United States
of America or under the Constitution of this State, or which is used or to be used
in operating or maintaining interstate transportation or interstate commerce ... "
Mitchell Pub. Co. v. Wilder, 52 N. W. (2d) 732 (S. D. 1952): "... it appears
that the appellant publishes a daily newspaper with a circulation of about 16,ooo
copies, slightly in excess of two percent of which circulation is mailed or otherwise
delivered to subscribers outside this state. That substantially all of the supplies
utilized, including ink, paper, mats, comics, supplements, and cartoons are pur-
chased and obtained from outside this State. That approximately fourteen percent
of the advertising appearing in the newspaper originates outside this state. That
the news service is obtained from the United Press and the Associated Press, of which
news eighty-four percent originates outside the state. That reporters, officers and
agents of the appellant corporation are frequently required to go outside the state on
business connected with the publication of the newspaper."
8A further theory which was not alluded to in either opinion of the principal
case might be that the press became a part of the realty and thus was taxable as
such after it had gained a local situs on the premises of the publishing company.
Justice Butler observed in New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board of Taxes
and Assessments, 280 U. S. 338, 346, 50 S. Ct. 111, 113, 74 L. ed. 463, 467 (1930); "It
is elementary that a state may tax property used to carry on interstate commerce."
Prior to this decision in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 15 S.
Ct. 36o, 39 L. ed. 311 (1895), the Supreme Court observed that a tax imposed on
the privilege of doing business in the state but measured by the value of the prop-
erty situated within the taxing state was really only a substitute for an other-
wise valid property tax on corporation property within the state. Although no
state could compel a corporation to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce, this immunity did not prevent a state from imposing an ordinary
property tax upon property having a situs within its jurisdictional limits that was
employed in interstate commerce. For further cases see: Atlantic and Pacific Tel.
Co. v. Philadelphia, 19o U. S. 16o, 23 S. Ct. 817, 47 L. ed. 995 (19o3); Adams Ex-
press Co. v. Ohio, x65 U. S. 194, 17 S. Ct. 305, 41 L. ed. 683 (1897); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530, 8 S. Ct. 961, 31 L. ed. 790 (1888).
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legislation in question was enacted in 1939 and amended in 1943. 9
It would seem reasonable to assume that the South Dakota legislature
in enacting this statute would have taken cognizance of the greatly ex-
panded meaning which the United States Supreme Court had given
to the term "interstate commerce" in its decisions prior to the passage of
this legislation.10
In arriving at its conclusion, the majority relies on one of its own
previous decisions construing the statute presently in issue, and on a
case decided recently by the Supreme Court of the United States in
an entirely different type of controversy. In Scandrett v. Nord," distil-
late purchased outside of South Dakota had been used within the
state in burning weeds off of a railroad right of way. In ruling that the
distillate was within the exemptions to the use tax provided in the
statute, the South Dakota court reasoned that the material was pur-
chased to be used in maintaining interstate transportation and thus
was expressly excepted. At its last term, the United States Supreme
Court, in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,12 considered the question
of whether a newspaper could be enjoined from taking action to pre-
vent its advertisers from buying advertisement time over a local radio
station. The newspaper, which enjoyed a substantial monoply on news
dissemination threatened to cut them off as advertisers in its paper. In
determining that the monopoly provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act applied to the situation, it was necessary that the Court find that
OMitchell Pub. Co. v. Wilder, 52 N. W. (2d) 752 at 734 (S. D. 1952).
%ON. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., So U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed.
893 (1957), sanctioned the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act as
being a valid exercise of congressional power to regulate labor disputes, when in an
industry affecting interstate commerce, which is subject to federal regulation. The
court said the steel company vitally affected interstate commerce and any dispute
within the company also affected interstate commerce by impeding its free flow.
Thus the power of regulation reached into the manufacturing process itself and
those activities essential to the operation of the process. Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U. S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. ed. 735 (1922), upheld the constitutionality of the
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, on the ground that stockyards were within the
scope of interstate commerce and Congress could regulate their activities and
enjoin certain practices which impeded or burdened interstate commerce. Houston,
East and West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. ed.
1341 (1914) affirmed a cease and desist order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
which forbade carriers to continue to discriminate against interstate commerce by
giving lower rates to intrastate commerce. Even intrastate commerce was held to be
subject to congressional regulation when it materially affected the flow of inter-
state commerce.
22o S. D. 527, 72 N. W. (2d) g44 (1945).
22342 U. S. 243, 72 S. CL. 181, 96 L. ed. 121 (1951).
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the newspaper was engaged in interstate commerce. Thus the holding
became relevant to the issue in the principal case.
The majority of the South Dakota court failed to mention other
available authority in support of its reasoning. Illustrative of this
omission is a case which holds the activities of a news service com-
pany, from the gathering of the news, through publication and dissemi-
nation, to be entirely within the !one of interstate commerce, thus
subjecting a labor dispute at the publishing site to the provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act.13 The United States Supreme
Court has also held that a publishing company was doing business in
interstate commerce and was thus subject to the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, where only one half of one percent of the cir-
culation of a newspaper it published was earmarked for out-of-state
distribution.
14
The minority judge in the principal case would uphold the tax as
being a valid exercise of the state's taxing power on a subject not with-
in the exemption clause of the statute. It was reasoned that inasmuch
as the printing of a newspaper is merely a local activity, separate and
distinct from the receipt of information and its subsequent distribu-
tion as a newspaper, the printing press was subject to state taxation
as it was not within the prohibited scope of interstate commerce. The
local activity theory has been employed in diverse cases to uphold the
validity of state taxes on property or goods indirectly used in inter-
state commerce. A Mississippi franchise tax on a corporation operating
an interstate pipe line,' 5 and a Louisiana privilege tax imposed on a
machine used to boost the pressure in an interstate pipe line were
"Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 3o U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650, 81 L. ed. 953 (1937).
"Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U. S. 178, 66 S. Ct. 511, go L. ed. 607 (1946).
The Court said that even a small paper sending a minute portion of its circulation
out of a state was engaged in interstate commerce and therefore subject to the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act which relate to employees' salaries. It
reasoned that Congress in passing the law had not explicitly set forth the requisite
degree of business that was necessary to be carried on in interstate channels be-
fore the producer would be amenable to the provisions of the law. Justice Murphy
disagreed with the majority, arguing that when only one half of one percent of
the circulation went outside the state it was for all practical purposes a local oper-
ation. Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U. S. 178 at 186, 66 S. Ct. 511 at 515, 9o
L. ed. 607 at 614 (1946).
5Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 8o, 68 S. Ct. 1475, 92 L. ed. 1832
(1948). A franchise tax imposed on all corporations "doing business" in Mississippi
was contested as not applicable because all of the operations of the gas company
fell within the scope of interstate commerce, but was sustained on the ground that
business of repairs and maintenance falls within meaning of term "doing business"
and thus was a taxable local activity.
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sustained as not being burdens on interstate commerce. 16 The same
local activity reasoning was pressed into use to uphold a state license
tax on the source and generation of electricity which was produced
locally but distributed immediately in interstate channels;17 and a
property tax on manufactured products which had been imposed by
the city of St. Louis on a local manufacturer was upheld on the grounds
that even though the amount of tax was measured by the quantity
of goods shipped in both interstate and intrastate commerce, the
actual taxing event occurred after the manufacturing had been com-
pleted but before shipments were commenced from the local situs.8
In the main, the local activity theory has been employed to sustain
state revenue taxes which are deemed not unduly to burden or to
impede the free flow of interstate commerce. If the courts feel that the
necessity for the revenue to the state overbalances the burden that
such a levy would place on interstate commerce, they will sustain the
tax. In upholding such an assessment, the courts look to see at what
time the actual taxing event occurred.' 9 Another relevant considera-
tion is whether a problem of multiple taxation will arise if the tax
is allowed.20 Still a third test, applied in the Henneford case, is
-Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U. S. 604, 58 S. Ct. 736, 82
L. ed. 1o43 (1938) (held that tax was on a local activity-the mechanical production
of pressure).
27Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 52 S. Ct. 548, 76 L. ed. 1038
(1932) (Idaho tax upheld on ground that power was produced locally even though
none was produced until orders were placed and then power produced went di-
rectly into interstate channels and was delivered to customers in tri-state area).
"American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, 39 S. Ct. 522, 63 L. ed.
1084 (igig). A manufacturing company in St. Louis made its products there and
shipped part of them to Missouri distributors and part to out-of-state dealers. A city
property tax was imposed on the goods, the measure of the amount of tax being
a quantity of goods shipped from the factory. The Supreme Court upheld the tax
as not being on interstate commerce but on the goods before they entered inter-
state channels.
"Note (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 94 at oo.
-"In Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 3o5 U. S. 434, 59 S. Ct. 325, 83
L. ed. 272 (1939), the Court struck down a Washington tax measured by the gross
receipts from shipment of fruit in interstate commerce. The tax was said to be a
burden on interstate commerce and if sustained, other states could impose a similar
tax using the same mode of measurement, thus subjecting interstate commerce to a
multiple tax burden from which intrastate commerce enjoyed complete freedom.
This burden of multiple taxation would again erect the barriers to interstate com-
merce which it was the object of the Commerce Clause to remove. In Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546, 82 L. ed. 823 (1938), the
doctrine of the Gwin case was recognized but not applied. Justice Stone observed
that in endeavoring to reconcile the two theories-i.e., that interstate commerce must
share local taxation burdens and that interstate commerce shall not be subjected
[Vol. X
CASE COMMENTS
whether the tax is discriminatory or imposed unequally.2x
In the light of previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, a state use tax could have been constitutionally imposed on
the printing press without any danger of unduly burdening interstate
commerce.2 2 As Justice Holmes observed twenty-two years ago: "Even
interstate commerce must pay its way." 23 In the case of Minnesota v.
to multiple tax burdens because it is interstate commerce-the distinctions should
be made on practical considerations rather than by the use of logical syllogisms. The
validity of an excise tax imposed only upon corporation property situated within
the boundaries of the taxing state was upheld in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 125 U. S. 53o, 8 S. Ct. 96x, Ys L. ed. 790 (1888), on the ground that there
was no burden imposed on interstate commerce. The tax was prorated on the value
of company property in Massachusetts. The Supreme Court observed that if this
tax was unconstitutional because the telegraph company was authorized to put its
poles along post roads by congressional statute, then all states would be deprived
of a great source of revenue as railroads and other instrumentalities authorized by
Congress to use public lands as a right of way could claim exemption from state
taxation.
21Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., Inc., 3oo U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524, 81 L. ed. 814
(1937). The Court went into the problem of whether the use tax imposed on the
machinery was levied in a like fashion on all materials which had ended their
interstate transit and had come to rest in Washington. It found that the use tax
was an impartial levy and nondiscriminatory in result. The opinion stressed the
fact that equality was the theme that ran throughout the the statute.
-"The majority opinion admits to this and cites Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher,
So6 U. S. 167, 59 S. Ct. 389, 83 L. ed. 586 (1939), where a suit was filed to enjoin
the collection of a California use tax which was levied on personal property of the
plaintiff, a railroad. The property was brought in from out-of-state and either in-
stalled for use on arrival or kept available for use as part of its transportation
facilities. The Supreme Court upheld the tax by reasoning that a taxable moment
existed at the interval between the receipt of the goods and their subsequent use.
At this time the goods were not a part of interstate commerce nor were they so re-
lated to it that the imposition of the tax would impose upon it an unconstitutional
burden. Accord: Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 3o6 U. S. 182, 59 S. Ct., 396, 83
L. ed. 595 (1939). Justice McReynolds dissented in both cases, arguing that the tax
was repugnant because it was for all practical intents a burden on interstate
commerce.
2New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes and Assessment, 280 U. S.
338, 351 , 50 S. Ct. I1, 115, 74 L. ed. 463, 470 (1930). The telephone company pro-
tested payment of a New Jersey tax levied on its telephone poles. The tax was
held to be invalid, as a burden on interstate commerce. The reasoning was that
the company was engaged in interstate commerce and thus its property was part of
interstate commerce (poles). Justice Holmes in the dissenting opinion observed that
only one third of the business was in interstate commerce and all of the poles were
located within the state's jurisdiction. The tax on these poles was reasonable and
did not constitute a material burden on interstate commerce. Justice Holmes'
demand was first voiced in Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249
U. S. 252, 259, 39 S. Ct. 265, 266, 63 L. ed. 590, 595 (1919), where Justice Clarke said,
"Even interstate business must pay its way."
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Blasius,24 the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a state property
tax on cattle, Justice Hughes observing that even though the cattle
remained within the general flow of interstate commerce, they had to
come to rest in the stockyard on tax day and were taxable as a part of
the common mass of property within the state. Similarly, it has been
held that though grain bought in the west and shipped to the east was
a part of the flow of interstate commerce, yet when the transit was in-
terrupted temporarily for sorting and bagging, the grain had attained
a local situs and was subject to a state property tax regardless of the
interval of time it rested there.25 A Louisiana property tax on coal
mined in Pennsylvania and shipped to Louisiana for transportation
elsewhere by water was held valid, the coal having come to rest tempo-
rarily in the state and become subject to taxation as part of the common
mass of property.26 The constitutionality of a tax on the gross receipts
from the sale of advertising space which had been solicited from out-
of-state businesses was upheld, the taxable event having occurred when
the advertising was printed.
27
As the South Dakota tax could have been constitutionally imposed
on a newspaper's printing press, the issue involved in the principal
case was whether the South Dakota legislature intended to exempt
such articles from taxation. The majority examined its prior decision
of Scandrett v. Nord,28 where the terms "interstate commerce" and "in-
terstate transportation" had been given a broad general meaning, and
decided that the intent of the legislature was to exempt from taxation
all tangible personal property used in "interstate commerce," and not
merely that which was used in "interstate transportation."
The minority pressed into use the doctrine of ejusdem generis29 in
24290 U. S. 1, 54 S. Ct. 34, 78 L. ed. 131 (1933).
2
5Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 33 S. Ct. 299, 57 L. ed. 615 (1913). The grain
was taken off the train temporarily in Illinois and put into an elevator for sorting
and bagging purposes before being sent on for sale in eastern markets. An Illinois
property tax on wheat so stored was held to be constitutional, the Court reasoning
that no matter whether future shipment was contemplated when the grain was
removed from the train, it was no longer in transit but had acquired a local situs,
and thus did not remain a part of interstate commerce.
24Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 S. Ct. 1091, 29 L. ed. 257 (1885).
2"Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546, 82 L. ed.
823 (1938). The Supreme Court observed that the tax was not measured by the sale
of magazine subscriptions, but by the purely local activity of printing and pub-
lishing the advertising.
-17o S. D. 527, 19 N. W. (2d) 344 (1945).
25o Am. Jur., Statutes § 249; "Similarly, in accordance with what is commonly
known as the rule of ejusdem generis, where, in a statute, general words follow a
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order to show that the most cogent interpretation which could be as-
signed to the legislative intent was that the statutory exemption applied
only to property used or to be used in maintaining interstate trans-
portation. The dissenting judge observed that "this construction har-
monizes with the objects and purposes of the act and does not impute
to the legislation an intention to favor local activities perhaps within
the regulatory powers of Congress...." 30 Thus, the argument was that
the legislature meant to exclude from taxation only that property used
in a narrow zone of interstate commerce, namely interstate transporta-
tion.
However, since the legislature designedly conferred an exemption
from the States's use tax broader than is required by the federal con-
stitutional limitations, the court justifiably felt impelled to give a broad
interpretation to the exemption. Should the legislature now determine
that it acted with excessive benevolence in exempting property used
in maintaining interstate commerce, it need only repeal the exemptive
words at its next session.
ROBERT R. KANE, III
TORTS-IMPUTATION OF DRivER'S NEGLIGENCE TO PASSENGER INJURED IN
COLLISION TO BAR RECOVERY FROM NEGLIGENT DRIVER OF OTHER
CAR. [Virginia]
When a passenger, who has been injured in an automobile collision
in which both drivers were negligent, brings an action for damages
against the driver of the other car, there are several legal bases upon
which courts have held that the negligence of the plaintiff's driver
can be imputed to the passenger so as to bar recovery. Where the driver
is the employee, agent or servant of the passenger who is injured while
travelling on a mission involving the passenger's business, the driver's
negligence may be imputed to the passenger on the theory of re-
designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general
words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particu-
lar designation and as including only things or persons of the same kind, class,
character or nature of those specifically enumerated." 50 Am. Jur., Statutes § 250:
... the doctrine of ejusdem generis is but a rule of construction to aid in ascertain-
ing and giving effect to the legislative intent, where there is uncertainty, and does
not warrant the court in subverting or defeating the legislative will by confining the
operation of a statute within narrower limits than intended by the lawmakers."
-"Mitchell Pub. Co. v. Wilder, 52 N. W. (2d) 732, 736 (S. D. 1952 ) .
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spondeat superior.1 Negligence has likewise been imputed to the hus-
band who is a passenger in a car driven by his wife, under the theory
that a husband is responsible for the torts of his wife.2 And in some
states by statute the negligence of a minor who has a driver's license
has been imputed to the parent, guardian or other person who signed
the application for the minor's license, with the effect of barring that
party from recovery from injuries suffered while riding with the
minor.3 Further, if a driver and passenger are found to be engaged
in a "joint enterprise," the driver's negligence is imputed to the pas-
senger, causing him to be liable with the driver for injuries to a third
person 4 and to be barred from any recovery against third persons
whose negligence also contributed to the accident.5
The general test of joint enterprise as laid down by the courts is
whether the parties have "a community of interest in the objects or
purposes of the undertaking, and an equal right to direct and govern
the movements and conduct of each other with respect thereto." Thus,
in order to impute the driver's negligence to an occupant of his vehicle
on a joint enterprise theory, there must exist something more than a
host and guest relation. There must be such a relationship between
the driver and passenger as to make each the agent of the other in the
execution of the common purpose and undertaking.
7
'Secured Finance Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 207 Iowa 1105, 224 N. W. 88
(1929); Crawford v. McElhinney, 171 Iowa 6o6, 154 N. W. 310 (1915); Meehl v. Barr
Transfer Co., 296 Mich. 697, 296 N. W. 844 (1941); Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn. 3o4,
161 N. W. 715 (1917); Flynn v. Kurn, 183 Miss. 413, 184 So. 16o (1938).
-Minor v. Mapes, 102 Ark. 351, 144 S. W. 219 (1912).
3California Vehicle Act § 62(b): "Any negligence of a minor in a motor vehicle
upon a public highway shall be imputed to the person or persons who shall have
signed the application of such minor for said license, which person or persons
shall be jointly and severally liable which such minor for any damages caused by
such negligence except in the event the minor is driving a motor vehicle as the
agent, or servant or upon the business of a person other than the person who has
signed said application." Sleeper v. Woodmansee, ii Cal. App. (2d) 595, 54 P- (2d)
519, 521 (1936).
'Haynie v. Jones, 233 Mo. App. 948, 127 S. W. (2d) 1o5 (1939); Ahlstedt v.
Smith, 13o Neb. 372, 264 N. W. 889 (1936); Poutre v. Saunders, ig Wash. (2d) 561,
143 P. (2d) 554 (1943).
5Brockman v. Peoples Gas, Light and Coke Co., 319 III. App. 115, 48 N. E. (2d)
802 (1943); Beaucage v. Mercer, 2o6 Mass. 492, 92 N. E. 774 (1910).
'Cunningham v. City of Thief River Falls, 84 Minn. 21, 86 N. W. 763, 765 (19o1).
Accord: Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone, 211 Ala. 516, 101 So. 49 (1924); Myers v. South-
era Pac. Co., 63 Cal. App. 164, 218 Pac. 284 (1923); Bryant v. Paciffic Electric Ry.
Co., 174 Cal. 737, 164 Pac. 385 (1917); Lawrence v. Sioux City, 172 Iowa 320, 154
N. W. 494 (1915); Bowley v. Duca, 8o N. H. 548, 12o At. 74 (1923); Ryan v. Snyder,
29 Wyo. 146, 211 Pac. 482 (1923).
7Greenwell's Adm'r v. Burba, 298 Ky. 255, 182 S. W. (2d) 436 (1944).
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It has been held that to constitute a joint enterprise the passenger
must have had a right to an equal voice in directing and governing
the conduct or movements of the driver in regard to the negligent
acts,8 and that the driver and occupant of a car must have been prac-
tically in joint and common possession of the vehicle as regards con-
trol and direction. 9 Where there is a prior arrangement to share ex-
penses and the purpose of the trip is a joint one, it has been held to
be a joint enterprise.10 If the journey is made on a matter of business
in which both the driver and passenger are mutually interested, the
use of the car as part of the common business enterprise makes each
responsible for the manner in which it is operated. 1 However, it is
not alone sufficient that the passenger indicates the route,12 or shares
in the driving,' 3 or pays or contributes to the expense of the trip,14 or
6The Supreme Court of Indiana followed this rule in a case brought by a
father for damages sustained on account of the death of his daughter while riding
in a school wagon which was hit by one of the defendant's railroad cars. Both
defendant and the driver of the school wagon were negligent, and defendant con-
tended that the driver's negligence is imputed to the parent on a joint enterprise
theory. The court declared that plaintiff had no equal right to control and govern
the direction and movements of the driver, and therefore there was no joint enter-
prise. Union Traction Co. of Indiana v. Gaunt, 193 Ind. 109, 135 N. E. 486 (1922).
In an Iowa case in which the passenger was being taken home from choir practice
on the invitation of the driver, the court held that there was no evidence to show
that the passenger had any control over the direction and movements of the
vehicle to allow imputation of negligence from the driver to the passenger on a
joint enterprise theory. Lawrence v. Sioux City, 172 Iowa 320, 154 N. W. 494 (1915)-
In another Iowa case a passenger had accepted the invitation of the driver for a
pleasure outing, and the court declared that a joint enterprise could not be infer-
red unless the evidence showed that the passenger had some right to control and
manage the vehicle. Withey v. Fowler Co., 164 Iowa 377, 145 N. NV. 923 (1914).
'The California court declared that the fact that the plaintiff was a family
relation or a business associate of the driver did not of itself cause imputation of
driver's negligence to the passenger, but there must be evidence showing joint
"control and direction over the automobile as to be practically in the joint or
common possession of it." Bryant v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 737, 164 Pac.
385, 386 (1917). This rule was reaffirmed in Collins v. Graves, 17 Cal. App. (2d) 288,
61 P. (2-d) 1198 at 12o (1936).
'"Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co., 366 Ill. 330, 8 N. E. (2d) 934 (1937).
URestatement, Torts (1934) § 491, Comment (e).
'-Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Green, 136 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1943); Hider v.
Gelbach, 135 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1943).
"Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Green, 136 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1943); Isaacson v.
Boston, IV. & N. Y. St. Ry. Co., 278 Mass. 378, 18o N. E. 18 (1932).
"'Jones Mercantile Co. v. Copeland, 54 Ga. App. 647, 188 S. E. 586 (1936); Adam-
son v. McEwen, 12 Ga. App. 508, 77 S. E. 591 (1913). Cf. Beaucage v. Mercer, 206
Mass. 492, 92 N. E. 774 (1910) (cited as authority for the principles laid down in
the Zell case, see text at note 16, on joint enterprise, but decision bases joint enter-
prise on sharing of expenses between driver and passnger).
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that both parties have certain plans in common such as a "joy ride"
or a common destination.1
In Virginia, the joint enterprise theory was first invoked on very
weak grounds as a basis for the imputation to a passenger of the driver's
negligence, in Washington & Old Dominion Ry. v. Zell's Adm'x,'0 de-
cided in 1916. The driver and passenger were engaged in a mutual
pleasure trip in the driver's car when the fatal collision with a train
of the defendant's company occurred. In the suit by the passenger's
administratrix the court held that the driver and defendant were
equally negligent and that the joint enterprise doctrine barred re-
covery by the plaintiff.
To establish joint enterprise the court stressed the fact that where
there is a joint or mutual interest, even though it is a pleasure trip, the
negligence of the driver can be imputed to the passenger. While courts
generally have held that the mere fact that the mutual adventure is one
of pleasure does not bar it from being a joint enterprise, 17 neither
does that fact in itself establish the undertaking as such.' 8 Though
it appeared in the Zell case that the passenger was the instigator of
this particular trip and that the two friends had often gone on similar
pleasure trips, taking turns in the driving, these factors were not relied
on by the court in establishing the existence of a joint enterprise.
Nowhere in the opinion was there mention of the fact that the driver
and passenger must have an equal right to direct and govern the move-
ments and conduct of each other in order to constitute joint enterprise,
and there was no evidence tending to establish the fact that the pas-
senger had an equal voice in control and management of the trip.
In spite of the questionable nature of the reasoning employed, the
Zell decision remained an effective precedent for eighteen years,19 until
its holding was greatly weakened by Miles v. Rose.2 0 There the driver
nBaltmore & 0. R. Co. v. Green, 136 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943); W. W.
Clyde & Co. v. Dyess, 126 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. ioth, 1942); Clark v. Janss, 39 Cal.
App. (2d) 523, 1o3 P. (2d) 175 (1940).
16118 Va. 755, 88 S. E. 3og (1916).
1 Greenwell's Adm'r v. Burba, 298 Ky. 255, 182 S. W. (2d) 436 (1944); Luey v.
John Hope 8 Sons Engraving 8: Mfg. Co., 45 R. I. 103, 12o Ad. 62 (1923).
ISW. W. Clyde & Co. v. Dyess, 126 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. ioth, 1942); Clark v.
Janss, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 523, 1o3 P. (2d) 175 (194o); Barry v. Harding, 244 Mass. 588,
139 N. E. 298 (1923).
10The following cases looked to the Zell case as authority: Cashell v. Southern
Ry. Co. 152 Va. 335, 147 S. E. 209 (1929); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Meyer, 15o Va.
656, 143 S. E. 478 (1928); Chapman's Adm'r v. Hines, 134 Va. 274, 115 S. E. 373 (1923);
Canody v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 129 Va. 56, 105 S. E. 585 (1921).
"The plaintiff was a passenger in a car in which four other persons were riding.
The group had purchased some whiskey, which four of them were interested in
[Vol. X
CASE COMMENTS1953]
and passengers were on a mutually beneficial errand seeking pleasure,
but the court specifically held that the fact that the driver and pas-
senger had a mutual or joint interest in the object and purpose of the
trip was not sufficient to constitute a joint enterprise. The repudiation
of the test of the Zell case was, in effect, an overruling of that decision,
the court taking pains to point out that the requirement of a relation-
ship between the driver and passenger whereby each is entitled to a
voice in the direction and operation of the vehicle had been dearly
laid down by cases subsequent to the Zell case.
21
The Zell case was further ignored in 1939 by Carroll v. Hutchin-
son,2 - where it was held that the fact of the driver and passenger be-
ing sisters created no inference that the passenger had such an equal
right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of the un-
dertaking that the negligence of the driver could be imputed to the
passenger on the theory of joint enterprise. It was said not to be enough
that the driver may voluntarily defer to the request of the passenger
if that was done with the idea of pleasing and not as a recognition of
right. And even the fact that the parties take turns driving does not
necessarily make the enterprise a joint one.23 The relationship must
be analogous to that of principal and agent.
It was not until the 1952 decision of Painter v. Lingon,24 that the
Zell case was expressly overruled. An action was brought for injuries
sustaihed by the passenger in a collision between defendant's automo-
bile and the automobile owned by plaintiff and driven by her hus-
band on a mutual pleasure trip. Defendant contended that the plain-
tiff and her husband were engaged in a joint enterprise within the
rule of the Zell case, and that the husband's negligence therefore
barred recovery by the plaintiff. In the face of this argument the Vir-
getting, and were heading back to the tourist camp where they were staying to
have a party, when the accident occurred with defendant's automobile. Both the
driver and defendant were negligent, and defendant depended on the theory of
joint enterprise. 162 Va. 572, 175 S. E. 23o (1934).
"Gaines v. Campbell, 159 Va. 504, 166 S. E. 704 (1932); Seaboard Air Line Ry.
Co. v. Terrell, 149 Va. 344, 141 S. E. 231, 235 (1928); Director General v. Pence's
Adm'x, 135 Va. 329, i16 S. E. 351, 356 (1923). It is to be noted that Judge Kelley
who wrote the opinion in the Director General case also wrote the opinion in the
Zell case. In the Director General case he stated that to impute negligence from
the driver to the passenger on the theory of joint enterprise there must rest in
the passenger some voice in the control and direction of the vehicle, an element
which he completely ignored in the Zell case.
=172 Va. 43, 200 S. E. 644 (1939).
"3Accord: Isaacson v. Boston, W. 9- N. Y. St. R. Co., 278 Mass. 378, i8o N. E.
118 (1932).
".193 Va. 840, 71 S. E. (2d) 355 (1952).
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ginia court was virtually forced to overrule its earlier decision or find
for the defendant, since in both cases the driver and passengers were
engaged in a mutual pleasure trip, and the indications of the passen-
ger's control over the undertaking were more pronounced in the prin-
cipal case. Pointing out that later cases had consistently refused to fol-
low the Zell case, 25 the court now expressly repudiated it, and ruled
that the factor of community of interest was not sufficient to establish a
joint enterprise.
26
Defendant advanced the further argument that the added facts, not
present in the Zell case, that the passenger was the owner of the car
and that the driver was her husband, provided grounds for finding a
joint enterprise. While the court conceded that the owner's presence
in an automobile driven by her husband tended to indicate that the
husband was the plaintiff's agent and was operating the car under her
control,2 7 it ruled that the fact of the title being registered in the name
of a wife was not conclusive proof that she was the actual owner so
as to give her all rights, benefits and liabilites therefrom. 28 The testi-
mony showed the husband had bought and paid for the automobile
for the use of the family, and had registered it in plaintiff's name
merely because she had asked her husband to do so in order that she
could say she owned a car. The husband used the car at will, especially
to go back and forth to his place of business, and the plaintiff seldom
drove the car when he was present. He maintained all the expenses
of the vehicle regardless of who used it. Thus, plaintiff was owner in
name only, and the court declared that in such a situation a husband
is presumed to be in absolute control of the automobile as to its di-
rection and operation even though his wife is present.
29
"5Carroll v. Hutchinson, 172 Va. 43, 2oo S. E. 644 ('939); Miles v. Rose, 162 Va.
572, 175 S. E. 2.30 ('934); Director General v. Pence's Adm'x, 135 Va. 329, 116 S. E.
351 (1923); Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 0o Va. 655, 91 S. E. 632 (1917).
-"Accord: MacGregor v. Bradshaw, 193 Va. 787, 71 S. E. (2d) 361 (1952) (decided
the same day as Painter case).
"'Welch v; Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 17 La. App. ioo, 135 So. 617 (1931);
Martens v. Penton, 15 La. App. 35, 130 So. 354 (1930); Gochee v. Wagner, 257
N. Y. 344, 178 N. E. 553 (1931); Wilcott v. Ley, 205 Wis. 155, 236 N. W. 593 (1931).
"Accord: United States Casualty Co. v. Bain, 191 Va. 717, 62 S. E. (2d) 814 (1951).
-"Accord: Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, io N. W. (2d)
406, 412 (1943). This court ruled: "Ownership of an automobile in which the owner is
riding, but which is being driven by another, does not establish as a matter of law
right to control in the owner. Right of control may be surrendered, as it often is,
where the owner parts with possession of his car to another. In that situation
the parties stand in relationship of bailor and bailee. The negligence of a bailee in
operating an automobile is not imputable to the bailor .... The existence of the
marriage relation between the parties does not change their relationship or lia-
bilities with respect to bailed property."
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The court further held that the marital relationship does not es-
tablish an agency between husband and wife, upon which an impu-
tation of negligence will be based.30 It is the duty of the husband to
provide recreation for his wife and when he is doing so he is not held
to be acting as her agent.31.
As a result of the principal decision, the last trace of the Zell case
doctrine has been eradicated from Virginia law. Henceforth, in this
jurisdiction, in order for a passenger to be barred from recovery by
the imputation to him of his driver's negligence, defendant must show
that there existed between the driver and passenger such a relationship
that each had a substantial right to direct and govern the movements
and conduct of the other in the prosecution of the common purpose.
Thus, Virginia has adopted the test of the majority of states in de-
termining the existence of joint enterprise.
DOUGLAS M. SMrrH
TORTS-PLACE OF FORESEEABILITY OF HAmu IN NEGLIGENCE CASES AS
PART OF PROXIMATE CAUSATION OR NEGLIGENCE-DUTY ISSUE. [Penn-
sylvania]
The problem of "foreseeability" as it affects liability for negligence
has received the attention of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
the recent case of Dahlstrom v. Shrum.' The fact situation in the
Dahlstrom case presented the Pennsylvania court with the opportunity
of either adhering to its earlier decision of Wood v. Pennsylvania R.
Co.,2 which treats foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff as a matter of
proximate causation,3 or of adopting instead, the approach of the New
-MAccord: Rodgers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 At. 166 (1931); Virginia Ry. &
Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 12o Va. 655, 91 S. E. 632 (1917).
MPainter v. Lingon, 193 Va. 840, 71 S. E. (2d) 355 at 359 (1952).
1368 Pa. 423, &1 A. (2d) 289 (1951).
2177 Pa. 3o6, 35 Ad. 699, 35 L. R. A. 199 (1896).
3Casual relationship is a requisite factor in every case involving liability' for
negligence, but the technical terminology used to describe the test for legal causation
has created serious confusion in this field of the law: Prosser, Torts (1941) § 46;
Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause (1932) 20 Calif. L. Rev.
229, 396-419; Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law (1950) 28 Tex.
L. Rev. 471, 474, 490; James and Perry, Legal Cause (1951) 6o Yale L. J. 761, 762;
Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (1911) 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103. Obviously, the
test requires that the alleged wrongful conduct supporting the negligence action be
the cause-in-fact of the injury or harm suffered by the plaintiff, whether that
harm was attributable to some negligent affirmative action on the defendant's part
or to some failure or omission to act when he was under a duty to act: Hayes v.
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York case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.,4 which treats foreseeability
as determinative of the existence of duty, and hence of negligence.
In the Palsgraf case, 5 the majority of the New York Court of Appeals,
speaking through Chief Judge Cardozo, held that to support a negli-
gence liability against the defendant, there must be conduct shown
which involved negligence toward the particular plaintiff; and that
"mere negligence in the air"6 is not sufficient. Negligence was thus
treated as a relative concept-i.e., relative to the particular plaintiff
who had suffered from the injury.7 "The ideas of negligence and
duty are strictly correlative"8 in the sense that where there is no duty to
the individual complaining, "the observance of which would have
averted or avoided the injury," 9 then, even though the defendant's
Michigan Central R. Co., 111 U. S. 228, 4 S. Ct. 369, 28 L. ed. 410 (1884); Cobb v.
Twitchell, 91 Fla. 539, 1o8 So. 186, 45 A. L. R. 865 (1920); Heiting v. Chicago R.
I. & P. R. Co., 252 Ill. 466, 96 N. E. 842 (1911); McNally v. Colwell, 91 Mich, 527,
52 N. W. 70, 3o Am. St. Rep. 494 (1892); Gilman v. Noyes, 57 N. H. 627 (1876). How-
ever, the scope of liability under the cause-in-fact test alone is so broad that modern
courts have seen fit to apply various restrictions in order to limit liability for the
actual consequences of negligent conduct. See note 27 infra; Gregory, Proximate
Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from "Rationalization" (1938) 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
36.
The necessity for limitations on this vast scope of liability was what generally
gave rise to the terms "proximate cause" or "legal cause." It has been said of
them: "To be sure this concept is only one of the devices used to limit the fact
and the extent of liability for negligence ... , however, the concept of proximate
cause has been greatly overworked. ... 'Having no integrated meaning of its own,
[the] chamelon quality [of proximate cause] permits it to be substituted for any
one of the elements of a negligence case when decision on that element becomes
difficult.... No other formula ... so nearly does the work of Aladdin's lamp.' The
result has been a widely recognized confusion, and as luxuriant a crop of legal lit-
erature as is to be had in any branch of tort law." James and Perry, Legal Cause
(1951) 60 Yale L. J. 761.
Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law (1950) 28 Tex. L. Rev. 471,
472, gives thirty-six common adjectives as supplementary to, or synonymous with,
the term "proximate." See St. John Green, Essay's and Notes On The Law of Tort
and Crime (1933) 1, 3, 9; Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (19o6) 11o.
'248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. L. R. 1253 (1928).
1248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. L. R. 1253 (1928) (passenger boarding train
was pushed by railroad company's guard, causing passenger to drop newspaper-
covered package containing fireworks which exploded, the shock of the explosion
throwing down scales striking and injuring the plaintiff standing many feet away).
6248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. L. R. 1253, 1255 (1928). Accord: Martin v.
Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 170, i26 N. E. 814 (1920). Cf. Salmond, Torts (6th ed. 1924) 24.
7248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 100, 59 A. L. R. 1253, 1256 (1928): "What the
plaintiff must show is 'a wrong' to herself; i.e., a violation of her own right, and not
merely a wrong to some one else, nor conduct 'wrongful' because unsocial, but not
a 'wrong' to any one."
8248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 1oo, 59 A. L. R. 1253, 1256 (1928).
'248 N. Y. 399, 162 N. E. 99, 1oo, 59 A. L. R. 1253, 1255 (1928). Accord: West
Virginia Central & P. R. Co. v. State, 96 Md. 652, 54 Ad. 669 (19o3).
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act may have been a wrong with regard to someone other than the
plaintiff, there is no liability to the plaintiff or, as might reasonably be
inferred, to that class of persons of which plaintiff is a member. "The
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed and
risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the
range of apprehension."'1o The majority of the New York court added
that liability for negligence may attach under this foreseeability test
even though the particular manner in which the harm resulted to the
plaintiff may have been strange and unexpected." Under this ap-
proach, the court added: "The law of causation, remote or proximate,
is thus foreign to the case ....12
By contrast, the Wood v. Pennsylvania R. Co.13 approach, devel-
oped by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court previous to the Palsgraf
decision, takes a more generalized view of negligence as conduct involv-
ing risk of harm to the public, but denies liability for the negligence
unless the specific result of that conduct to this plaintiff was "the
natural and probable consequence"' 4-i.e., the foreseeable conse-
10248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 1oo, 59 A. L. R. 1253, 1256 (1928).
u248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 100, 59 A. L. R. 1253, 1257 (1928). Accord: Munsey
v. Webb, 231 U. S. 150, 34 S. Ct. 44, 58 L. ed. 162 (1913); Robert v. United States
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 24o N. Y. 474, 148 N. E. 650 (1925); Condran
v. Park & Tilford, 213 N. Y. 341, 107 N. E. 565 (1915).
Some authority has even gone so far, and quite logically perhaps, as to provide a
basis by which an extension to this liability test may be inferred. It has been said
that the view set out by Judge Cardozo "does not always depend on foreseeability
of the hazard causing the harm if the evidence indicates that the plaintiff was
within range of the effect of the foreseeable hazard which made the defendant's
conduct negligent, as long as there is a substantial similarity between the normal
effect of the foreseeable hazard which actually causes the harm." Gregory, Proximate
Cause In Negligence-A Retreat From "Rationalization" (1938) 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
36, 48 [first and last italics supplied]. The author drew his conclusion from per.
sonal conversation with Judge Cardozo and claims no other authority as source.
"Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 101, 59 A. L. R.
1253, 1258 (1928). It was also stated by the majority of the court that: "The question
of liability is always anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences
that go with liability. If there is no tort to be redressed, there is no occasion to
consider what damage might be recovered if there were a finding of a tort." 258 N. Y.
339, 162 N. E. 99, 101, 59 A. L. R. 1253, 1258 (1928).
13177 Pa. 3o6, 35 Ad. 699, 35 L. R. A. 199 (1896) (train, negligently failing
to give signal at railroad crossing, struck decedent, throwing her body against
plaintiff, some 50 feet away on station platform, causing injuries to him). Compare:
Hoag & Alger v. Lake Shore and Mich. So. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293 (1877).
1 'Vood v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 3o6, 35 At. 699, 700, 35 L. R. A. 199, 20o
(1896) : "'But it is generally held that, in order to warrant a finding that negligence,
or an act not amounting to wanton wrong, is a proximate cause of an injury, it
must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negli-
gence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in the light of
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quence-thereof. Under this approach the limits of liability are marked
as an application of the law of proximate causation. The court ap-
parently reasoned that "even if the defendant was negligent in some
respects and even if that negligence was in fact causally contributive
to the harm complained of, the court will nevertheless direct a verdict
for the defendant if in its opinion the eventuality complained of was
not a foreseeable incident of the defendant's negligent conduct, i.e.,
was a rather weird and improbable occurrence."'u
The fact situation in Dahlstrom v. Shrum 6 was strikingly similar
to that of Wood v. Pennsylvania R. Co. The accident occurred when
a bus in which decedent and plaintiff were passengers stopped at
night on the highway to allow them to alight at a sparsely settled
village. Defendant, approaching the scene in his automobile at a speed
of about 35 miles per hour was partially blinded by the headlights of
the stationary bus, so that he could neither determine what kind of
vehicle it was nor see any activity around it. Just as defendant's car
reached the spot, decedent stepped out from behind the bus and started
to walk across the highway. The car struck him and hurled his body
against plaintiff, who was standing at the rear of the bus preparatory
to crossing the highway about four or five feet behind decedent. Plain-
tiff was seriously injured and sued for damages. The trial court granted
a compulsory nonsuit however, on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to produce evidence that the defendant was negligent, and on
appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.
In its opinion the Pennsylvania court defined negligence as "the
absence of care under the circumstances"'17 and then continued: "The
test of negligence is whether the wrongdoer could have anticipated and
foreseen the likelihood of harm to the injured person, resulting from
attending circumstances.'" [quoting i Jaggard, Torts (1895) 374.] Also: Bohlen,
Studies In the Law Of Torts (1926) 16, 17 [Reprint from Bohlen, The Probable
or The Natural Consequence as The Test of Liability in Negligence. (19o) 4o Am.
L. Reg. N. s. 79, 148].
"Gregory, Proximate Cause In Negligence-A Retreat from "Rationalization"
(1938) 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 36, 43. Accord: Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg,
94 U. S. 469, 24 L. ed. 256 (1877); Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 I1. 300, 45 N. E.
(2d) 665 (1942); Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. Welch, 25 Ind. App. 3o8, 58 N. E. 88
(xgoo); Uvalde Const. Co. v. Hill, 142 Tex. 19, 175 S. W. (2d) 247 (1943); Texas &
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S. W. 162 (1896).
'1368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289 (1951).
1T368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289, 29o (1951). Accord: Adams v. Bullock, 227 N. Y.
208, 125 N. E. 93 (igig); Paul v. Consolidated Fireworks Co., 212 N. Y. 117, 105
N. E. 795 (1914); Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. L.
R. 1253 (1928); Beck v. Stanley Co. of America, 355 Pa. 608, 50 A. (2d) 306 (1947).
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his act.... Was plaintiff within that group of people to whom a reason-
able man could foresee an injury under these circumstances? We think
not."' s Laying stress on the point that the defendant was not aware of
the presence of anyone behind the bus because he was not certain as
to the vehicle's identity and was partially blinded by its light as
he approached at a reasonable speed, the court added: "Such reason-
able man would not foresee that anyone would be behind the bus and
would not foresee that such person would be passing behind the bus
and stepping into the oncoming lane of traffic." 19 Thus, there was no
negligence toward the decedent. Futhermore, the court decided that
"A reasonable man, under the present circumstances, could not foresee
that anyone standing in the street behind the bus would be injured
by an object struck by defendant's car."'20 Therefore, there was no
negligence toward the plaintiff. "Plaintiff was clearly outside the
orbit of risk and therefore no right of plaintiff was invaded and defen-
dant breached no duty which he owed to plaintiff."21 The gist of the
court's reasoning seems to be that the one killed was an unforseeable
decedent and plaintiff was an unforeseeable plaintiff-i.e., both were
outside the orbit or zone of any apparent danger, and no duty was
owed to either.
If the opinion had stopped there, on the note that foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff is the test of negligence, the result would have
rested squarely on the Palsgraf decision. But the court was not content
to conclude at that point and stated further that "Even if defendant
were held to be negligent with respect to deceased, in that he should
have foreseen that someone might be in back of the bus attempting
from that position to cross the road, no negligence existed as to the
plaintiff, because it could not be foreseen that deceased's body would
strike plaintiff."22 The earlier decision of Wood v. Pennsylvania R.
Co. 23 was cited to substantiate this point.
The troublesome factor arising from this last observation is that,
1368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289, 290 (1951). Cf.: Scurfield v. Federal Laboratories,
Inc., 335 Pa. 145, 6 A. (2d) 559 at 561 (1939); Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248
N. Y. 339, x62 N. E. 99 at 1oo, 59 A. L. R. 1253 at 1257 (1928).
"368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289, 291 (1951) ("darting out" case analogy struck).
Rowe v. Coopey, 339 Pa. 105, 14 A. (2d) 76 (194o); Taylor v. Philadelphia Rural
Transit Co., iii Pa. Super. 575, 17o At. 327 (1934); McAteer v. Highland Coffee Co.,
291 Pa. 32, 139 Ad. 585 (1927).
20368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289, 292 (1951).
'1368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289, 292 (1951).
1368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289, 292 (1951) [italics supplied].
=177 Pa. 306, 35 Ad. 699, 35 L. R. A. 199 (1896).
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if the defendant were thus negligent toward the deceased, then on the
same reasoning, plaintiff's presence behind the bus was foreseeable,
and hence it is difficult to see why plaintiff would not be within the
zone of risk from the hurtling body of decedent. This is the same
difficulty that is often encountered when the Wood case is under con-
sideration. There, the woman at the grade crossing was a foreseeable
decedent, plaintiff standing on the nearby station platform was
"known" to be there, and it was certainly a foreseeable risk that any
object struck by the train at the crossing would be tossed aside, and
might strike anyone within the area. Apparently, the Wood case is
insisting upon foreseeability, not as to risk but as to the happening of
the precise event that occurred in the precise manner in which it
occurred. Such a concept of foreseeability, whether it is enforced under
the negligence-duty issue, as in the Dahlstrom case, or under the doc-
trine of proximate cause, as in the Wood case, seems unduly strict in
limiting liability.
It is logical to suppose that Judge Cardozo would not have de-
cided the Wood case as the Pennsylvania court did.24 To him, "the
risk reasonably to be perceived" 25 does not mean that the precise event
must be foreseen. In his Palsg-raf opinion he quotes with approval from
a United States Supreme Court decision: "It was not necessary that
the defendant should have had notice of the particular method in
which an accident would occur, if the possibility of an accident was
clear to the ordinarily prudent eye. ' '20
Apparently the instant case places Pennsylvania in that group of
jurisdictions which follows the Palsgraf case in holding that foresee-
ability of injury is relevant to the question of duty, and thus of negli-
gence, and not, as the Wood case held, to the issue of proximate
cause. On the other hand, the second part of the opinion, while re-
"Although some have hinted that the Cardozo view in the Palsgraf case and the
Pennsylvania's court view in the Wood decision are virtually the same, this very
striking analysis has been given in reply: The Cardozo view "emphasizes those
factors in a case which might indicate that the result of the defendant's negligence
was probable or foreseeable, whereas the latter ignores these clues and looks only
at the damage in light of normal expectancies. That is to say, under the Cardozo
formula the step by step method might lead up to foreseeability of what happened,
whereas the eventuality itself might, without consideration of the intermediate
steps, seem quite improbable." Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence- A retreat
from "Rationalization" (1938) 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 36, 53.
-Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, ioo, 59 A. L. R.
1253, 1256 (1928).
26248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 1oo, 59 A. L. R. 1253, 1257 (1928), quoting Munsey
v. Webb, 231 U. S. 15o, 156, 34 S. Ct. 44, 45, 58 L. ed. 62, 166 (1913).
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jecting the Wood teaching as to technique, adopts the actual result
of the Wood case as to the meaning of "foreseeability," and thus en-
forces a limitation of liability which appears to be stricter than that
contemplated by the prevailing opinion in the Palsgraf case. The Penn-
sylvania court, then, while seizing the opportunity afforded by Dahl-
strom v. Shrum to return foreseeability to its proper place under the
negligence issue,27 still felt compelled to adhere to the specific decision
of the Wood case as to what is foreseeable under the specific facts in-
volved in these cases.
ROBERT J. INGRAM
ToRTs-RIGHT OF ACTION OF CHILD AGAINST PARENT FOR PERSONAL
TORT COMMITTED IN NON-PARENTAL CAPACITY. [Ohio]
Though no cases testing the right of an infant to recover against
his parent in a personal tort action appear to have arisen until late in
the nineteenth century,' the first clear American decision on the point
It may be hoped that this decision is one more indication that the "proximate
cause" test for limiting liability is losing favor among the courts. Sinram v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., 61 F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Kinderavitch v. Palmer, 127 Conn.
85, 15 A. (2d) 83 (194o); Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E.
99 (1928); DeGregorio v. Malloy, 356 Pa. 511, 52 A. (2d) 195 (1947); Ennis v. Atkin,
354 Pa. 165, 47 A (2d) 217 (1946); Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 Pa. 642, 23 A. (2d) 445
(1942); Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927) 77-121, 144-170; Green, Proximate
Cause in Texas Negligence Law (195o) 28 Tex. L. Rev. 471, 621, 755. The American
Law Institute has stated that "the duty to abstain from certain conduct may be estab-
lished solely to protect the other from the risk of harm from one particular hazard,
and as to that hazard, the conduct is clearly negligent." Restatement, Torts (1948
Supp.) § 281 [italics supplied]. "When volume II [Restatement of Torts] was written,
most courts were still treating the hazard problem as one of 'proximate cause'"
Restatement, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 281. The new comments state the modern ap-
proach in analyzing most of the problems which were once generally treated under
the vague term 'proximate cause.' This increasing recognition required expansion
and revision of the original comment.
In referring to the Wood decision, and its approach under the proximate cause
method, the Restatement comments: "Opinions in such cases frequently lead the
seeker after light into the realm of utter confusion." Restatement, Torts (1948 Supp.)
§ 281.
"It would seem that such an action was unknown to the English law, though
there were no prohibitions of it. See Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. ii at 18, 4 S. E. (2d)
343 at 345 (1939). Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 15o Atl. 905, 906 (1930): "There
never has been a common law rule that a child could not sue its parent." Villaret
v. Villaret, 169 F. (2d) 677 (C. A. D. C., 1948): "The ancient common law did not,
it appears, expressly deny to a child a right of action against a parent for personal
injury negligently inflicted. But since 18gi there has grown up in this country a mass
of authority holding that such a suit is against public policy and cannot be main-
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has been widely accepted as establishing a general rule against the
recognition of such a cause of action. In 1891 the Mississippi Supreme
Court in Hewellette v. George, without citing any precedents or mak-
ing any examination of earlier authorities, ruled against recovery by
the child from his parent on the grounds of public policy. It was de-
dared that "So long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide,
and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and
comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The peace
of society ... and a sound public policy.., forbid to the minor child
a right to ... [assert] ... a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent."2
Other American courts proceeded to adopt the principle of parental
immunity from suit, and set about bolstering up the somewhat dubious
logic of the Hewellette case with a variety of additional reasons, which
are principally amplifications of the policy basis of that decision.
Among the most frequently advanced arguments is that the relation-
ship between parent and child is roughly analogous to that existing
at common law between husband and wife, and that therefore the
child should be under the same disability to sue as is the wife.3 How-
ever, though there is some similarity between the relationships, 4 the
husband's immunity from suit rested fundamentally on the doctrine
tained." Also Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A. (2d) 923 at 924 (Md. 1951); dissenting opin-
ion, Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 at 24, 31 A. L. R. 1135 at 1146
(1923); Prosser, Torts (1941) 9o5; Eversley, Domestic Relations (1885) 6ol.
However many of the courts which bar recovery take a different view of the
common law. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788, 789, 68 L. R. A. 893, 894
(19o5): "At common law it is well established that a minor child cannot sue a
parent for a tort. ... So well is this principle of law understood that there have
been few attempts to inaugurate actions of this kind." Also Belleson v. Skilbeck,
185 Minn. 537, 242 N. W. 1 at 2 (1932); Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E.
12 at 13, 31 A. L. R. 1135 at 1137 (1923); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 At.
198 at 199, 200, 42 A. L. R. 136o at 1362 (1925); Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S. C. 517, 155 S. E.
888 at 889 (1930); McKelvey v. McKelvey, i11 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664, 64 L. R. A.
991 (19o3). This seeming conflict in the interpretation of the law can be best under-
stood if one considers that "perhaps there is a useful distinction to be noticed be-
tween the law and a mere social conformity, however well established. A social
rule or prevailing sentiment excluding for ages all practical opportunity to institute
actions ex delicto cannot be said to be the same thing as a rule of law denying the
action." Note (1951) ig A. L. R. (2d) 431.
268 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 887, 13 L. R. A. 682, 684 (1891).
'Prosser, Torts (1941) 906.
'The father has a right to the earnings of a minor child, as the husband does
to his wife's earnings at common law. The father and the husband have similar
duties of support to child and wife. The stability of the home is dependent on the
discipline of the father over the child as it is on the discipline of the husband over
the wife (hardly a valid concept in the mid-twentieth century).
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of the unity of the spouses, and there is no such theory in effect in
parent and child law. Furthermore, even if the analogy between the
relationships were sound, its weakness as a basis for the parental im-
munity rule is indicated by the fact that several states now permit
actions between husband and wife while still denying the right of a
child to sue his parent.5
It is also often asserted that the recognition of a cause of action in
favor of an unemancipated child against a parent would result in de-
stroying the harmony of the family relationship and the stability of
the home.6 This argument is emotionally appealing and has long been
advanced as a justification for the wife's disability to sue her husband
for personal torts, but in both situations it may be regarded as doubt-
ful that domestic harmony will continue to exist after serious personal
injuries have been inflicted by one member of the family on another.
Yet, in the unfortunate case of Roller v. Roller, wherein the father
had committed rape on his minor daughter, the argument was made
that domestic relations had already been irreparably disturbed but the
court's rejoinder was that "there seems to be some reason in this argu-
ment, but it overlooks the fact that the courts in determining their
jurisdiction or want of jurisdiction rely on certain uniform principles
of law .... "' Courts have been similarly adamant in refusing to con-
cede that since property and contract rights of action have long been
allowed between child and parent without unduly disrupting the
family relationship, actions for personal torts could also be safely per-
mitted.8
'Mesite v. Kirchstein, log Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929); Small v. Morrison,
185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 31 A. L. R. 135 (1923); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260,
212 N. W. 787, 52 A. L. R. 1113 (1927).
OSmall v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 16 (1923): "There are some
things that are worth more than money. One of these is the peace of the fireside
and the contentment of the home, for such is the kindgom of righteousness ....
If this... [rule of non-liability] ... were not announced by any of the writers of
the common law ... it was unmistakably and indelibly carved upon the tablets
of Mount Sinai." Briggs v. Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super. 5o, 17o Atl. 871 at 872 (1934),
rev'd on other grounds in Vi6 Pa. 48, 173 At. 316 (1934); Trundell v. Leatherby,
212 Cal. 678, 300 Pac. 7 at 8 (1931); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. x31 at 132, 131 Ad.
198 at 199 (1925).
737 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788, 789 (19o5) [holding disapproved as too broad, in Borst
v. Borst, 251 P. (2d) 149 at 156 (Wash. 1952)].
'Mesite v. Kirchstein, io9 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753, 755 (1929): ".it is asked,
Are the property rights of a minor of more importance to him than the rights of
his person? No; but their protection will not disturb the family relation as will the
action for personal injuries...." Unfortunately, the court offers no proof of this
questionable assertion.
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Financial considerations have also been put forward in support of
the immunity rule. The fear is expressed that the family's financial re-
sources might be depleted to the detriment of other children if the par-
ent is forced to pay one child a judgment for damages. 9 However, this
argument seems to be employed in the cases without regard to whether
there actually are other children; and in any event, no reason is shown
why the injured child is not deserving of compensation for detriment
suffered but rather must bear the whole loss of the injury personally.
Similarly, courts seem unduly alarmed by what has been called the
"possibility of succession"1 0 which grows out of the fact that the par-
ent, in case of the death of the child while still a minor, would, as
next of kin, reacquire the damages previously awarded the child.
Though most of the reasoning purporting to prove the necessity for
parental immunity from tort actions can be logically discredited, the
basic theroy of the Hewellette case, that the parent's right of discipline
and control over the family must not be undermined by allowing
children to sue them in tort, continues to have validity. The grow-
ing body of case and text authority repudiating the absolute immunity
doctrine still recognizes that the maintenance of the family institu-
tion requires that parents be privileged to some extent in this regard. 1
However, a number of modern courts have taken the position that
immunity should not be extended to cover injuries arising from obvi-
ous disciplinary excesses or injuries suffered from wrongful acts of the
parent not done in his capacity as parent. Thus, in suits involving
wilful or malicious acts the modern inclination has been favorable
to recovery by the infant because the wilful conduct is regarded as
evidencing an abandonment of the parental relationship by the wrong-
doer.12 Where an insurer will have to bear the ultimate liability for
the parent's tort committed in a non-parental capacity, several courts
have held recovery ought to be allowed. The Virginia Supreme Court
"Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 ('9o5); Prosser, Torts (1941) 906.
IbRoller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); Prosser, Torts (1941) 9o6.
"Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, i5o At. 905, 909 (1930): "It is conceded, of
course, that parental authority should be maintained. To this end it is also con-
ceded that the parent should not ordinarily be accountable to the child for a
failure to perform a parental duty ..." Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. (2d)
445 at 451 (1950); Borst v. Borst, 251 P. (2d) 149 at 156 (Wash. 1952).
uDunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 15o Aft. 905, 910 (1930): "But there is such
a thing as abandonment of the parental relation. This ... may be implied from
acts. It should be implied in the cases of malicious injuries." Brown v. Cole, 198
Ark. 417, 129 S. W. (2d) 245, 122 A. L. R. 1348 (1939); Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196
Misc. 551, 92 N. Y. S. (2d) 595 (1949); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. (2d) 445,
19 A. L. R. (2d) 405(1950).
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of Appeals in Worrell v. Worrell ruled that because the tort was com-
mitted by the parent in a vocational capacity as operator of a common
carrier, and because the parent in this capacity was covered by liabili-
ty insurance which was compulsory under state statute, the case was
removed from the general immunity rule.13 When faced with a very
similar problem, the West Virginia court declared that it was "not
impressed with the idea that the ills accredited to... [actions between
parent and child] ... may be obviated merely by suing the parent in
his business capacity.. . To both, the defendant would be essentially
the parent, and it would be against him (as such) the child would be
publicly arrayed." But recovery for the child was allowed because
a "different situation arises where the parent is protected by insurance
in his vocational capacity .... ,,14 For under such circumstances the
suit "is not unfriendly as between the daughter and the father. A re-
covery by her is no loss to him. In fact, their interests unite in favor
of her recovery .... There is no filial recrimination .... Family har-
harmony is assured instead of disrupted .... When no need exists for
parental immunity, the courts should not extend it as a mere gra-
tuity."1 5 Thus, the allowance of recovery rests primarily on the fact
that there was liability insurance. However, a different approach was
used by the New Hampshire court in Dunlap v. Dunlap, on finding
that the injured child was working for his parent under circumstances
showing a master's liability for tort damages to a servant.16 Here the
employer-parent's liability insurance was regarded as merely evidence
that a master and servant relationship existed to a degree which so
modified the parental relationship that recovery should be allowed.
In these cases in which the parental immunity was not recognized,
recovery was allowed on the basis of special circumstances, and the
courts were not prepared to deny the validity of the general non-lia-
bility rule. In each case there was a relationship additional to that of
parent and child, such as master and servant,17 or carrier and passen-
'1374 Va. 11, 27, 4 S. E. (2d) 343, 349 (1939): "For the protection of ... pas-
sengers, in the event of the violation of his [defendant's] duty, the State required
him to carry liability insurance. Can it be that his duties to other passengers are
higher than his obligations to his own child, when his interest, her interest and
the interest of the State all require the preservation and protection of her rights?"
"Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932).
5113 V. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538, 539 (1932).
" Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930)-
'7Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 15o Atl. 9o5 (193o). Some courts, while
paying lip-service to the immunity rule, have allowed recovery by the child in
suit against his parent's employer for a tort committed by the parent in the scope
of his employment, though recovery directly from the parent is denied. Chase v.
New Haven Waste Material Corp. iii Conn. 377, 15o Atl. 1o7 (1930).
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ger;' 8 the breach of duty was not within the scope of the conduct of
the domestic establishment or the duty of rearing the child; and the
courts have very pointedly restricted their holdings to the narrow
question thereby presented.19
In the recent case of Signs v. Signs2° the Ohio Supreme Court has
taken a further step in this judicial process of obviating the immunity
rule where under the special circumstances of the case a denial of re-
covery would work a manifest injustice. Plaintiff, an unemancipated
minor, brought an action for personal injuries allegedly caused by the
negligence of the defendant partnership, composed of the plaintiff's
father and another, in the maintenance of a gasoline pump. In the
lower courts, it appears to have been assumed that a minor child could
not sue for personal injuries against his parent, and the case turned on
the question of whether a partnership in which the parent is a member
may be sued in tort by the minor child upon the theory that it is a
legal entity apart from the partners.21 In the Supreme Court of Ohio,
however, the plaintiff abandoned the partnership entity theory, and
argued directly that an unemancipated child should be allowed to
maintain a tort action against his parent in the latter's "business or
vocational capacity." In affirming the intermediate court's order re-
manding the case for trial on the merits, the unanimous court declared:
"In view of the changed conditions to which we have re-
ferred, we have come to the conclusion that, if there ever was
any justification for the rule announced in Mississippi in 1891,
that justification has now disappeared and that an unemanci-
pated child should have as clear a right to maintain an action
in tort against his parent in the latter's business or vocational
capacity as such a child would have to maintain an action in re-
lation to his property rights.
22
As the "changed conditions" which justify a departure from the es-
tablished rule, the court cited "the advent of the motor vehicle and
"sWorrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. (2d) 343 (1939).
"Note (1951) 19 A. L. R. (2d) 433, § 2. The courts are now in considerable
conflict on how far the immunity rule should be extended to one who is not a
natural parent but who stands "in loco parentis." Note (1951) 19 A. L. R. (ad) 434,
§ 5, and cases therein cited.
20156 Ohio 566, 103 N. E. (ad) 743 (1952).
21The trial court entered judgment for the defendant on the pleadings on the
grounds that since "the liability of each partner was joint and several, any judg-
ment recovered against the partnership would become a liability of the father."
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the immunity rule
"'should not obtain on this record as a matter of law'." 156 Ohio 592, 103 N. E. (2d)
743, 745 (1952)-
2'156 Ohio 666, io3 N. E. (2d) 743, 748 (1952).
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the growing complications of business and industry... in an indus-
trial age .... "23 The reference is ambiguous in regard to the issue
of parental immunity from tort liability, but it would be a logical
assumption that the prevalence of liability insurance brought on by
these modern conditions influenced the decision. The opinion gave
particular attention to several modern cases in which other courts
have at least implied, if not definitely ruled, that the fact that the de-
fendant-parent was protected by liability insurance obviated the rea-
son for the rule denying liability. However, the Ohio tribunal ex-
pressly denied that the presence or absence of liability insurance
should influence the decision of whether a child should be allowed
to recover. Since the opinion is specific in recognizing the liability of
the parent in his "business or vocational capacity," it may be that the
court thought that the "growing complications of business and in-
dustry" would produce more situations in which the parties would
stand in some other relationship than merely that of parent and child.
But if there is real reason in 1952 for allowing recovery for injury in-
flicted on a child by his parent acting in a business capacity, it would
seem that recovery should have been allowed in 1891 in the fewer cases
which would have arisen under the different industrial conditions of
sixty years ago.
In view of the ambiguity of the phrases "changed conditions" and
"business and vocational capacity," it is not possible to determine
definitely to what extent the Ohio court advocates the abandonment
of the general parental immunity rule. Manifestly, it does not go so far
as to advocate a total withdrawal of parental immunity in all types of
situations. It does seem certain, however, that the court intends to go be-
yond the earlier cases which have recognized liability of a parent,24 but
have conditioned its imposition upon the existence of liability insur-
ance protecting the parent from financial loss or of an employment rela-
tionship between the parties which tends to indicate the economic, if
not the legal, emancipation of the injured minor. In laying down the
broad rule that the parent should be liable for injuries caused by him
in his business or vocational capacity, the Ohio court has made a
further step toward establishing a modified immunity rule granting
the parent a privilege from liability for injuries inflicted while rea-
sonably exercising parental discipline and control in maintaining the
23156 Ohio 566, io 3 N. E. (2d) 743, 748 (1952).
rDunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, i5o At. 905 (193o); Worrell v. Worrell 174
Va. 11, 4 S. E. (2d) 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17 , 166 S. E. 538 (1932).
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domestic establishment, with no privilege in relation to those injuries
inflicted outside of this sphere.2 5
EUGENE M. ANDERSON, JR.
TORTS-RiGHT OF MARRIED WOMAN To SUE HUSBAND FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES INFLICTED BEFORE MARRIAGE. [Virginia]
Since at common law the personality of the wife merged in that
of the husband,' and the husband was entitled to the wife's choses
in action,2 it followed that no tort action could be maintained by
a wife against her husband.3 Under the common law theories of the
status of married persons, if a cause of action were to be recognized in
the wife for the wrongdoing of the husband, he would be under a duty
of compensating himself,4 and would have to be both the plaintiff
and defendant, since the wife could sue and be sued only through her
husband.5
The general disability of the wife to sue in her own name has been
removed in modern times by the Married Woman's Acts which typi-
cally provide that a married woman may sue and be sued as if un-
married.6 Under these statutes the courts recognize the right of the
2-In Borst v. Borst, 251 P. (2d) 149 (Wash. 1952) the court, citing the Signs
case with full approval, and disapproving its own holding in the Roller case, allowed
recovery to a child injured by his father's negligence in the operation of a truck in
which the child was not a passenger. After a thorough review of the reasons com-
monly given to support the immunity of the parent from liability, the court de-
clared: "The reasons for the rule do not exist, and the mantle of immunity there-
fore disappears, where the tort is committed by the parent while dealing with the
child in a nonparental transaction." 251 P. (2d) 149, 156. McCurdy, Torts Between
Persons in Domestic Relation (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. iolo at 1079, advocates such a
view.
'Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. ed. si8o (191o);
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936); Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21
Ohio App. 11o, 153 N. E. 93 (1925); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.
W. 628 (1915).
2
Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss 61, 1oo So. 591 (1924); Prosser, Torts (1941) 898.
3Spector v. Weisman, 40 F. (2d) 792 (C. A. D. C. 193o); Newton v. Weber, ixg
Misc. 240, 196 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1922); Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 11o,
153 N. E. 93 (1925); 41 C. J. S., Husband and Wife § 396.
'Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 24o at 242, 196 N. Y. Supp. 113 at 114 (1922);
Harper, Torts (1933) §288.
5Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N. E. 462 at 463 (1896); Harper, Torts
(1933) § 288.
03 Vernier, American Family Laws (1935) § 179 states that thirty-one states have
statutes of this type.
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wife to sue her husband to protect her property interests against tor-
tious injury,7 but in regard to suits for personal torts, there is still dis-
agreement.8 Though the Married Woman's Acts are usually in such
general terms as to allow courts to recognize by implication the right
of the wife to sue her husband for personal torts, the statutes are not
so specific on this point as to require the recognition of the right.9
The question thus becomes whether the legislation shall be construed
as having abrogated the entire common law restriction against a
married woman suing for wrongs committed against her, including
those of the husband, or merely as having given her a remedy of suit
in her own name to enforce any cause of action that could have been
enforced by action in the joint names of husband and wife prior to
the enactment of the statute. If the latter is the correct interpreta-
tion, no action can be brought by a wife against her husband for a
personal tort since no right of action against the husband was rec-
ognized in the wife at common law, and the Married Woman's Act
would create no new causes of action.
Representing the majority view10 is the recent Virginia decision of
Furey v. Furey,"1 a case of first impression on the precise issue pre-
sented.' 2 Plaintiff brought an action against her husband for damages
for personal injuries suffered, before the marriage of the parties, as
a result of the defendant's gross negligence in the operation of an auto-
7 Prosser, Torts (1941) 900.
'Harper, Torts (1933) § 288. For the division of the states see note io, infra.
"A table of the states and United States possessions and the relevant Married
Woman's Act of each may be found in 3 Vernier, American Family Laws (1935)
§§ 179, i8o; Prosser, Torts (1941) 9o2. New York amended its Married Woman's
Statute in 1937 so as expressly to authorize personal tort actions between husband
and wife. New York Dom. Rel. Law § 57 as amended by N. Y. Laws (1937) c. 669,
§ 1.
O0The states following the majority rule are: California, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. The states
following the minority rule are: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
North Carolina, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Wisconsin. Also see Notes (92o) 6 A. L. R. io38; (1924)
29 A. L. R. 1482; (1934) 89 A. L. R. 118; (1946) 16o A. L. R. 14o6; (1926) 4 Wis. L.
Rev. 37.
U193 Va. 727, 71 S. E. (2d) 191 (1952).
2 The Virginia court held in Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96
S. E. 315, 1 A. L. R. 439 (1918) that a wife could not maintain an action against
her husband for a personal tort committed during coverture under the Virginia
Married Woman's statute, but the issue of an antenuptial tort was not involved in
that case.
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mobile in which plaintiff was a passenger. She contended that the Vir-
ginia Married Woman's statute providing that "A married woman
may ... sue and be sued in the same manner and with the same con-
sequences as if she were unmarried.. ."13 empowered her to bring the
present action. However, the circuit court sustained defendant's
plea in bar denying the right of a wife to sue her husband in tort, and
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for
defendant.
The Virginia court had held thirty-four years earlier that the
Married Woman's Act does not allow a wife to sue her husband for
a personal tort committed during coverture. 14 The principal case
now holds that the same reasoning applies to the case of an ante-
nuptial tort.15 In aligning itself with the majority by these two de-
cisions, the Virginia court has relied upon the usual reasons ad-
vanced in support of this view. The opinion declares that: The statute,
being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed;' 0
that if it had been the intent of the legislature to permit personal
tort actions between husband and wife, it would have been a simple
matter to have expressly so provided;17 and that the marriage relation-
ship, "upon the preservation of [the] integrity [of which] the health,
morals, and purity of the State is dependent,"' 5 must be protected,
and to allow an action for personal tort between spouses would tend to
disrupt the peace and harmony of the home.' 9 It is also suggested that
an unequal situation would result from giving the wife the right to sue
her husband, because there is no statute "removing the common law
inhibition against the husband's suing the wife for personal tort,"
20
138 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 55-36.
1tKeister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S. E. 315, i A. L. R. 439
(0918).
'1Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727 at 730, 71 S. E. (2d) 191 at 192 (1952).
'"Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S. W. 832 (igi6); Heyman v. Hey-
man, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 S. E. 25 (1917); Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S. W.
(2d) 1o84 (1933)-
ITlandfield v. Bandfield; 117 Mich. So, 75 N. W. 287 (1898); Leonardi v.
Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 11o, 153 N. E. 93 (1925); Fehr v. General Accident Fire &
Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N. W. (2d) 787, 16o A. L. R. 1402 (1944).
"sKeister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 176, 96 S. E. 315, 322, 1 A. L. R.
439, 449 (1918)-
'DYellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F. (2d) 626, 19 A. L. R. (2d) 1OO1 (C. A. D. C.
195o); Broaddus v. Wilkenson, 281 Ky. 6oi, 136 S. W. (2d) 1052 (1940); Lindley v.
Cusson, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 5i6 (1917). See Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 1o N. E. (2d) 547,
549 (1950-
'°Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 732, 71 S. E. (2d) 191, 194 (1952). Also Brandt
v. Keller, 347 Ili. App. 18, 1o5 N. E. (2d) 796 (1952).
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and therefore a husband would not have a cause of action against the
wife. As additional arguments for this rule it has been asserted that
the danger of collusion by the spouses against insurance companies
would be great if the wife could maintain an action against her hus-
band for personal injuries,21 and that each spouse has remedy enough
in the criminal and divorce courts.
22
The courts following the minority view23 argue that there should
be a legal remedy for every wrong,24 and construe the Married Woman's
statutes as having wholly abrogated the common law disability of
married women to sue, and as preserving the separate legal identity of
the wife.25 These authorities refute the arguments of the majority by
pointing out that: The Married Woman's Acts are remedial in nature
and should be broadly construed;20 that the courts following the ma-
jority rule allow the wife to sue her husband to protect her property
rights, and tnere is no gieater danger of disturbing the domestic tran-
quility by allowing actions for personal torts; 27 that the danger of many
trivial actions being brought for minor annoyances may be abated
by invoking a doctrine of assumption of risk or by recognizing the
special relationship between husband and wife as a basis for finding
an implied license as to unimportant acts which are technically torts;28
that the risk of collusion is involved in many well-recognized actions as
=See General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Morgan, 33 F. Supp. 19o,
192 (W. D. N. Y. 1940); Prosser, Torts, (1941) 9o3, n. 40.
-Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. ed. 118o (igo);
Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, ioo So. 591 (1924); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304,
24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877).
2See note 1o, supra.
-'Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P. (2d) 740 (1935); Courtney v. Courtney, 184
Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 66o (1938); Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022
(1914).
2Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 At. 889 (1914); Crowell v. Crowell, 18o
N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 2o6 (1920); Note (1949) 6 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 213, 217.
-'Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 66o (1938); Prosser v. Prosser,
114 S. C. 45, 1o2 S. E. 787 (1920).
"Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Crowell v. Crowell, 18o N.
C. 516, 1o5 S. E. 2o6 (1920); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 66o
(1938); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475, 48 A. L. R. 276 (1926).
3 Vernier, American Family Laws (1935) § 18o; Prosser, Torts (1941) 903;
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relation (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev.
13o0, 1055. It seems that under this theory the wife would not be considered as
having assumed the risk that her husband might beat or chastise her or deprive
her of her liberty, but would assume only the risks of the ordinary frictions of the
marital relationship. In the case of negligence, since the husband and wife are en-
gaged in a common enterprise, usually under the control of both and for the
common benefit, each would bear the risk of the actions which the other spouse
would take in the ordinary course of the marriage relationship.
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one of the hazards in the administration of justice, but this alone should
not defeat the cause of action; 29 that the spouses do not always have
sufficient remedy in the divorce and criminal courts, since neither
of the above courts would compensate the plaintiff for the injuries, and
these courts do not have jurisdiction over all torts-e.g., inflicting of a
personal injury by ordinary negligence is nowhere grounds for divorce
or criminal prosecution.30
Text writers purport to see a trend toward allowing a wife to
bring a tort action against her husband for personal tort.31 However,
the principal case and a recent Illinois case8 2 point to the strengthen-
ing of the majority view. 33 The Virginia court was virtually forced
to this result by its earlier decision in the Keister case. Though the
cases are distinguishable on the basis of the time of the occurrence of
the tort, an opposite decision in the principal case would have created
the anomaly of allowing recovery for antenuptial torts but not for
torts committed during coverture, whereas there seems to be no justi-
"See Brandt v. Keller, 347 Ill. App. i8, io5 N. E. (2d) 796, 8o (1952).
'*Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 at 338 (1917); Courtney v. Court-
ney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 660 at 666 (1938); Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42 Okla. 124, 140
Pac. 1022 1914); Prosser, Torts (1941) 903, n. 39.
3'Prosser, Torts (1941) 904; Harper, Torts (1933) § 288; 3 Vernier, American Fam-
ily Laws (1935) § i8o; Note (1949) 6 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 213, 217. The text writers
vigorously support the views of the minority courts, setting forth the same reasons
for their position as are advanced by the minority courts for the liberal interpreta-
tion of the Married Woman's Act.
"Brandt v. Keller, 347 Ill. App. 18, io 5 N. E. (2d) 796 (1952) (case of first im-
pression in Illinois holding wife could not maintain an action against husband for
personal tort committed during coverture under Illinois Married Woman's statute).
"There appear to be twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia follow-
ing the majority, and thirteen following the minority. In five of the latter states,
the rule has been established by cases of first impression within the past quarter
century: Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P. (2d) 740 (1935); Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho
440, 209 P. (2d) 733 (1949); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N. D. 191, 242 N. W. 526
(1932); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S. D. 53, 298 N. W. 266 (1941); Wait v. Pierce, 191
Wis. 202, 20o9 N. W. 475, 48 A. L. R. 276 (1926). New York adopted the rule by
statute in 1937. N. Y. Laws (1937) c. 699, § i. In the same period, ten states have
adopted the majority rule in cases of first impression: Corren v. Corren, 47 So. (2d)
774 (Fla. 1950); Brandt v. Keller, 347 Ill. App. 18, 1o5 N. E. (2d) 796 (1952); Furst-
enburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 At. 534 (1927); Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont.
425, 15 P. (2d) 922 (1932); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 18o,
216 N. W. 297 (1927); Von Laszewski v. Von Laszewski, 99 N. J. Eq. 25, 133 At. 179
(1926); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 Ad. 663, 104 A. L. R. 1267
(1936); Comstock v. Comstock, io6 Vt. 5o, 169 Atl. 903 (1934); Poling v. Poling, 116
W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 604 (1935); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P. (2d)
940 (1943). No decision has been found in which a court has changed from one view
to the other during that time.
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fication for different results. 34 Furthermore, the Virginia legislature
apparently approves the view of the Keister case, inasmuch as it has
shown no inclination during thirty-four years to amend the Married
Woman's Act so as to repudiate the court's earlier construction. 35 Since
the court has now extended its previous application of the majority
view and since the legislature indicates no desire to overthrow the
rule by revising the statute, it appears that Virginia will not in the
foreseeable future join any trend toward recognizing a wife's right to
sue her husband for a personal tort. LAWENCE C. MR
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY INFLICTED ON EMPLOYEE BY As-
SAULT OF FELLOW WORKER AS "ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT."
[Mississippi]
Since Workmen's Compensation Acts almost invariably specify that
an injury to an employee is compensable only if it "arises out of his
employment,"' the courts must continually decide whether particular
injuries so qualify-a task that frequently proves troublesome because
of the obvious vagueness of the requirement. In 1952 the Supreme
Court of Mississippi in Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pitt-
man,2 a vivid case of first impression, was confronted with the issue of
whether the injury inflicted by the personal assault of one workman
upon a fellow workman met this prerequisite to the awarding of com-
pensation.
Claimant, a Negro boy sixteen years old, and his assailant, a white
man, were employed in laying a concrete floor in a garage. The boy
brought the concrete into the garage in a wheelbarrow which he
filled from a cement mixer located outside the building. After the
"'The English courts now allow the wife to recover for antenuptial tort, but deny
the wife the right to maintain an action against her husband for a personal tort com-
mitted during coverture. The courts justify this apparent inconsistency by reasoning
that the cause of action which the wife acquires before marriage is a right of prop-
erty, and when the plaintiff marries the defendant the action becomes her separate
property within the meaning of the Married Woman's Act, and by the same Act the
plaintiff is entitled to enforce the action against the defendant. See Note (1949) 12
Mod. L. Rev. 93.
3This statute has been amended three times since 1918. Va. Code (1919) § 5134;
Va. Acts (1932) 21; Va. Acts (195o) 46o.
2Prosser, Torts (1941) 528; 6 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text (3 d ed.
1948) § 1542; 58 Am. Jur. 716.
259 S. (2d) 547 (Miss. 1952).
1953]
134 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
concrete was emptied from the wheelbarrow, it was the job of claim-
ant's assailant to spread the mixture over the floor with a shovel. When
the mixer became empty, there was of necessity a few minutes while
the mixer was being refilled during which neither the Negro boy nor
the white man had any duties to perform. During one such interval,
the assailant lit the last cigarette in a package and then crumpled the
package into a small ball and tossed it at the claimant, striking him
in the back of the neck. The boy picked up a small pebble and tossed
it at the white man, hitting him on the neck or shoulder. Each worker
when hit had his back turned to the other, and no injury was inflicted
on either employee thereby. While the claimant stood by the wheel-
barrow, waiting for it to be refilled from the mixer, his assailant
walked over behind him and "struck him a tremendous blow on the
back of the head with the shovel with which he was working." The
blow knocked the claimant unconscious, fractured his skull, and in-
flicted a serious and permanent brain injury. An award in his favor
was made by the Workmen's Compensation Commission, which award
was affirmed by the circuit court. His employer's insurance company
then brought the case before the Supreme Court of Mississippi, con-
tending principally that the evidence did not show that the injury
arose "out of and in the course of employment" so as to be compen-
sable under the state's Workmen's Compensation Act.3
The award was affirmed, over the dissent of two judges, by the Su-
preme Court of Mississippi, which found that although the cause of the
injury was a willful assault and battery, yet since "the employment
and the nature of the work brought Pittman and Stewart in close
contact with each other,... one of the hazards of this contact was that
of an assault committed by one employee upon another, [and] under
our compensation law the injured employee is entitled to compensa-
tion for injury resulting from such a hazard the same as he would be
if he had been injured by the machine in proximity to which he
was required to work, and... the injury from this hazard arose out of
and in the course of Pittman's employment." 4 A vigorous dissent, in
bitterly attacking the ruling that the injury arose out of the employ-
'Miss. Laws (1948) c. 354.
4Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 59 S. (2d) 547, 556 (Miss.
1952). In Joe N. Miles & Sons v. Myatt, 61 S. (2d) 39o (Miss. 1952), the court referred
to the quoted portion of the principal case opinion as indicating that the employer
also assumes the risk of injury to an employee resulting from "horseplay" between
friendly employees. The decision was limited, however, to the situation in which the
injured party was not the aggressor in the horseplay.
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ment, asserted that the decision means that "even though the injury
results from personal malice on the part of the wrongdoer towards
the injured employee ... [and does not arise] out of the employment
other than in the sense that both were employed and were working at,
or about, the same place... every employer is the guarantor against
eccentricities, habits, temperament, disposition, inclinations, emotions,
and foolish whims of all his employees." 5
To obtain any effective understanding of decisions involving the
"arising out of employment" proviso, it is essential to remember that
no question of proximate causation, as that term is used in negligence
actions, is involved. A claimant is not required to show that his em-
ployment and his injury are so closely linked that the former would be
said in tort law terminology to be the proximate cause of the latter.6
However, since it would be both illogical and unconstitutional7 to
award compensation for injuries unrelated to employment, the "aris-
ing out of employment" proviso makes necessary the showing of a caus-
al connection between injury and employment.8 What degree of
causal connection will suffice is a matter of confusion in the courts
today.9 It has been generally held, especially in the earlier cases, that
'Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 59 S. (2d) 547, 556 (Miss.
1952).
"Truck Insurance Exchange v. Industrial Accident Comm., 27 Cal. (2d) 813, 167
P. (2d) 705 (1946); Fiarenzo v. Richards & Co., 93 Conn. 581, 107 At. 563 (1919);
Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 297 N. W. 19 (1941); Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Peters, 14 S. W. (2d) 1oo7 (Tex. Com. App. 1929); A. N. Campbell & Co.
v. Messenger, 171 Va. 374, 199 S. E. 511 (1938). "To incorporate in the phrase 'proxi-
mately caused by accident' all the conceptions of proximate cause in the law of
negligence would be to lug in at one door what the Legislature industriously put
out at another." City of Milwaukee v. Industrial Comm., 16o Wis. 238, 151 N. W.
247, 249 (1915).
7"It may be assumed that where an accident is in no manner related to the
employment, an attempt to make the employer liable would be so clearly unreason-
able and arbitrary as to subject it to the ban of the Constitution." Cudahy Packing
Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 423, 44 S. Ct. 153, 154, 68 L. ed. 366, 369, 30 A. L. R.
532, 535 (1923).
'Mulligan v. Oakes, 128 Conn. 488, 23 A. (2d) 870 (1942); General Properties Co.
v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 18 S. (2d) 9o8 (1944); Connor Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
374 Ill. 1o 5 , 28 N. E. (2d) 270 (194o); Carney v. Hellar, 155 Kan. 674, 127 P. (2d)
496 (1942); Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 196 S. E. 684 (1938).
"The following brutal but accurate description of many judicial opinions in
this field has been made: "The courts have struggled arduously and valiantly in
their attempts to decide whether a particular accident 'arises out of the employ-
ment.' The usual opinion, after a few preparatory remarks concerning the humane
character of compensation legislation and the liberal interpretation that should
be given to the act, customarily gives expression to one or more general formulas,
by which it professes to be guided in reaching a decision. It then follows with a
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the employment must expose the employee to the injury from risks
and hazards peculiar to that employment and to which the general
public is not subject.10 It is frequently stated that one's mere presence
at the place of employment and the doing of one's usual work at the
time of injury is insufficient to establish the requisite causal relation-
ship between injury and employment. 1 Yet there are numerous cases
in which the awarding of compensation seemingly is explainable only
on the basis that such a time-place coincidence will suffice.'
2
A survey of cases involving assaults by employees on co-employees
reveals no adequate test for determining whether the assault was suf-
ficiently linked with the employment to be compensable. Certain typi-
cal situations appear clearly to qualify-e.g.: where a timekeeper was
ordered by the company to withhold a co-employee's paycheck and
was assaulted by this employee following a dispute over the check;' 3
where an assault resulted from a quarrel among two employees as to the
proper amount of work each should do in alternately pushing a
large number of supposedly analogous cases from numerous jurisdictions, many dis-
similar and not a few irrelevant, and then with the air of a magician pulling the
rabbit out of the hat declares that it is clear that the accident involved in the
present case either does or does not arise out of the employment. It is not sur-
prising that conflict and confusion results." Brown, "Arising out of and in the
Course of the Employment" in Workmen's Compensation Laws-Part III (1932) 8
Wis. L. Rev. 134, 143.
"Consumers' Co. v. Industrial Comm., 324 Ill. 152, 154 N. E. 423 (1926);
Harvey v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil Co., 6. S. (2d) 742 (La. App. 1941); McNicol's
Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1913); Thier v. Widdifield, 21o Mich. 355, 178
N. W. 16 (192o); Slanina v. Industrial Comm., 117 Ohio St. 329, 158 N. E. 829
(1927); Carey v. Industrial Comm., 181 Wis. 253, 194 N. V. 339 (1923); Prosser,
Torts (1941) 533-
"Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., ig Cal. (2d) 622, 122
P. (2d) 570, 141 A. L. R. 798 (1942); Math Igler's Casino v. Industrial Comm., 394
I1. 33o, 68 N. E. (2d) 773 (1946); In re Betts, 66 Ind. App. 484, 118 N. E. 551 (1918);
Ricketts v. Story Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 155 S. W. (2d) 536 (Mo. App. 1941);
Hopper v. Industrial Comm., 71 Ohio App. 156, 48 N. E. (2d) 125 (1943); Archi-
bald v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 448, 87 S. E. 791 (siq6). See also 58 Am. Jur. 719.
"2Boris Construction Co. v. Haywood, 214 ,Ala. 162, io6 So. 799 (1925) (truck
driver killed by stray bullet fired a block away by small boy shooting at birds);
Harivel v. Hall-Thompson Co., 98 Conn. 753, 12o At. 603 (1923) (traveling salesman
injured in fire at hotel at which he was staying); Filitti v. Lerode Homes Corp.,
244 N. Y. 291, 155 N. E. 579 (1927) (cornice fell from building injuring laborer on
adjoining lot); Consolidated Pipe Line Co. v. Mahon, 152 Okla. 72, 3 P. (2d) 844
(1931) (during sudden thunderstorm outdoor worker took shelter in old house
which shortly thereafter was struck by lightning); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Mac-
Kendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S. E. 46 (1928) (newspaper employee driving car
through woodland was killed when a violent storm blew down a tree on the car).




truck;14 and where an assault stemmed from an argument over the
use of a pencil.15 Such situations are illustrative of the well-established
principles that compensation will be allowed for an assault by a fellow
employee where the person injured is a supervisory employee acting to
discipline a worker or to withhold wages on company orders, 16 or
where the assault arises from an altercation as to how the work shall
be done,' 7 or as to who is entitled to possession of a tool used in the
work.18 However, where the assault originates in matters of a purely
personal nature, recovery is usually denied-e.g.: where a remark by
one employee to a co-employee's wife precipitated an assault by the
husband;' 9 where a worker refused to lend money to the assailant;
20
and where the refusal of a white employee to share drinking water
with a Negro co-employee brought on an assault by the latter.2' The
reasoning in such cases is that the employment is too remotely related
to the injury because the assault is made solely to gratify the assailant's
feeling of anger or hatred and is directed at the employee as an individ-
ual and not as an employee. 22
While some such situations can be readily classified as either in-
volving or not involving sufficient causal connection between injury
and employment to justify compensation, the difficult problems appear
in incidents such as gave rise to the principal case, where elements of
both employment and personal actions blend to form a "twilight"
zone. In the Pittman case the assault occurred during working hours
and during an interval when assailant and victim were required by
the nature of their work to stand idly by, a situation which might
reasonably be considered as conducive to horseplay and resulting
'4Hinchuk v. Swift 9- Co., 149 Minn. 1, 182 N. W. 622 (1921).
"Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Culpepper, 82 S. W. (2d) 1054 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
"Polar Ice & Fuel Co. v. Mulray, 67 Ind. App. 270, l19 N. E. 149 (1918); Hansen
v. Frankfort Chair Co., 249 Ky. 194, 60 S. W. (2d) 349 (1933); Winter v. U. S.
Gypsum Co., 2o N. J. Misc. 425, 28 A. (2d) 545 (1942); 58 Am. Jur. 768.
1-6 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text (3 d ed. 1948) 131.
'-Ashley v. F-W. Chevrolet CO., 222 N. C. 25, 21 S. E. (2d) 834 (1942); Indus-
trial Comm. v. Pora, loo Ohio St. 218, 125 N. E. 662 (1919); Indian Territory Il-
luminating Oil Co. v. Jordan, 140 Okla. 238, 283 Pac. 240 (1929).
1 1Elrod v. Union Bleachery, 204 S. C. 481, 3o S. E. (2d) 73 (1944).
'-OSchlener v. American News Co., 24o N. Y. 622, 148 N. E. 732 (1925).
-"City of Chicago v. Industrial Comm., 292 Ill. 4o6, 127 N. E. 49, 15 A. L. R. 586
(1 2o).
nStulginski v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co., 124 Conn. 355, 199 Ati. 653 (1938);
Kentucky Fluorspar Co. v. Volford, 263 Ky. 471, 92 S. W. (2d) 753 (1936); Hor-
vath v. La Fond, 3o5 Mich 69, 8 N. W. (2d) 915 (1943); Continental Life Ins. Co.
v. Gough, 161 Va. 755, 172 S. E. 264 (1934).
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assaults. 23 Clearly, however, the incidents which precipitated the as-
sault neither were intended to serve the interests of the employer nor
did serve them in fact. The assault seems to have been motivated purely
out of anger and was made to obtain revenge for what the assailant
considered a personal affront. Every injury results from a combination
of numerous factors, and when an injury occurs during working hours
at the place of employment, it is almost impossible not to regard the
employment as some sort of contributing cause thereof.24 But when
liability is to be imposed on the company in certain of such cases and
denied in others, it would seem that the courts must have some cri-
terion with which to work. In finding that the injury "arose out of
the employment," the majority in the Pittman case appears to use a
"but for" test-i.e., that the employment was an essential element in the
occurrence of the injury in the sense that if it had not been for the fact
of employment no injury would have occurred. The test that the dis-
senting justices thought appropriate is more obscure. Apparently they
would have found liability only if the assault had been for the purpose
of serving some real or fancied interest of the employer or if the em-
ployer had had reason to know that such an assault might occur be-
tween these particular employees. In essence, however, their refusal to
concur with the rest of the court appears to have been founded not on
the espousal of any affirmative test of their own but upon the conviction
that the test utilized by the majority makes the employer an absolute
insurer of his workers as to personal assaults by a co-employee com-
mitted during working time.
The ground of decision selected by the majority is so excessively
broad as to justify the fears of the dissent. Stripped of surplusage and
make-weights, the ratio decidendi of the Pittman case is that a personal
assault by a fellow employee is made one of the hazards of employ-
ment by the mere fact that the employees work together in close as-
sociation. Some men are friendly, peaceful, and slow to anger; others
are unfriendly, belligerent, and temperamental. According to the ma-
2Gillmore v. Ring Construction Co., 227 Mo. App. 1217, 61 S. W. (2d) 764 (1933).
The decisions are in conflict as to whether injuries incurred in friendly horseplay
between employees on the job are compensable. Since the principal case was decided,
the Mississippi Court has held such injuries to be within the scope of the Compensa-
tion Act, where the injured party was not the aggressor. Joe N. Miles & Sons v.
Myatt, 61 S. (2d) 390 (Miss. 1952). Justice Roberds who dissented in the principal
case, wrote the court's opinion in the Myatt case, declaring that he was not in ac-
cord with the decision but felt compelled to hold horseplay injuries compensable
because *the court had already ruled malicious injuries to be under the Act.
2'Prosser, Torts (1941) 533-
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jority opinion, when an employer hires a group of men of varying
personalities, races, religions, and national origins, assaults between
such employees while on the job are to be considered the normal and
natural product of their working together. Under this approach, the
temperamental explosion of claimant's assailant may be likened to the
physical explosion of a machine at the place of employment, a situa-
tion in which compensation would be awarded. In both cases the
"machine," human or mechanical, was an essential part of the em-
ployer's business, and claimant was compelled to be in its presence to
do his work; and in neither case could claimant choose the quality of
machine with which he should work, since that was a matter wholly
determined by his employer. It has also been asserted that a trivial in-
cident, such as the throwing of the paper and the pebble in the prin-
cipal case, frequently precipitates an assault which is really the cul-
mination of a long sequence of irritations between employees that
were produced by their associations on the job.
2
5
It must be acknowledged that considerable case following exists
for the theory of the Pittman case. 26 Justices Cardozo and Rutledge,
prior to their elevation to the United States Supreme Court, handed
down two notable decisions frequently quoted in support of the view.
2 7
Nevertheless, the present weight of authority indicates that one's mere
presence at the place of employment and doing the usual work at the
time of injury does not establish such a causal connection between in-
2"Personal animosities are created by working together on the assembly line
or in traffic. Others initiated outside the job are magnified to the breaking point
by its compelled contacts. No worker is immune to these pressures and impacts
upon temperament. They accumulate and explode over incidents trivial and im-
portant, personal and official. But the explosion point is merely the culmination
of the antecedent pressures." Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 72
App. D. C. 52, 112 F. (2d) 11, 17 (1940).
- 1Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 72 App. D. C. 52, 112 F. (2d)
11 (1940); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 26 Cal. (2d)
286, 158 P. (ad) 9 (1945); Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Clendennin, 81 Ind. App. 323,
143 N. E. 303 (1924); Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E.
711, 13 A. L. R. 522 (1920); Verschleiser v. Joseph Stern & Sons, 229 N. Y. 192, 128
N. E. 126 (1920); Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N. C. 28, 153 S. E. 594 (193o).
nLeonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 47o , 128 N. E. 711, 13 A. L. R.
522 (1920); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 72 App. D. C. 52, 112 F.
(2d) 11 (1940). Regarding the latter decision one of the dissenting Justices in the
principal case observed: "The Hartford case has been given undue weight because
Justice Rutledge, the writer of the opinion, later became a member of the Supreme
Court of the United States. However, I think it must be admitted that much of the
meaning is obscured by the language used in the opinion. Also a considerable part
of the opinion is a discourse upon philosophy and social relations-not an analysis
of legal principles." Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 59 S. (2d)
547, 561 (Miss. 1952)-
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jury and employment as to satisfy the "arising out of the employment"
proviso.28 Such a test of liability as the principal case advances would
make it virtually impossible for any assault by one worker on another
not to be compensable if it occurred while the men were on the job.
Further, while trivial incidents may ignite long-smouldering animosi-
ties produced by close association in employment, no proof of the ex-
istence of such a situation was made in the principal case, nor did the
court intimate that such proof was necessary.29 On the bare proof of
an assault by a co-employee while at work, the Mississippi court was
ready to assume the validity of such a speculative origin of the assault.
The causative danger here was not peculiar to the work in any realistic
sense, for as one of the dissenting justices observed: ". . . Stewart would
just as likely and quickly have gone haywire and attacked Pittman had
they been at a baseball game as he did under the circumstances here."3 0
The result reached in the Pittman case points up a growing ten-
dency among the courts to pay only lip service to the "causal relation-
ship" requirement. Workmen's Compensation Acts are construed with
liberality in favor of the employee,31 and such a policy of construction
appears to have led naturally over a period of years to a steady erosion
of the amount of causal relationship needed to obtain an award. One
of the basic theories behind such Acts is that payment for injuries in-
cidental to employment should be borne by the employer as an or-
dinary cost of business, a cost which can be passed on to consumers in
the form of higher prices for the employer's goods and services.32 The
fact that the cost falls not directly on the employer but only indirectly
on a vague group called the consuming public, coupled with the pur-
28See note i , supra.
19But see Edelweiss Gardens v. Industrial Comm., 290 Ill. 459, 125 N. E. 260,
262 (1959) quoting from C. E. Peterson & Co. v. Industrial Board, 281 I1. 326, 117
N. E. 1o33, 1035 (1917): "Liability cannot rest upon imagination, speculation, or
conjecture, upon a choice between two views equally compatible with the evidence,
but must be based upon facts established by evidence fairly tending to prove them."
8°Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 59 S. (2d) 547, 559 (Miss.
1952).
"'Krupp v. J. C. Penny Co., 51 Ariz. 228, 75 P. (2d) 692 (1938); Haverly v. Union
Const. Co., 236 Iowa 278, 18 N. W. (2d) 629 (1945); Schenck's Case, 293 Mass. 526,
2oo N. E. 266 (1936); Jones v. Herbert Equities, 186 Misc. 163, 6o N. Y. S. (2d) 88
(1946); Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal Co., 179 Va. 790, 2o S. E. (2d) 530 (1942);
Felty v. Compensation Com'r, 124 W. Va. 75, i9 S. E. (2d) 9o (1942).
2Birchett v. Tuf-Nut Garment Mfg. Co., 205 Ark. 483, 169 S. W. (2d) 574 (1943);
Stapf v. Savin, 125 Conn. 563, 7 A. (2d) 226 (1939); Hays v. Illinois Terminal
Transp. Co., 363 Ill. 397, 2 N. E. (2d) 309 (1936); Archibald v. Employers' Liability
Assur. Corp., 2o2 La. 89, 11 S. (2d) 492 (1942); Westchester Lighting Co. v. West-
chester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N. Y. 175, 15 N. E. (2d) 567 (1938).
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pose of the Acts to afford dependable protection for injuries in any way
significantly linked with employment, 33 has been a potent inducement
for courts to sustain somewhat dubious awards originally made by an
administrative board. However, it appears questionable that even the
liberal social purpose underlying the Acts meant to guarantee a near
certain form of insurance for assaults made while on the job by a co-
employee without regard to motive.
THOmAS C. DAMEWOOD
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO THIRD PARTY
SUSTAINING Loss THROUGH INJURY TO EMPLOYEE RECEIVING COM-
PENSATION. [New Jersey]
It is generally agreed that Workmen's Compensation legislation
serves the twofold purpose of providing the injured employee with a
prompt, sure, and definite recovery for injuries suffered in the course
of employment, and of relieving the employer of liability to the em-
ployee based on common law tort principles.1 However, the question
of whether an employer may still be liable to third parties who may
sustain a loss through the injury to the employee continues to confront
the courts. A majority of the courts have ruled that employee's next
of kin cannot recover benefits under the Death Acts, because the Work-
men's Compensation statutes provide for recovery in the event of the
employee's death, and the employee's being covered by Workmen's
Compensation cuts off any right his next of kin would otherwise have
had.2 It is reasoned that the deceased has "the power to sell out the
Koeppel v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours 9. Co., 7 W. W. Harr. 369, 183 At. 516
(Del. 1936); Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940);
Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Comm., io3 Utah 371, 135 P. (2d) 266 (1943).
'Thus, the cost of accidental injuries to workmen becomes a part of the cost
of business, borne by the general consumer rather than the unfortunate workman.
i Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (3d ed. 1941) § 3, and cases there cited. Also,
the Acts cover only accidental injuries and, frequently, occupational diseases. How-
ever, they seldom include intentional wrongs by the employer. 1 Schneider, Work-
men's Compensation (3d ed. 1941) § 2.
2Elliott v. Armour & Co., 3o F. Supp. 367 (E. D. S. C. 1939); Bigby v. Pelican
Bay Lumber Co., 173 Ore. 682, 147 P. (2d) 199 (1944). This is true regardless of the
fact that deceased may have left no dependents so that there could be no award
under the Workmen's Compensation laws. Chamberlain v. Florida Power Corp.,
144 Fla. 719, 198 So. 486 (1940); Atchison v. May, 2oi La. 1oo3, 1o S. (2d) 785 (1942).
But there can be recovery beyond the workmen's compensation award where the
employer was grossly negligent or deliberately intended the death of the employee.
McAlester v. Sinclair Refining Co., 146 F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1944); Morrison
v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 278 Ky. 746, 129 S. W. (2d) 547 (1939).
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claim of the beneficiaries before it has come into existence." 3 Further,
a parent cannot recover from the employer when an injured child-em-
ployee is covered by Workmen's Compensation, because the child's
recovery includes the loss of wages and hospitalization expenses which
the parent could recover at common law.4 Various other third party
claims asserted in isolated cases have generally been held unenforce-
able.5
In the recent case of Danek v. Hommer,6 the New Jersey Supreme
Court, over the dissent of the Chief Justice, followed the same exclu-
sionary approach to Workmen's Compensation legislation in denying
a husband's right to recover for loss of consortium of an injured wife-
employee. There had been an injury to the plaintiff's wife for which
she had received a Workmen's Compensation award, and thereafter
plaintiff brought suit against the employer for the husband's loss of
consortium due to his wife's injuries. Plaintiff admitted that the legis-
lature could bar such an action, but contended it had not done so in
express terms, and that the court should not imply the abolition of the
common law right. The New Jersey Act 7 provides for an agreement
3Prosser, Torts (1941) 968.
'Courage v. Carleton, 77 A. (2d) ill (N. H. 195o); Deluhery v. Sisters of St.
Mary, 244 Wis. 254, 12 N. W. (2d) 49 (1943). "A parent's common law action for
loss of services of a minor is generally held to be abrogated by the 'exclusive of
all other remedies' provision of the compensation acts." i Schneider, Workmen's
Compensation (3 d ed. 1941) § 96 (c).5 fBankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Hardware & Forging Co., 77 Ohio App.
121, 62 N. E. (2d) 18o (1945) (after a recovery under Workmen's Compensation
for the death of three employees in an explosion caused by using the wrong type of
gas, employer, even if negligent, held not liable to gas company which had been
held liable in a suit by the deceased employees' dependents); Monteleone v. Canter
Storage Warehouses, 68 N. Y. S. (2d) 369 (App. Div. 1946) (recovery for a minor
employee's death under Workmen's Compensation held to be exclusive and par-
ent's common law action against employer barred, even though minor was illegally
employed); Cf. Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp.,
278 N. Y. 175, 15 N. E. (2d) 567 (1938) (third party, who had paid judgment for
workman's death, recovered from employer whose negligence also contributed to
the death, even though Workmen's Compensation would have barred a suit by de-
ceased employee's administratrix against employer).
69 N. J. 56, 87 A. (2d) 5 (1952).
7N. J. Laws (191i) c. 95, p. 134: "An Act prescribing the liability of an em-
ployer to make compensation for injuries received by an employe in the course
of employment, establishing an elective schedule of compensation, and regulating
procedure for the determination of liability, and compensation thereunder."
N. J. S. A. (1937), R. S. 34:15-7: "When employer and employee shall by agree-
ment, either express or implied, as hereinafter provided, accept the provisions of
this article compensation for personal injuries to, or for the death of, such employee
by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment shall be made by
the employer without regard to the negligence of the employer, according to the
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whereby the employee receives compensation from the employer, re-
gardless of the latter's negligence, for injuries suffered within the
course of the employment. The agreement is expressly stipulated to
constitute a surrender of other rights of the parties thereto and to bind
the employee, his personal representatives, and his widow and next of
kin, as well as the employer. The trial court ruled that the remedy
under the Act was exclusive as to the employee and placed an absolute
limitation on the employer's liability. The Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey affirmed the summary judgment for defendant, holding that with
the award to the wife "any action in tort that the husband had by
virtue of the marital status of his employee-wife" was precluded.8 In
the view of the majority of the court, the controlling purpose of Work-
men's Compensation was to provide one award which would relieve
the employer of all liability quickly and with little litigation, such
award extinguishing all common law rights and liabilities which might
have formerly arisen out of the injury compensated. The dissenting
Justice argued that the husband's right to consortium was "personal
to him and independent of any cause of action his wife might have," 9
and was therefore not abrogated by the exclusion section of the Act,
and not compensated for by the award to the wife.
The cases in which a spouse is the third party who is bringing suit
against the employer can readily be distinguished from those actions
brought under a Wrongful Death Act by the employee's next of kin
or brought by a parent of a child-employee. In neither of the latter
situations does the plaintiff have an independent right, except as such
may have been created by statute. The Wrongful Death Acts generally
provide for recovery by the next of kin only if the deceased, had he
not died, could have recovered for the injury.'0 Since the deceased em-
schedule contained in sections 34:15-12 and 34:15-13 of this title in all cases except
when the injury or death is intentionally self-inflicted, or when intoxication is the
natural and proximate cause of the injury, and the burden of the proof of such
fact shall be upon the employer."
N. J. S. A. (1937), R. S. 34:15-8: "Such agreement shall be a surrender by the
parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compen-
sation or determination thereof than as provided in this article and an acceptance
of all the provisions of this article, and shall bind the employee himself and for
compensation for his death shall bind his personal representatives, his widow and
next of kin, as well as the employer, and those conducting his business during
bankruptcy or insolvency."
sDanek v. Hommer, 9 N. J. 56, 87 A. (2d) 5, 7 (1952).
Danek v. Hommer, 9 N. J. 56, 87 A. (2d) 5, 8 (1952).
1 Hyba v. C. A. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N. E. (2d) 564 (1939);
Emands v. Olson, 64 R. I. 39, 9 A. (2d) 86o (1939); McCormick, Damages (1935)
§§ 93, 94.
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ployee could not have recovered except under Workmen's Compensa-
tion, the Death Act confers no right on the next of kin. And at common
law a parent could recover loss of wages and hospitalization expenses
when his child was tortiously injured, because he had complete con-
trol over the child's earnings."' This common law right is abolished
where the child has a recovery under Workmen's Compensation,' 2 be-
cause the child's recovery includes the loss of wages and hospitaliza-
tion fees which the parent could have recovered. 13 In the Danek case,
on the other hand, the husband has suffered a personal injury which at
common law afforded him an independent right of action not derived
from the injured wife, and which is not expressly provided for by the
Workmen's Compensation statutes.'
4
The Danek case turns primarily on the interpretation of the ap-
plicable provisions of the New Jersey statute. The majority clearly
states its conclusion as to the meaning of this legislation, insofar as it
applies to plaintiff's rights of consortium: ".... the common law remedy
in tort falls by reason of the statutory contract for compensation, based
not upon the principle of tort but on remuneration regardless of
fault to the injured employee. With it fell any action in tort that the
husband had by virtue of the marital status of his employee-wife ....
This seems to be so implicit in the statute that it is as much a part of
it as if it had actually been therein expressed."' 5 But this conclusion
is not supported by any reasons in the opinion, and is apparently based
on the preconceived notion that the essence of Workmen's Compensa-
tion statutes lies in protection for employers from any liability except
for benefit payments as scheduled in the Act. If this were the exclusive
purpose of the legislation, the court's conclusion might be acceptable.
But it is arguable that the primary aim of the statutes is to insure to
the employee a quick and inexpensive award for injuries received
while on the job,16 and this purpose does not require the exclusion of
independent claims by third parties. The actual words of the statute,
nDanek v. Hommer, 9 N. J. 56, 87 A. (2d) 5, 8 (1952); McCormick, Damages
(1935) § 91.
12See note 4, supra.
1N. J. S. A. (1937), R. S. 34:15-15, 34:15-37; 4 Schneider, Workmen's Compen-
sation (3 d ed. 1945) § 1177 (n).
'4 See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Vanderbilt in Danek v. Hommer, 9
N. J. 56, 87 A. (2d) 5, 8 (1952).
I'Danek v. Hommer, 9 N. J. 56, 87 A. (2d) 5, 7 (1952)-
""The Workmen's Compensation Act was intended as a simple and speedy rem-
edy by way of compensation to the employee." Ex parte Puritan Baking Co., 2o8 Ala.
373, 94 So. 347, 349 (1922).
[Vol. X
CASE COMMENTS
which were inadvertently misquoted in the court's opinion, exclude
only claims of the employee and claims of those having derivative
rights based on the employee's death or injury.17 But the majority
would use the statute to exclude all claims of whatever nature grow-
ing out of the injury, once compensation has been given under the Act.
This action would seem to violate the rule that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be strictly construed, so that no rights not
specifically designated would be destroyed.'5 It also ignores the rule
of construction ". . . that if a statute enumerates the things upon which
it is to operate, every thing else must necessarily, and by implication,
be excluded from its operation and effect."' 9
The view of the New Jersey court makes more acute the unequal
operation of the Workmen's Compensation system as between married
and unmarried employees. Under the conclusions of the Danek case,
part of the wife's award compensates the husband for his loss of con-
sortium. Yet an unmarried employee in the same position would have
received the same award, presumably all for her personal losses. This
inconsistency would tend to deny that it is "implicit in the statute"
that the husband's rights fell with the passing of the Act.
The weight of authority is heavily in accord with the decision of the
Danek case. 20 However, the recent federal case of Hitaffer v. Argonne
Co., Inc.21 involving a statute22 similar to that under consideration in
the principal case and facts different only in that it was a plaintiff-
17N. J. S. A. (1937) R. S. 34:15-8 (see note 7, supra). Compare the statute as
quoted by the New Jersey court: "... and shall bind the employee himself and
for compensation for his death and shall bind his personal representatives, his
widow and next of kin ... " Danek v. Hommer, 9 N. J. 56, 87 A. (2d) 5, 6 (1952).
[italics supplied.]
s'Crawford, Statutory Construction (1940) 486. And compensation laws are in
derogation of the common law. Liberato v. Royer, 270 U. S. 535, 46 S. Ct. 373, 70
L. ed. 719 (1926); Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., i9o S. C. -36, 2 S. E. (2d) 825
(1939).
2 Crawford, Statutory Construction (1940) § 195.
''Holder v. Elms Hotel Co., 338 Mo. 857, 92 S. W. (2d) 620, 1o4 A. L. R. 339
(1936); Sharp v. Producers' Produce Co., 226 Mo. App. 189, 47 S. W. (2d) 242 (1932);
Swan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 129 Misc. 5oo, 222 N. Y. S. 111 (1927); McVey v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 1o3 W. Va., 519, 138 S. E. 97 (1927); Guse v.
A. 0. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 51 N. W. (2d) 24 (x952). No cases holding contra
have been found, except Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F. (2d) 8ii (C. A. D. C.
195o), discussed in this comment, infra.
21183 F. (2d) 811 (C. A. D. C. 1950).
22"The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his
legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin and anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law ... " 44 Stat. 1426
(1927), 33 U. S. C. § 905 (1947).
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wife suing for loss of the injured husband-employee's consortium, al-
lowed recovery from the employer. The federal court reasoned:
"There can be no doubt but that this [exclusion) section is
designed to make the employer's liability under this statute ex-
clusive of any other liability ... to the injured employee or
anyone suing in the employee's right. But where a third person
is suing in his or her own right on account of the breach [of]
some independent duty owed them by the employer, even
through the operative facts out of which this independent right
and correlative duty arose are the same as those out of which
the injured employee recovers under the Act, the Act does not
proscribe the third person's cause of action .... There can be no
doubt ... the injury to the consortium is an injury to a right
which is independent of any right in the other spouse and to
which the defendant owes an independent duty. And in view of
the fact that this appellant is suing in her own right for the
breach of an independent duty owing her, we cannot saw that
the Act was designed to deprive her of her action.
Moreover it would be contrary to reason to hold that this
Act cuts off independent rights of third persons when the whole
structure demonstrates that it is designed to compensate in-
jured employees or persons suing in the employee's right on
account of employment connected disability or death. It can
hardly be said that it was intended to deprive third persons of
independent causes of action where the Act does not even pur-
port to compensate them for any loss."123
The better view under the present statutes appears to be to allow
recovery in the situation of the Danek case. Accurate statutory con-
struction is the issue, and the reasoning of the Hitaffer case, while it
stands alone on its holding, conforms more closely to the expressed
legislative intent. If policy considerations require exclusion of all third
party claims, the step should be taken by the legislatures in specific
terms, not by the courts through strained reasoning and illogical
statutory interpretation. If such change is made, consideration should
be given by the legislatures to the need for varying the Workmen's
Compensation awards on the basis of the employee's marital status,
in order that those with dependents and/or spouses with independent
causes of action may receive a proportionately greater award, in view
of the greater injury suffered by such employees and the third parties.
2 4
EDwARD L. OAsr, JR.
23183 F. (2d) 811, 819 (C. A. D. C. 1950).
"In case of death of the employee, but not injury alone, New Jersey is typical
in providing a proportionately greater award determined by the number of de-
pendents. N. J. S. A. (1937), R. S. 34:15-13. 4 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation,
Statutes (3d ed. 1939) 4424.
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